The constitutional rights of 'benefactor children' and 'saviour siblings' to bodily intergrity and autonomy by Du Plessis, Emma Kate
  
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ‘BENEFACTOR 
CHILDREN’ AND ‘SAVIOUR SIBLINGS’ TO BODILY 
INTEGRITY AND AUTONOMY 
 
By 
 
Emma Kate du Plessis  
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
of Magister Legum in the Faculty of Law at the Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University 
 
 
November 2011 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Prof. A. Govindjee 
Co-Supervisor: Adv. G. van der Walt 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I, Emma Kate du Plessis (206001240), hereby declare that the dissertation for 
Magister Legum is my own work and that it has not previously been submitted 
for assessment or completion of any postgraduate qualification to another 
University of for another qualification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.K. du Plessis                           Date  
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
                                                                                                                                Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………………….. i 
SUMMARY.………………………………………………………………………………….. ii 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION…………..…………………………………….… 1 
 
CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL LAW…………………………………………... 6 
2 1 Introduction……………………………………………………………….. 6 
2 2 International children’s rights instruments……………………………... 7 
2 3 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child………….. 7 
 2 3 1  The origin, negotiation and adoption of the UNCRC………….. 9 
 2 3 2  Optional Protocols to the UNCRC………………………………. 12 
 2 3 3  The underpinnings of the UNCRC………………………………. 12 
2 4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights…... 18 
2 5 World Medical Association Declaration of Ottawa on the Rights of 
the Child to Healthcare (Declaration of Ottawa)………………………. 
 
19 
2 6 Jurisdiction of international law in South African courts……………… 20 
2 7 Foreign law……………………………………………………………….. 21 
2 8 The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine…….. 22 
2 9 Regional law……………………………………………………………… 23 
2 10 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child………… 23 
2 11 Southern African Development Community (SADC)…………………. 25 
2 12 Conclusion………………………………………………………………… 27 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE HISTORY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, LAW AND THE ‘BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD TEST’ IN SOUTH AFRICA…………... 
 
28 
3 1 Introduction………………………………………………………………... 28 
3 2 Pre-colonial era…………………………………………………………… 28 
3 3 Colonial era……………………………………………………………….. 33 
3 4 Union years……………………………………………………………….. 38 
3 5 Apartheid regime…………………………………………………………. 39 
3 6 The ‘best interests of the child test’…………………………………….. 41 
3 7 Conclusion………………………………………………………………… 43 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN TO BODILY 
INTEGRITY AND AUTONOMY………………………………………… 
 
45 
4 1 Introduction………………………………………………………………..   45 
4 2 South African Constitutions……………………………….…………….. 46 
 4 2 1  Definition of a Constitution……………………………………….. 46 
4 3 The Interim Constitution…………………………………………………. 47 
4 4 The Final Constitution……………………………………………………. 48 
4 5 The Preamble and values of the Constitution…………………………. 49 
4 6 The Bill of Rights…………………………………………………………. 50 
 4 6 1  The rights in the Bill of Rights as they relate to children……… 52 
 4 6 2   Respect for a child’s right to autonomy………………………… 61 
4 7  The importance of the ‘best interests of the child’…….………………. 62 
4 8 Conclusion………………………………………………………………… 70 
 CHAPTER 5: SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION………………………………. 72 
5 1 Introduction.………………………………………………………………..   72 
5 2 Children’s Act……………………………………………………………...  73 
 5 2 1  General principles and special protective measures of the  
          Children’s Act as they relate to the health of children………… 
 
74 
 5 2 2  The distinction between medical treatment and surgical   
          operations…………………………………………………………. 
 
82 
 5 2 3  ‘Best interests of the child standard’……………………………. 83 
5 3 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act………………………………  86 
5 4 National Health Act and Human Tissue Act…………………………… 87 
 5 4 1  Existing national framework……………………………………… 88 
5 5 Conclusion………………………………………………………………… 92 
 
CHAPTER 6: TOMORROW’S MEDICINE – ‘BENEFACTOR CHILDREN’ 
AND ‘SAVIOUR SIBLINGS’: A MEANS TO AN END?............ 
 
95 
6 1 Introduction …….………………………………………….……………...   95 
6 2 A new way of organ and tissue donation – the age of ‘benefactor 
children’ and ‘saviour siblings’……………………..…………………….  
 
97 
6 3 ‘Saviour siblings’………………………………………………………….. 98 
 6 3 1  Definition and technique………………………………………….. 98 
 6 3 2  International and foreign law……………………………………. 101 
 6 3 3  National legislation………………………………………………... 108 
6 4 ‘Benefactor children’……………………………………………………… 118 
6 5 Conclusion………………………………………………………………… 124 
 
CHAPTER 7: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ‘BENEFACTOR 
CHILDREN’ AND ‘SAVIOUR SIBLINGS’: CONCLUDING 
REMARKS…………………………………………………………. 
 
 
127 
 
TABLE OF CASES ………………………………………………………………..... 135 
TABLE OF STATUTES …………………………………………………………………. 138 
BIBLIOGRAPHY …………………………………………………………………. 142 
 
i 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to acknowledge and express my sincere thanks and appreciation to: 
 
Prof. Avinash Govindjee – Supervisor and Associate Professor of Public Law at the 
NMMU Faculty of Law, for his invaluable supervision, continued support, guidance 
and dedication to this dissertation.  
 
Adv. Glynis van der Walt – Co-supervisor and Senior Lecturer of Private Law at the 
NMMU Faculty of Law, for her encouragement, support and kindness shown during 
the course of this dissertation. 
 
Prof. Narnia Bohler-Muller – Director of Research: Social Sciences at the Africa 
Institute of South Africa, for initially helping conceptualise the idea for this 
dissertation and setting me on course.  
 
My family for their unwavering motivation, encouragement, understanding and 
willingness to help me, when and where they could. 
 
To the One who placed the desire in my heart to see justice served and who gave 
me the capacity to do it, my Father God. 
 
The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation (NRF) towards this 
research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, 
are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the NRF. 
 
The Ernst and Ethel Eriksen Trust and the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 
for their financial assistance.  
 
 
ii 
 
SUMMARY 
 
In modern society, children are acknowledged as bearers of both children‟s rights 
and all other rights in the Bill of Rights which generally apply to children. One 
important right, outside of section 28, is that of bodily integrity or the right to control 
and decide what happens to their body. Therefore, children theoretically have the 
right to consent to medical treatment and surgery. However, children are generally 
deemed to lack the necessary maturity to make decisions of this nature and require 
parental consent before any medical procedure may be performed. Following the 
enactment of the Children‟s Act 38 of 2005, the age of consent for medical 
intervention was lowered to the uniform age of twelve. Children above the age of 
twelve are recognised as having the capacity to make their own decisions in respect 
of bodily integrity, whereas those under twelve still require parental consent. While 
this may be a positive development, it is potentially problematic for two groups of 
children, known as „benefactor children‟ and „saviour siblings‟.   
 
In the last 50 years, there has been a noticeable advancement in the field of genetic 
research. One such development is the possibility of creating one child to save the 
life of another through tissue or organ donation. This has provided options to parents 
of children with life threatening conditions where before, there was little hope of a 
cure. Now, at the request of these parents, children can be specifically “genetically 
engineered” as an embryo, to become a tissue or organ match to a sick sibling. 
These children are known as „saviour siblings‟.  
 
Another group of children has emerged. While not the result of “genetic engineering”, 
they serve a similar purpose in being potential life-saving donors to an ill sibling and 
are known as „benefactor children‟. Both categories of children enjoy the protection 
of fundamental rights. For those who are under twelve years of age however, the 
right to bodily integrity can be infringed upon by the proposed surgical removal of 
organs or tissue for the benefit of a sick sibling, based purely on a parent‟s consent. 
 
At stake too, is the right to reproductive autonomy. Parents bear children for a 
number of different reasons, which can include raising a child to save the life of 
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another. As they have the right to reproductive autonomy, adults are able to decide 
when they want children and for what reason they want children, which can include 
the various techniques used to bring about „saviour siblings‟.  
 
However, as rights are mutually interrelated and interdependent, they cannot be 
viewed in isolation. Therefore, it must be asked: does a person‟s right to reproductive 
autonomy, as guaranteed by the Constitution, justify interference with an embryo? 
As an embryo is not recognised in South African law as a legal subject, it will be 
difficult to justify interference with this right on this basis. 
 
The right to consent to medical intervention only from age twelve was described as 
potentially problematic for „benefactor children‟ and „saviour siblings‟, as parents with 
seriously ill children may become so emotionally burdened, that they place the 
welfare of the sick child over that of the healthy child. Thus, it is possible that parents 
will consent to any and all procedures on the „benefactor child‟ or „saviour sibling‟, 
regardless of the implications to the health and suffering of the healthy child. Section 
28(2) of the Constitution states that the child‟s best interests are of paramount 
importance but, it must be asked, whose best interests are more important when 
more than one child is involved?  As this is a decision parents are incapable of 
making at that time, the decision should be made by a neutral, impartial and 
unemotional third party such as the Court, which can be assisted by the Family 
Advocate and an ombudsman, who are experts in assisting children and promoting 
their best interests.   
 
Presently, South African law does not expressly address „saviour siblings‟. However, 
with few changes to the National Health Act and other Regulations, this is an area 
which could be regulated in time. These changes could include finalising the draft 
regulations as well as providing a list of the medical and dental purposes for which 
blood and tissue can be removed and should make specific reference to the removal 
of tissue, blood or blood products to treat a sick sibling. It is also imperative that 
South Africa regulates these matters now, as „saviour siblings‟ are no longer simply a 
matter for the future. Furthermore, legislation needs to be amended and enacted to 
prevent the law from becoming out-dated and redundant, leaving „benefactor 
children‟ and „saviour siblings‟ vulnerable while law is being drafted.  
iv 
 
In that international law is silent on the matter, South Africa would be well advised to 
consider foreign law such as the United Kingdom, in developing its law. As the 
United Kingdom has developed a National Board, so too should South Africa, as this 
would assist in regulating „saviour siblings‟ by allowing members to review each 
proposed case of „saviour siblings‟. This is merely one recommendation of several 
which could facilitate a smooth, controlled regulation of a highly emotional topic.  
 
Children remain one of the most vulnerable groups in society and their rights are 
often susceptible to infringement or abuse. It is incumbent on the law to ensure that, 
wherever possible, these rights are protected, especially as science continues to 
advance and it becomes more difficult to determine what is morally correct.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
As the Greek philosopher Heraclitus once said, the only constant is change.1 No 
more so is this sentiment reflected than in the fields of science and medicine. 
Research within these fields has led to their constant evolvement and advancement. 
 
Possibly, no field of science has changed the world more during the last 50 years 
than that of genetics. Due to the accelerating pace of genetic research, there are 
now considerable and increasing possibilities available to families that have a history 
of genetic illness.2 However, some of these possibilities bring with them much 
concern. One such recent possibility is the creation of one child to save the life of 
another.  
 
It can be presumed that any parent with a sick child will be prepared to go to any 
lengths to save that child. This may include the use of genetic and reproductive 
techniques to create a perfectly matched child to save the life of the sick child - that 
is, the creation of a ‘saviour sibling’. A ‘saviour sibling’ is a child who was conceived 
and selected as an embryo by his or her parents, specifically to be an organ or tissue 
donor for an ill sibling.3 With the aid of assisted reproductive techniques,4 scientists 
are now able to use their knowledge of human Deoxyribonucleic Acid(DNA)5 and the 
                                                          
1
 The quote used above is a variation to Heraclitus’ original quote. 
2
 Foreword by Baroness Helena Kennedy in Human Genetics Commission Making 
Babies:Reproductive Decisions and Genetic Technologies Report (January 2006) 3. See further BBC 
News “Concern over ‘spare part’ babies” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4663396.stm (accessed on 
18-10-2011). 
3
 Jacob “Frail Connections: Legal and Psychiatric Knowledge Practices in U.S. Adjudications over 
Organ Donations by Children and Incompetent Adults” in Freeman (ed) Children’s Health and 
Children’s Rights (2006) 219 219.A ‘saviour sibling’ has also been defined as “a child selected as a 
result of genetic screening to have some innate characteristic that will help save the life of an existing 
brother or sister.” Hocking & Ryrstedt “The Perils of Terminology and the ‘Saviour Sibling’ Dilemma” in 
Hocking (ed) The Nexus of Law and Biology: New Ethical Challenges (2009) 1 2. The term ‘saviour 
sibling’ is reported as having first appeared in the Journal of Medical Ethics October 2002. ‘Saviour 
siblings’ will be considered in substantially more detail in Chapter 6. 
4
 Assisted reproductive techniques include in-vitro fertilisation (IVF). 
5
 The scientific definition of DNA is “[a] macromolecule usually consisting of antiparallel polynucleotide 
chains held together by hydrogen bonds, in which the sugar residues are deoxyribose. The primary 
carrier of genetic information.” Klug & Cummings Essentials of Genetics 4
th
 ed (2002) G-5. For more 
information on the topic of DNA see chapter 10 onwards of the same book. 
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human genome to screen embryos for diseases and tissue-type them to be an exact 
match to an ailing sibling.6 
 
Not every situation, however, necessitates the creation of a ‘saviour sibling’, as a 
current sibling may also prove to be a tissue match. A child in this category is 
referred to as a ‘benefactor child’. A ‘benefactor child’ is defined as a child who was 
not selected as an embryo and who was not subjected to any scientific procedures, 
but who is nevertheless a tissue or organ donor for a sick sibling.7 That a sibling who 
is not the product of genetic and reproductive techniques can be a compatible match 
to a sick sibling is relatively slim, with only a one in four chance of there being a 
match.8 These slight odds of sibling compatibility, without specifically being 
conceived for the purpose of saving a sibling and, the equal scarcity of compatible 
organ donors, adds further support for calls for ‘saviour siblings’.9 
 
Public opinion generally influences the writing of law. In other words, that which is 
considered as being moral, should be permitted, whereas that which is perceived as 
unjust and immoral, should be prohibited.10 In recent years, the matter of ‘saviour 
siblings’ has become highly controversial and a cause for concern amongst the 
general population.11 There are some who have openly expressed their support for 
this development, while others have expressed their concern.12 Those who oppose 
‘saviour siblings’, have likened it to scientists and parents “playing God” and maintain 
that continued advancements in this area will result in society heading down a 
                                                          
6
 The double-helix structure of DNA was discovered in 1953 by James Watson and Francis Crick. 
Exactly 50 years later, and using the structure of DNA as a starting point, scientists have been able to 
map the entire genetic structure of humans. Alternatively called the human genome. 
7
 The term ‘benefactor child’ was created by the author. This term was created to define the children 
mentioned above, as the term ‘saviour sibling’ has a very precise meaning and could not be used to 
include children that already exist and who are used to save the life of a sick sibling. The word 
‘benefactor’ was used as it refers to “a person who supports or helps a person.” See Collins Shorter 
English Dictionary (1993) 99.    
8
 Braude, Pickering, Flinter & Ogilvie “Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis” 2002 (3)Nature Reviews 
Genetics 941 953. See further Chapter 6 on the discussion of ‘saviour siblings’ and ‘benefactor 
children’.  
9
 There are at least 3500 people in South Africa waiting for an organ transplant. See the organ donor 
foundation website at http://www.odf.org.za/ (accessed on 06-11-2011). 
10
 Swanepoel “A Proposed Legislative Framework for the Regulation of Aspects Pertaining to 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Therapeutic Cloning in South Africa” 2010 THRHR 1 2. 
11
 See specifically the reaction to ‘saviour siblings’ in the United Kingdom.  
12
 Those who are in favour of this development include most scientists and parents who seek to 
create a ‘saviour sibling’. 
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“slippery slope.”13 Although public opinion is important, before a decision can be 
made on the legality of ‘saviour siblings’,14 the rights of those involved need to be 
considered, as“constitutional rights are mutually interrelated and interdependent and 
form a single constitutional value system.”15 
 
The South African Constitution16 recognises the right to bodily integrity, which is 
inclusive of the right to make decisions concerning reproduction.17 The freedom to 
make decisions concerning reproduction protects a person’s right to have children or 
to not have children. This right, it can be argued, is therefore inclusive of any 
decision to undergo an abortion or to use any technique that will bring about the 
desired child.18 In other words, the right to reproductive autonomy can be said to 
extend to include the decision as to how to conceive a child and for what reason.19 
‘Benefactor children’ on the other hand are not necessarily affected by the 
reproductive rights and motivations on the part of parents, as are ‘saviour siblings’. 
However, through their genetic make-up, ‘benefactor children’ serve the same 
purpose as ‘saviour siblings’, that is to save the life of a sick sibling. 
 
The above issues pose a number of questions, which impact directly upon the rights 
children, including: Does a person’s right to reproductive autonomy, as guaranteed 
by the Constitution, justify interference with an embryo? Furthermore, can a parent 
consent to any and all procedures being carried out on a child? More specifically, 
                                                          
13
 The “slippery slope” is reference to ‘designer babies’. A ‘designer baby’ is defined as “[an] artificial 
creation of human beings with certain pre-determined characteristics through modification of an early 
embryo’s genetic structure.” Human Fertilisation and Embryology: A Framework for Legislation 
November White Paper 1987 para 37. In other words, these are children who have been designed to 
be a certain gender, to have a particular eye and hair colour, to be of a certain intelligence level and 
so on. Currently, gender selection is available in the United States of America. Elsewhere, sex 
selection is prohibited unless there is a sex-linked disease in the family. Doctors in America recently 
had to put a hold on their plans to offer parents the option of selecting eye and hair colour, due to the 
overwhelming negative response from the public. See Carte Blanche Medical: Designer Babies 
(2010).  
14
 The legality relates to their creation and purpose. 
15
De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) 2004 1 SA 406 (CC) 
para 55. 
16
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
17
 S 12(2)(a) of the Constitution 
18
 Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 308. The techniques referred to include in-
vitro fertilisation (IVF), preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and human leukocyte antigen (HLA) 
tissue typing. See Chapter 6 for more on these procedures.  
19
 People have children for a number of reasons. Some have children to show their love, others have 
them to increase the size of the labour force, and still there other people who have children to change 
the family dynamics. Therefore, the decision to have a ‘saviour sibling’ to save the life of a sick sibling, 
can be viewed as a reason why a couple has a child. 
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can a parent consent to a tissue or organ transplant from one child to another? Does 
a ‘benefactor child’ or ‘saviour sibling’ have the right to consent to or refuse medical 
treatment that may save the life of a sibling?  
 
With these questions in mind, the primary aim of this dissertation is to determine the 
content and nature of the rights to bodily integrity and autonomy and how it applies 
to a child making decisions in regard to his or her body. The secondary aim of this 
dissertation is to determine how the rights to bodily integrity and autonomy affect 
firstly, ‘saviour siblings’ and secondly, ‘benefactor children’.20 Furthermore, this 
dissertation will determine whether parents, in terms of South African law, have the 
right to make decisions concerning medical treatment and surgical procedures of this 
nature, on behalf of their child. This dissertation will also consider whether ‘saviour 
siblings’, as well as the techniques used in their creation, are regulated in South 
African law. 
 
To achieve the objectives of this dissertation, and to answer the questions posed, 
will require consideration of both South African law and international, foreign and 
regional law. As the best interests of the child are considered to be of paramount 
importance in any legal matter pertaining to them, this test will be considered at all 
times.21 
 
In keeping with the requirements of section 39(1) of the Constitution, which states 
that international law must be considered and foreign law may be considered when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, this study begins in Chapter 2, with a consideration of 
applicable international, foreign and regional law in regard to children and their rights 
and specifically, to those areas relevant to this study.22 The focus of the dissertation 
turns to South African law in Chapter 3, where a discussion ensues regarding the 
progression of children’s rights, from the time of pre-colonial South Africa, up to and 
including the apartheid regime.  
                                                          
20
 As will be seen in Chapter 6 ‘saviour siblings will be considered first and then ‘benefactor children’, 
as the concept of ‘benefactor children’ came about as a result of questions prompted by the issue of 
‘saviour siblings’. 
21
 S 28(2) of the Constitution. 
22
 S 39(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution. 
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Following this historical analysis, Chapter 4 covers the period of the constitutional 
transformation in South Africa. It will briefly consider the current Constitution and the 
rights which appear in the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, Chapter 4 will determine which 
of the rights in the Bill of Rights are applicable to children, with specific attention 
being paid to the right to bodily integrity and autonomy.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses other South African law including applicable legislation and 
case law. 
 
In the last of the content chapters, the application of the stated law to the issue of 
‘benefactor children’ and ‘saviour siblings’ will be specifically considered. Chapter 6 
will involve defining both ‘benefactor children’ and ‘saviour siblings’ in further detail, 
analysing what procedures are utilised in their creation, what purposes these groups 
of children serve and the problems associated with these children. Thereafter, the 
law and legal principles as discussed in the previous chapters, will be applied to 
‘benefactor children’ and ‘saviour siblings’. 
 
Chapter 7 brings finality to this dissertation, through the summarising of conclusions 
that have been drawn on the topic, and making recommendations based on the 
potential flaws identified. 
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CHAPTER 2 
International Law 
 
2 1  Introduction 
Human rights violations generally occur within a State as opposed to anywhere else, 
such as the high seas.23 Therefore, the effective protection and resolution of human 
rights violations must generally come from within that particular State, by means of 
application of national legislation.24 Even so, national legislation may require the 
acknowledgment and enforcement of international law principles for the effective 
protection of human rights. This is the position taken by the Constitution. Section 
39(1)(b) of the Constitution requires that “when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a 
Court, tribunal or forum must consider international law”, which means that 
international law must be taken into consideration when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights.25 
 
The Constitution makes provision for the application of international law in several 
sections. Firstly, as customary international law in section 232, secondly, as treaty 
law in section 231, thirdly, as guiding norms for the interpretation and application of 
legislation and the Bill of Rights in sections 233 and 39(1)(b) respectively and 
fourthly, as humanitarian law in chapter 11 of the Constitution.26 
 
                                                          
23
 Steiner, Alston & Goodman International Human Rights in Context Law, Politics, Morals 3
rd
 ed 
(2008) 1087. 
24
 Steiner et al International Human Rights in Context 1087. 
25
 S 39 should be read in conjunction with s 8(3) of the Constitution. Furthermore, see s 233 of the 
Constitution which requires that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any 
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative 
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.” Under the authority of the Interim 
Constitution, s 35(1) stated that “[when] interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall 
promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality 
and shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the 
rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law.” The 
provision in s 35(1) is not the same as ss 39(1) and 233 and as such, the courts had to determine the 
meaning of the role of international law as an interpretive tool within the South African legal system. 
See Ngidi “The Role of International Law in the Development of Children’s Rights in South Africa: A 
Children’s Rights Litigators Perspective” in Killander (ed) International Law and Domestic Human 
Rights Litigation in Africa (2010) 173 175. 
26
 Church, Schulze & Strydom Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law Perspective 
(2007) 163. 
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In view of the above, a discussion follows on the subject of international law, paying 
particular attention to the status of children’s rights at this level. Also included in this 
chapter is a discussion on the position of children’s rights provisions and protection 
in the African region and at SADC level. A study of international and regional law 
must be undertaken for reasons of ensuring, at national level, compliance with 
obligations set out in regional and international instruments. 
 
2 2  International children’s rights instruments 
There are a wide range of international instruments dealing with various human and 
children’s rights matters.27 Of these multiple international instruments28 the following 
are some of the most important: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC)29 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).30 Instruments such as these have a significant bearing on South 
Africa’s legislation, as highlighted in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
As the focus of this dissertation is on children, the discussion that follows 
commences with the UNCRC. This is for reasons that its provisions recognise, 
protect and have a considerable bearing on the rights of children and that it is the 
principal children’s rights treaty.31 
 
2 3 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The UNCRC is a treaty32 and is regarded as the “most comprehensive single treaty 
in the human rights field”,33 due to its scope and wide acceptance.34 As its name 
                                                          
27
 See the United Nations Treaty Collection for a comprehensive list of international treaties and 
conventions. 
28
 There are also a number of regional instruments that deal with human and children’s rights and 
which will be equally relevant to this study, such as, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child (ACRWC). 
29
 The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1989 and entered into 
force on 2 September in accordance with art 49. South Africa became a signatory on 29 January 
1993 and ratified the UNCRC on 16 June 1995. 
30
 The Covenant was adopted and opened for signature and ratification by the General Assembly on 
16 December 1966. It was subsequently entered into force on 3 January 1976 in accordance with art 
27. 
31
 Van Bueren The International Law on the Rights of the Child (1998) xx.    
32
 Art 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 defines a treaty as “an 
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its 
particular designation.” A treaty is one of the sources of international law. Art 38(1)(a)-(d) lists other 
recognised sources of international law. These include in addition to conventions, international 
custom or customary international law, general principles of law recognised by civilised nations and 
judicial decisions and teachings of qualified publicists. The term convention is used interchangeably 
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implies, the provisions of the UNCRC35 are applicable to persons36 under the age of 
eighteen years.37 In view of the fact that the treaty applies to children, the UNCRC 
can be identified as being concerned with the following areas: 
 
1. the participation of children in decisions that affect his or her own destiny and 
his or her participation in community life;  
2. the protection of children against discrimination and all forms of torture, cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment as well as punishment, neglect and 
exploitation;  
3. the prevention of harm to children, the development of preventative health 
care and the prevention of child abduction; and 
4. the provision of assistance for children’s basic needs, inclusive of 
rehabilitation for child victims of a wide range of abuse and neglect and the 
provision of equal access for children to cultural and recreational activities.38 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
with treaty and international agreements. See Steiner & Alston International Human Rights in Context 
2
nd
 ed (2000)107. See further Olivier “The Status of International Children’s Rights Instruments in 
South Africa” in Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (2000) 197 198 n 4. The 
Constitution in s 233 also makes reference to international agreements. 
33
 Steiner et al International Human Rights Law in Context 511.  
34
 Can There Be Any Universal Children’s Rights? Some Considerations Concerning Relativity and 
Enforcement (2002) Discussion Paper at the D & G Seminar, 6 November 2002 4. According to the 
United Nations Treaty Collection there are presently 193 Parties to the UNCRC of which 140 are 
signatories. A Party means “a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the 
treaty is in force.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
35
 The UNCRC is regarded as the principle children’s treaty. Van Bueren International Law on the 
Rights of the Child xx.    
36
 Children must be seen as individuals and human beings as this is the view of the UNCRC – see 
arts 5 and 12. The UNCRC believes that a child is “not a chattel, but a human being in his or her own 
right.” Revaz “An Introduction to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child” in Todres, Wojcik & 
Revaz (eds) The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child: An Analysis of Treaty Provisions and 
Implications of U.S. Ratification (2006) 9 10. This viewpoint from an international instrument is in 
keeping with the view expressed by some in national law. For example Sachs J stated in S v M 
(Centre for Child Law: Amicus Curiae) 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) para 18 that “Every child has his or her 
own dignity. If a child is to be constitutionally imagined as an individual with a distinctive personality, 
and not merely as a miniature adult waiting to reach full size, he or she cannot be treated as a mere 
extension of his or her parents, umbillically destined to sink or swim with them. The unusually 
comprehensive and emancipatory character of s 28 presupposes that in our new dispensation the 
sins and traumas of fathers and mothers should not be visited on their children.”  
37
 Art 1 of the UNCRC. The age of eighteen will apply unless the age of majority is reached at an 
earlier age under a specific State Parties law. The age reference stipulated in art 1 is in line with s 
28(3) of the Constitution. Upon reaching the age of eighteen or majority, the individual will be entitled 
to all the rights in the Convention that are accorded to adults, but the provisions pertaining to children 
rights will no longer be applicable to them. McGoldrick “The United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child” 1991 (5) Int Jnl of Law and the Family 132 132. 
38
 This list is commonly referred to as the four P’s. The breakdown of the UNCRC in this way is useful 
in that it makes the treaty easier to understand and follow, not just for children, but for adults as well. 
The breakdown of the UNCRC in this way is further fulfilment of a duty placed on governments by art 
42 of the UNCRC. See further Van Bueren “The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
9 
 
The provision for these four basic areas in the treaty, the surprising speed with which 
the Convention was ratified and the equally astonishing number of States that signed 
and ratified the UNCRC39 have helped the treaty to attain the elevated status as a 
key international instrument40 that sets out the fundamental principles of the 
international rights of children.   
 
2 3 1 The origin, negotiation and adoption of the UNCRC 
Although the UNCRC has been hailed as being the principal children’s rights treaty,41 
it was not the first human rights treaty42 that catered for and embraced the concept of 
the protection of children’s rights at an international level.43 The origins of children’s 
rights can be traced as far back as the early 1900’s, with the League of Nations 
showing a great deal of interest in both the provision for - and protection of 
children.44 
 
In 1924 the Declaration of the Rights of the Child45 was adopted by the Fifth 
Assembly of the League of Nations.46 The Declaration of the Rights of the Child 
preceded the Universal Declaration on Human Rights47 by 24 years. From the 
wording of both the text and preamble of the 1924 Declaration, it is clear that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Child: An Evolutionary Revolution” in Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa(2000) 202 
203. 
39
 More countries have ratified the UNCRC (there are presently 193 parties to the UNCRC and 140 
signatories – This is according to the latest statistics supplied by the United Nations Treaty Collection)  
than any other human rights treaty or convention. Furthermore, the Convention came into operation 
only 7 months after its adoption, which is extremely quick when compared to other Conventions. See 
Sloth-Nielsen “Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Some 
Implications for South African Law” 1995SAJHR 401 402. As has already been stated, South Africa 
became a signatory on 29 January 1993 and ratified the Convention on 16 June 1995.  
40
 Buck International Child Law (2005) 41. See also van der Walt “The United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child – Has the Bridge been crossed between Theory and Practice: Mauritius and 
South Africa?” 2010 Obiter 715 715.    
41
 Van Bueren International Law on the Rights of the Child xx.    
42
 The Minimum Age (Industry) Convention adopted by the International Labour Conference in 1919 is 
said to be the first international instrument to protect children.  
43
 Revaz “An Introduction to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child” in The U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 12. The heading for paragraph 2 2 1 is based on the wording of Paragraph 
B in the aforementioned book. 
44
 Evidence of the League’s interest in children can be seen initially from the establishment of a 
Committee for the Protection of Children in 1919. 
45
 The 1924 Declaration of the Rights of the Child is also called the Declaration of Geneva as Geneva 
was the host city where the Declaration was adopted. 
46
 This instrument is said to be the first human rights Declaration that was adopted by any inter-
governmental organisation. At the adoption of the Declaration, the President of the Assembly, 
Guiseppe Motta was reported as saying that the approval of the Declaration by the Assembly makes 
the Declaration, the “Children’s Charter of the League.” 
47
 1948. 
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Declaration was never created to be an instrument that would bind State Parties.48 
Following the 1924 Declaration, the 1934 Declaration was adopted. This Declaration 
was the same as its 1924 predecessor and, as such, was merely reaffirmed by the 
League of Nations as no amendments were required.49 
 
In 1959 the next Declaration on the Rights of the Child was adopted.50 The adoption 
followed several events, most notable of these being the dissolution of the League of 
Nations and the decision taken by the Temporary Social Commission of Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations to develop a second Declaration.51 The 
second Declaration maintained the framework of the original 1924 Declaration but 
the Council made several amendments to the text where this was deemed 
necessary. 
 
In 1978,52 during the 34th Session of the UNCHR, the Government of Poland put 
forward a proposal for a Convention on the rights of children. The proposal was 
inspired by Professor Adam Loatka, the then President of the Polish Association of 
Jurists and a delegate to the UN Human Commission on Human Rights.53 Based on 
this proposal, a pre-sessional working group was established to draft the UNCRC. 
The Polish proposal was used as the foundation for the UNCRC but was expanded 
on, as it was initially deemed to be a simple regurgitation of the 1959 text.54 
 
During February 1988, the working group completed its first reading of the text. In 
order to complete the second reading, a further twelve meetings were held.55 During 
the second reading, significant changes were made to the text. Following these 
changes and amendments and inspired by various existing human rights 
                                                          
48
 Since the Declaration was not binding, it was actually more of a guideline than a treaty. The “rights” 
that the Declaration then granted to children were, in effect, only moral entitlements due to the lack of 
implementation and enforcement provisions within the Declaration. See de Villiers “The Rights of 
Children in International Law: Guidelines for South Africa” 1993 (3) Stell LR 289 as quoted in Sloth-
Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 402. 
49
 Van Bueren International Law on the Rights of the Child 9 and Buck International Child Law 48. 
50
 The 1924 Declaration principles formed the structure of the 1959 Declaration. 
51
 Van Bueren International Law on the Rights of the Child 9. 
52
 The following year, 1979, was designated as the Year of the Child. 
53
 Revaz “An Introduction to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child” in The U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 13. 
54
 Buck International Child Law 48. 
55
 Van Bueren International Law on the Rights of the Child 14. 
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documents,56 the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the 
UNCRC on 20 November 1989 and it entered into force on 2 September 1990.57 
 
To date there have been 140 signatories and 193 Parties to the Convention. For 
purposes of the UNCRC, ratification58 normally takes place first as opposed to 
signing. In light of this, it must be pointed out that Somalia and the United States of 
America have both signed the UNCRC but have failed to ratify it. According to the list 
provided by the United Nations Treaty Collection, all the countries mentioned on the 
list as parties to the UNCRC have undergone the process of ratification, accession, 
acceptance or succession, of course with the exception of Somalia and USA.  
 
South Africa became a State Party to the UNCRC having both signed and ratified the 
document.59 Upon completion of signature and ratification, a proactive obligation was 
placed upon the Government of South Africa to introduce whatever measures it 
deems prudent and necessary to turn the UNCRC principles into reality.60 As a 
means of ensuring that State Parties have made provision for the UNCRC principles 
in national law, as well as monitoring the progress made on the implementation 
process, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC)61 reviews reports which are 
sent by State Parties on a regular basis.62 
 
In compliance with Article 44(1)(a) of the UNCRC, South Africa as a State Party to 
the convention, “deposited the initial CRC country report with the United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child in November 1997”, two years after ratifying 
the convention.63 
                                                          
56
 Instruments that played an influential role in the 1989 UNCRC are the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the ICESCR.  
57
 See the UNCRC. 
58
 Art 2(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 defines ratification, acceptance, 
approval and accession as meaning in each case the “international act so named whereby a State 
establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty.” 
59
 South Africa signed the UNCRC on 29 January 1993 and ratified it on 16 June 1995. Ambassador 
to the UN Mr Josiah Jele was responsible for ratifying the UNCRC for South Africa. 
60
 van der Walt 2010 Obiter 716. Whether South Africa has in fact fulfilled its obligations and put the 
principles into practice in national law will be seen in Chapter 5. 
61
 Art 43 of the UNCRC contains the provisions relating to the establishment and function of the 
Committee. 
62
 Art 44 of the UNCRC relates to the writing and submitting of reports by State Parties to the 
Committee. 
63
 See South Africa’s First Supplementary CRC Report to the United Nations Committee on the Rights 
of the Child. 
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2 3 2 Optional Protocols to the UNCRC 
The UNCRC is supported by two Optional Protocols,64 namely Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict (OPAC)65 and Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (OPSA).66 An in-
depth discussion on these two Optional Protocols is not provided given that the 
nature of these protocols is outside the scope and content of this particular work.   
 
2 3 3 The underpinnings of the UNCRC 
The UNCRC is recognised as being a comprehensive document which deals with all 
aspects of children’s rights, protection, survival and development.67The 
comprehensiveness and complexity of this convention has the potential to leave the 
reader bewildered and confused. This is problematic, in view of the fact that the 
provisions and principles of this convention need to be made known to adults and 
children alike.68 Therefore, in addition to the responsibilities born by State Parties 
through various articles of the convention, the CRC has selected four principles 
which it regards as being the “general principles” of the Convention and which are 
the “soul” and value system upon which the convention is based.69 
 
The four core principles selected by the Committee are found in Article 2 - freedom 
from discrimination, Article 3 - the best interests of the child, Article 6 - the right to life 
and Article 12 - respect for the child’s views.70 None of the four general principles are 
more important than the other, but it could be argued that Article 3, which is the 
                                                          
64
 The Protocols are not to be mistaken as amendments to the UNCRC. Buck International Child Law 
73. 
65
 OPAC was opened for signature on 25 May 2000 (by any State that had signed/ratified the 
UNCRC) and came into force in international law on 13 February 2002. South Africa signed OPAC on 
8 February 2002 and ratified OPAC on 24 September 2009. South Africa made a declaration stating 
that the National Defence force did not forcibly conscript a person to become a member of the force 
and that a person would only be entitled to voluntarily join on reaching the age of eighteen years. This 
means that no children are allowed to be a part of South Africa’s National Defence Force. In other 
words, child involvement in times of armed conflict is nil.  
66
 OPSA was also opened for signatures on 25 May 2000 but came into force on 18 January 2002, a 
month earlier than OPAC. Unlike its counterpart, South Africa has as yet to sign OPSA. Accession by 
South Africa did however take place on 30 June 2003. 
67
 Sloth-Nielsen 1995SAJHR 408. 
68
 Art 42 of the UNCRC. 
69
 See also Sloth-Nielsen 1995SAJHR 408. 
70
 Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 408-411. See further Revaz “An Introduction to the U.N. Convention on 
the Rights of the Child” in The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child 9. 
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recognition of a child’s best interests, underlies all the other provisions in the 
Convention.71 For this reason it will be discussed first, with the other three core 
principles being discussed in general after Article 3. It must be mentioned that 
despite the importance of all the articles in the UNCRC, the four core principles and 
Article 24 will be discussed as an analysis and discussion of the entire Convention is 
beyond the scope of this work. 
 
The foundation for Article 3 can be found in Principle 2 of the Declaration of 1959.72 
Principle 2 states:  
 
“The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and facilities, by law 
and by other means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and 
socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. In the 
enactment of laws for this purpose, the best interests of the child shall be the paramount 
consideration.”
73
 
 
Article 3 (1) of the Convention74 states: 
 
“[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, Courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of 
the child shall be a primary consideration.”
75
 
 
As can be seen, there is a difference in the wording of the best interests provisions 
between the 1959 Declaration and the UNCRC.76 Principle 2 of the 1959 Declaration 
states that the best interests standard shall be the paramount consideration, 
whereas Article 3 of the UNCRC states that the best interests of the child shall be a 
                                                          
71
 Freeman A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Article 3 The 
Best Interests of the Child (2007) 1. 
72
 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 1959. 
73
 Principle 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 1959. 
74
 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. 
75
 See art 3(1) of the UNCRC. 
76
 The reason for the difference in the wording of Principle 2 and art 3 can be understood in light of 
the history of children’s rights in international law. Very simply, because the Polish proposal was seen 
as a simple regurgitation of the 1959 text, the Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights 
was established, to develop a text with which all nations would be satisfied. The development of the 
text took place during various sessions, over a number of years. It was during these sessions that the 
wording of principle 2 was debated, as some delegations were unhappy with the wording. 
Subsequently, in 1980, new wording for the best interests test was submitted to the Working Group. 
Freeman Article 3 26. Despite some reservations, the revised text submitted in 1980 was adopted the 
following year. This version can be found in art 3(1) of the UNCRC. 
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primary consideration. The use of the words “paramount consideration” in Principle 2 
meant that the best interests of the child were determinative.77 The first draft of the 
best interests article in the UNCRC was worded in the same way as Principle 2, 
which meant that the best interests of a child would be determinative.78 Several 
delegations were uneasy about this. Therefore, an alternative draft was submitted 
and was adopted, and today, Article 3(1) reads “…shall be a primary consideration” 
as opposed to “…shall be the paramount consideration.”79 
 
Article 3 of the UNCRC fails to define the best interests of the child and it also does 
not provide a checklist of factors that can be used to determine what is in a child’s 
best interests.80 The lack of guidelines and definition is problematic. Without a set 
standard or list of factors, the best interests of the child test will be interpreted and 
applied differently. This is due to different cultures, backgrounds, societies and so 
on.81 The most accurate way to describe the problem identified is that the best 
interests concept is indeterminate.82 
 
                                                          
77
 In other words, “paramount consideration” did not merely mean that the best interests of the child 
were to be considered first amongst other factors. Freeman Article 3 26. 
78
 The first draft of article 3 was Poland’s proposal. Freeman Article 3 25-56. 
79
 See the discussion under heading 2 3 3 above as well as Freeman Article 3 26. 
80
 Despite there being no legally recognised definition for the best interests of the child test, there 
have been a number of attempts by academics to provide a definition. Of the various attempts, John 
Eekelaar is said to have provided the best definition. According to him, the best interests can be 
defined as “basic interests, for example to physical, emotional and intellectual care developmental 
interests, to enter adulthood as far as possible without disadvantage; autonomy interests, especially 
the freedom to choose a lifestyle of their own.” See Eekelaar “The Importance of Thinking That 
Children Have Rights” 1992 (6) Int Jnl of Law and the Family 221 230-231. One possible reason that 
can be put forward as to why a definition for the best interests of the child is lacking, is because of the 
maxim Omnis definition in jure periculosa est. This means that every definition in law is perilous. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the drafters of international law were trying to avoid this problem 
and would rather leave it to the Courts to interpret the definition. See Andorno “Global Bioethics at 
UNESCO: In Defence of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights”2007J Med Ethics 
150 151. Art 3(1) only stipulates that the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
There are no factors or guidelines in the article. Art 3(2) and (3) also fail to provide any factors or 
definitions. The Polish text, from which the UNCRC emerged, did attempt to develop a checklist. This 
draft stated: “The child shall enjoy special protection and shall be given opportunities and facilities, by 
law and other means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in 
a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. In the enactment of laws for 
this purpose, the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration.” The Polish 
proposal was exactly the same as Principle 2 of the 1959 Declaration. 
81
 See S v M 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) and Bosman-Sadie & Corrie A Practical Approach to the Children’s 
Act (2010) 22.  
82
 Freeman Article 3 27. 
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Despite not having a clear checklist of factors and a definition of what is in a child’s 
best interests in international law, it is clear what is not in a child’s best interests.83 
An examination of the reports of the CRC clearly alludes to what is not in a child’s 
best interests, for example corporal punishment and child abuse.84 
 
Although there are problems associated with the test, there are still a number of 
reasons why the best interests of children are a primary consideration in international 
law. These reasons include the following:85 
 
1. Children have the right to have their welfare prioritised. 
2. Children are more vulnerable. Since adults ‘run’ the world, the interests and 
welfare of children may be ignored if they were not provided for. 
3. Children need to be given the right and the opportunity to become successful 
adults. 
 
It must be mentioned that, above all else, State Parties to the UNCRC have a 
mandatory duty to regard the best interests of a child as a primary consideration. In 
other words, a child’s best interests must be the first consideration. 
 
Article 2 is another of the principles regarded by the CRC as being a core principle. 
This particular article corresponds to the principle protecting children from 
discrimination. Article 2 stipulates that a child may not be discriminated against 
based inter alia on age, race, sex, language, religion and birth. Furthermore, this 
article has a wide range of protection, as it also protects a child from discrimination 
on the basis of the status of parents, legal guardians or family members.86 The 
inclusion of this additional clause was included by the drafters, as it was deemed 
necessary to protect children from the adverse effects of discrimination against his or 
her family as well.87 
 
                                                          
83
 Freeman Article 3 51. 
84
 Freeman Article 3 51-52. 
85
 Freeman Article 3 40. 
86
 Art 2(2) of the UNCRC. 
87
 Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 409. 
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Article 2 also speaks of State Parties taking measures that will eradicate and protect 
a child from discrimination. According to some authors,88 this means that upon 
ratification a State will incur “an international obligation to work towards eradicating 
the consequences of discrimination for children who have suffered discrimination in 
the past.”89 As South Africa is a State Party to the convention, the government has a 
responsibility towards its children to eradicate the effects of discrimination, especially 
in light of its apartheid past.90 Whether the measures to be taken include affirmative 
action is not clear, as there is no specific principle in the UNCRC permitting 
affirmative action.91 
 
The right to life, found in Article 6, is the third core principle identified by the CRC. In 
addition to stipulating that a child has the right to life, Article 6 provides additional 
protection for this right, by obliging State Parties to ensure “[to the] maximum extent 
possible the survival and development of the child.”92 Article 24 is closely related to 
the right to life, as it protects a child’s right to the highest standard of health care, 
which is inclusive of treatment for health problems. 
 
The final of the four core principals is a child’s right to participation, which is 
protected in Article 12 of the convention. When read in context, this right recognises 
that the best interests of the child are not to be merely interpreted as meaning what 
parents alone deem to be in the best interests of the child.93 Children must also have 
a say as to what is in their best interests.94 No age-limit is mentioned in Article 12, 
which suggests, that a child of any age can participate in matters affecting 
them.95Should a child express an opinion or view, due consideration must be given 
to the views of the child.96 Due consideration means that simply listening to the child 
                                                          
88
 McGoldrick and Sloth-Nielsen. 
89
 Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 410. 
90
 The history of apartheid, where it is relevant, will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
91
 McGoldrick 1991 (5) Int Jnl of Law and the Family 135. 
92
 Art 6(2) of the UNCRC. 
93
 Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 410. 
94
 Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 410. 
95
 Where children participate, they are able to express their views, both verbally and non-verbally. The 
CRC has acknowledged that a child is capable of expressing his or her view in a non-verbal manner 
and this can be done for example, through paintings, facial expressions and body language. See UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 12 (Fifty-first sess, 2009) The Right of 
the Child to be Heard UN doc CRC/C/GC/12 9.  
96
 See ss 10 and 31 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, which are relevant to the discussion on children 
and consent to medical treatment and operations in Chapter 5. 
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express his or her view is not enough. A serious consideration of the opinions 
expressed by the child must be undertaken in order to comply with the obligation 
imposed by Article 12.97 When considering the view expressed by the child, the age 
of the child must not sway the weight attached to his or her view. Age alone does not 
determine the significance of the views of the child.98 The maturity of the child must 
also be factored in when assessing his or her views, as a child’s level of 
understanding or capacity is not uniformly linked to his or her biological age.99 This 
statement is important for the discussion that follows in Chapters 5 and 6, in regard 
to a child’s right to participate in medical decisions. As will be seen in national law, 
this right has far reaching implications in the area of medical decisions. 
 
In addition to the four core principles, the right to health as set out in Article 24 must 
be considered. Article 24 of the UNCRC requires State Parties to recognise a child’s 
right to the highest attainable standard of health and to adopt measures which will 
ensure full realisation of this right.100 Although Article 24 is referred to as the right to 
health, it must not be misinterpreted as providing a child with the right to be healthy. 
No legal instrument or person can guarantee another person the right to be 
healthy.101 Where Article 24 refers to the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health, it in essence means, “a right to the best possible health outcomes taking into 
                                                          
97
 UN doc CRC/C/GC/12 11. 
98
 Supra 97.  
99
 Supra 97. With regards to health care and the right to participate, the CRC does welcome 
legislation that makes provision for a fixed age limit at which the right to consent is transferred to a 
child. Therefore, a child over the fixed age can consent to medical treatment or health care, without 
their capacity to make such decisions being assessed. Where a child is younger than the age of 
consent, but can demonstrate the capacity to make or express an informed opinion or view pertaining 
to his or her medical treatment, that view must be given due consideration. See n 97 above 23. In 
South Africa, the newly operational Children’s Act 38 of 2005 sets down a fixed age for consenting to 
medical treatment and surgical operations (s 129). However, a child’s capacity to consent is not 
restricted only to age, but to age and maturity. This is known as a combined approach and would 
require some form of assessment of a child’s maturity. Ss 10 and 31 of the same Act make provision 
for a child’s right to participate. These sections as well as s 129 will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 5. 
100
 Art 24(1)-(2). Art 24 also requires State Parties to take appropriate measures to abolish traditional 
practices that are prejudicial to children. See art 24(3). South Africa as a State Party to the convention 
has fulfilled this obligation with the implementation of s 12 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. Art 24 of 
the UNCRC is very similar to art 12 of the ICESCR, which guarantees the right to health to all 
persons. Many of the interpretations of art 12 of the ICESCR are therefore applicable to art 24. See 
further Eide & Eide A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child:Article 24 The Right to Health (2006) 1. It must be noted though, that art 24 of the UNCRC is 
said to form a more detailed provision than art 12 of the ICESCR. See Detrick A Commentary on the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1999) 721. 
101
 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 14 (Twenty-second 
sess, 2000) The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health UN doc E/C.12/2000/4 3. 
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account both the child’s biological preconditions and its living conditions as well as 
its access to health care.”102 
 
A closer inspection as to whether South Africa has fulfilled its international legal 
obligations103 will be conducted in Chapters 5 and 6. The articles of the UNCRC 
which are of importance are Articles 2, 3, 12 and 24. Article 3 – the best interests of 
the child, Article 12 – a child’s right to participation and Article 24 – the right to 
health, are of particular importance, given the nature of this dissertation, namely a 
child’s right to bodily integrity104 and to make decisions regarding his or her medical 
treatment.105 
 
2 4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights106 
Another international instrument of importance is the ICESCR. Unlike the UNCRC, 
this particular covenant is not limited to protecting only the rights of children. 
Furthermore, this covenant covers a number of social, economic and cultural rights 
that are not all relevant to this discussion. Therefore, for purposes of this discussion, 
only Article 12 and 15 are relevant.  
 
Article 12 recognises that everyone has the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health, both physical and mental. That this right refers to the highest attainable 
standard of health does not mean that the enjoyment or application of this right is 
limited to health care.107 In fact, Article 12 is said to embrace a wide range of socio-
economic factors that promote conditions which allow people to live a healthy life.108 
Furthermore, the right to health includes certain freedoms, such as the right to 
control one’s health and body and the right to be free from interference.109 It must be 
                                                          
102
 Eide & Eide Article 24 9. Art 24 can be argued as guaranteeing the right to the best medical 
treatment and health care. 
103
 See s 39(2) of the Constitution, as well as the relevant individual articles of the various 
international instruments. 
104
 S 12(2) of the Constitution. 
105
 S 12(2)(b) and (c) of the Constitution. 
106
 To date South Africa has signed this Covenant but not ratified it. South Africa signed the Covenant 
on 3 October 1994. 
107
 UN doc E/C.12/2000/4 3. 
108
 Supra 107. 
109
 The right to control one’s health and body is inclusive of the right to reproductive freedom. The 
recognition of reproductive freedom supports a woman’s decision to have an abortion and can also be 
interpreted as being the right to decide to either have children or to not have children. This right could 
also be argued to support a woman’s decision as to how she has a baby. In other words reproductive 
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noted though, that the right to health does not provide a person with the right to be 
healthy. No law can ever guarantee any person the right to be healthy.  
The wording of Article 12 is very similar to the wording of Article 24 of the UNCRC. 
This similarity is due to the fact that the text of Article 24 was taken directly from 
Article 12.110 Therefore, many of the interpretations of Article 12 can be applied to 
Article 24.111 
 
The other article of relevance is Article 15. This Article recognises the right to culture 
and science. As there is no general comment, the scope of Article 15 remains 
unclear and is not easily understood.  Although lacking clarity, it has been argued 
that the right to scientific progress and biomedical advances is intertwined with the 
right to scientific progress under Article 15.112 As there is no clarification as to what is 
recognised as being scientific progress or biomedical advances, it is submitted that 
any advancement in science will be viewed as scientific progress and will therefore 
fall within the scope of Article 15.113 
 
2 5 World Medical Association Declaration of Ottawa on the Rights of the  
Child to Healthcare (Declaration of Ottawa) 
Physicians have a duty to use their professional judgment and utilise their extensive 
medical training for the benefit of their patients.114 This duty extends to patients who 
are children. The Declaration of Ottawa is said to provide an ethical framework for 
the medical treatment of children.115 The Preamble of this Declaration claims that the 
principles of the Declaration apply to all children in the world, which is therefore 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
freedom can be seen to recognise a woman’s decision to use IVF for example to have a child. With 
this interpretation in mind, it can be argued that art 12 supports a couple’s decision to undergo 
techniques that will allow them to have a baby that is a tissue match to an ill child.   
110
 Support for this statement can be found in the UNCRC preparatory work. Detrick A Commentary 
on the UNCRC 402. 
111
 As was seen in the discussion above, art 24 also recognises that the right to health must not be 
interpreted to mean that a person or child has the right to be healthy. Furthermore, art 24 recognises 
that the right to health can be interpreted as the right to the best possible health outcomes. See the 
discussion under heading 2 3 3. 
112
 Sabatello Children’s Bioethics: The International Biopolitical Discourse on Harmful Traditional 
Practices and the Right of the Child to Cultural Identity (2009) 237. 
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 Based on this submission, it can be held that ‘saviour siblings’ are a biomedical advancement or 
scientific advancement and therefore fall within the scope of art 15. 
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 See the World Medical Association Declaration of Geneva: International Code on Medical Ethics 
2006.   
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 Dhai & Etheredge “Codes of Healthcare Ethics” in Dhai & McQuoid-Mason (eds)Bioethics, Human 
Rights and Health Law: Principles and Practice (2011) 16 22; McQuoid-Mason & Dada A-Z of Medical 
Law (2011) 144. 
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inclusive of children in South Africa.116 Although not considered to be law, many of 
the principles have found application in the Constitution, the Children’s Act and in the 
rules of the Health Professional Council of South Africa.117 Failure by a doctor to 
comply with the provisions and principles of the Declaration may result in a violation 
of children’s rights in the Constitution and Children’s Act, and even a breach of the 
ethical rules of the HPCSA, potentially leading to legal action being taken.118 
 
Physicians treating children should be encouraged to always act in the best interests 
of the child.119 This is especially important to remember when parents disagree with 
the proposed treatment of the child and refuse to consent to the proposed treatment 
of the child.120 Furthermore, physicians must respect that children have the right to 
active participation in matters affecting their health and treatment and that the wishes 
and opinions of the child must also be given due consideration.121 Where a doctor 
deems a child to be mature enough, that child although may not legally be allowed to 
give consent, is entitled to make decisions about his or her health care.122 
 
Compliance with the principles of the Declaration should be a priority for physicians, 
parents, communities and governments alike.123 
 
2 6 Jurisdiction of international law in South African courts 
An assumption can easily be made that international law applies to international 
disputes and that national law applies to national disputes. However, the separation 
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 In this Declaration, children represent the age group between birth and eighteen years of age, 
unless under the applicable law of a country it is recognised that the age of majority is attained either 
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 The application of the principles in South African law further entrenches the statement that the 
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 McQuoid-Mason & Dada A-Z of Medical Law 145. 
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 den Exter International Health Law and Ethics: Basic Documents (2009) 465. See also art 12 of 
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of law in such a manner is not always as clear cut as this, given that international law 
can transcend national borders and court jurisdictions and be applied to national 
cases where applicable. 
 
In the landmark case of Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v 
Grootboom and Others,124 Yacoob J stated: 
 
“[t]he relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation but the weight to be attached 
to any particular principle or rule of international law will vary. However, where the relevant 
principle of international law binds South Africa, it may be directly applicable.”
125
 
 
Justification for the stance taken by Yacoob J126 can be found in section 39(1)(b) of 
the Constitution, which requires courts to consider international law when interpreting 
the BOR. A further obligation which promotes the consideration and application of 
international law can be found in section 233 of the Constitution, which states that: 
 
“[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law.” 
 
2 7 Foreign law 
In terms of the Constitution of South Africa, there is an obligation to consider 
international law, whether it is binding or not, whereas foreign law may be 
considered.127 A consideration of foreign law is particularly relevant to this 
discussionin areas where South African law has not developed to the same extent as 
that of some countries around the world. Although it is necessary to consider foreign 
law, South Africa is not bound by the provisions of foreign law. 
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 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). 
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 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 26. 
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 Justice Yacoob delivered the judgment and was supported by Chaskalson CJ, Langa DCJ, 
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2 8 The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine128 
The above named Convention provides insight into an area of law that is presently  
underdeveloped in South Africa and which has the potential to impact significantly,  
the rights of a child to bodily integrity and autonomy.129 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine is recognised as the 
first legally binding international text that is designed to preserve human dignity, 
rights and freedoms, through a series of principles and prohibitions against the 
misuse of biological and medical advances.130 
 
This Convention lays down a series of principles and prohibitions that concern 
bioethics, medical research, organ transplants and consent.131 One of the principles 
relating to bioethics and medical research, for which this Convention makes 
provision, is the carrying out of predictive genetic tests. However, this provision 
covers specifically medical purposes only.132 While the Convention makes provision 
for some procedures, there are others that it strictly prohibits, subject to certain 
exceptions. For example, the treatment of a person who is unable to give consent, 
such as a child, may be carried out only if there is a direct benefit to the child, or 
where the removal of regenerative tissue is between siblings.133 
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 The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine was opened for signature by 
member States of the Council of Europe on 4 April 1997 and entered into force on 1 December 1999. 
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Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on Transplantation of Organs and 
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2 9 Regional law   
Human rights find protection not only on an international level but also at a regional 
and national level. Regional instruments build upon the universal standards of 
international instruments and make the international principles and norms more 
relevant to Africa by lending them an African flavour.134 
 
2 10 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC)135 is Africa’s 
regional treaty on the protection of children and is said to address some matters not 
dealt with in the UNCRC.136 The Charter was produced in response to a need having 
been identified for a regional human rights instrument which would reflect and deal 
with matters that were pertinent to children within the boundaries of the African 
Continent.137 The ACRWC was adopted shortly after the adoption of the UNCRC, 
which is demonstrative of the African States’ strong support to the universal cause of 
children’s rights.138 
 
Similar to its international counterpart, the ACRWC has three main features or core 
principles.139 The main features identified are, firstly, the best interests of the child,140 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on Transplantation of 
Organs and Tissues of Human Origin Explanatory Report. See 
http://www.wordlii.org/int/other/treaties/COETSER/2002/1.html (accessed on 21-11-2011). A more 
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International Conference on the Rights of the Child at the Community Law Centre, University of the 
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SA 218. 
138
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Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (2001) 137. The ACRWC was adopted in 1990. 
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secondly, the principle of non-discrimination,141 and thirdly, the primacy of the charter 
over harmful cultural practices and customs.142 
 
The wording of the best interests of the child criterion is similar to Article 3 of the 
UNCRC. The difference in the text is that Article 3 stipulates that the best interests 
“shall be a primary concern”;143 whereas Article 4 states that the best interests “shall 
be the primary concern.”144 
 
The attitude towards discrimination at an international level is reflected and adhered 
to at a regional level as well. Children are entitled to be treated equally and cannot 
be discriminated against because of race, culture, language, religion or because of 
the status of his or her parents, legal guardian or family members.145 
 
The last of the main features is primacy over culture. This particular issue was one 
that was excluded from the UNCRC and which is believed to have been sacrificed 
for the sake of consensus at an international level. Article 21 of the ACRWC relates 
specifically to harmful cultural practices which are synonymous with African tradition, 
namely female genital mutilation,146 arranged marriages and the male primogeniture 
rule.147 
 
Considering the discussion above on international and regional children’s rights 
orientated instruments, the following question may be raised: If a State has ratified 
both the UNCRC and ACRWC for example, which level of protection should the 
State adhere to? The answer is that both instruments provide that their provisions do 
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not affect ‘any provisions that are more conducive to the realisation’ of children’s 
rights.148 Therefore, should South African national legislation or the ACRWC provide 
for a higher level of protection, it will supersede the UNCRC.149 
 
2 11 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
As will be seen from the discussion below, there are currently no instruments relating 
specifically to the health and welfare of children within the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). Therefore, instead of excluding SADC altogether, 
reasons for the lack of instruments and provisions on children’s rights are explained 
below. 
 
SADC is made up of member States within and surrounding Africa, specifically 
Southern Africa. Presently, there are fifteen member States, including South 
Africa.150 Member States of SADC are committed to advancing the rights of children 
as contained in the ACRWC, as most have ratified, signed or endorsed the 
Charter.151 In light of this position, it has been said that SADC should be advancing 
the rights of children as contained in the ACRWC too.152 This unfortunately is not the 
sense that one comes away with having read the vision and mission of SADC and 
principles and objectives of the Treaty of the Southern African Development 
Community.153 
 
The vision of SADC is to achieve a common future, that is: 
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“… a future within a regional community that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of 
the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice and peace and security 
for the people of Southern Africa.”
154
 
 
The SADC mission: 
 
“is to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development 
through efficient productive systems, deeper co-operation and integration, good governance, 
and durable peace and security, so that the region emerges as a competitive and effective 
player in international relations and the world economy.”
155
 
 
The objectives as set out in the SADC treaty comprise of a list of eleven points, 
which include: 
 
 promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic 
development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective 
of its eradication, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of 
Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional 
integration; 
 consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability; 
 achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection 
of the environment; and 
 combat HIV/AIDS or other deadly and communicable diseases. 
 
From these various texts it appears that the needs and rights of children do not 
feature prominently in SADC. However, it has been reported that within the last five 
or six years children’s rights have been “quietly gaining prominence on the SADC 
agenda.”156 
 
 
 
                                                          
154
 See the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) chapter 1. Alternatively go to the 
SADC website at http://www.sadc.int/ (accessed on 18-08-2011). 
155
 Refer to chapter 1 of RISDP or the SADC website. 
156
 Norton Regional Child Rights Advocacy: Scoping the Opportunities and Challenges for Promoting 
and Protecting Children’s Rights in Southern Africa through SADC 10. 
27 
 
2 12 Conclusion  
From as early as the 1900’s, children have experienced what can be termed as 
universal protection and international recognition of their rights.157 Children continue 
to enjoy this protection today, through the provisions of a number of international and 
regional instruments. 
 
A discussion on international law is included, as section 39 of the South African 
Constitution requires a consideration of both international and foreign law.158 
Furthermore, a discussion on international, foreign and regional law is undertaken, 
because it is both pertinent to this study, as it provides an international perspective 
on children’s rights and because it provides insight into areas of law which are 
lacking in the South African legal framework.159As a State Party to many of these 
instruments, it is also important to study international law, to determine the legal 
obligations by which South Africa is bound. 
 
All of the various instruments that have been examined above have a bearing on the 
topic of this dissertation in some way and, therefore, have been discussed before 
any national legislation. In the next chapter, the focus shifts to South African law, 
beginning with an examination of the progression of children’s rights through history.  
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CHAPTER 3 
The history of children’s rights, law and the ‘best interests of the child test’ in 
South Africa 
 
3 1  Introduction 
Human Rights are valuable and important commodities. A society where rights do 
not exist will be morally impoverished and relationships will be based on power.160 
Many nations across the world have enacted legislation that makes provision for the 
protection and respect of human rights. South Africa is one such nation. In South 
Africa, the Constitution161 devotes an entire chapter, consisting of 32 sections, to the 
promotion, protection and furtherance of the respect of fundamental human rights.162 
 
In order to fully appreciate the development and enactment of the Constitution, the 
legal position of human rights, more specifically, children’s rights, prior to the 
constitutional transformation in South Africa, must be studied. To study this 
position163 requires an analysis of South African legal history. 
 
This chapter provides a detailed history showing the progression of children’s rights 
and law in South Africa prior to the enactment and implementation of both the 
Interim164 and Final165 Constitutions. The period to be covered in this chapter 
includes: the Pre-colonial era, the Colonial era, the Union years as well as the 
Apartheid regime. 
 
3 2  Pre-colonial era 
Prior to the first European settlement in South Africa (the pre-colonial era), the 
inhabitants of the country were not organised constitutionally within a framework that 
could be compared to that of a modern state.166 Instead the inhabitants were 
governed and regulated according to the practices and rules of customary and 
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indigenous law. This meant that customary law regulated and determined what 
rights, if any, children and others had.  
 
For purposes of this discussion it must be noted that the childhood phase in pre-
colonial South Africa differed to that of today.167 In terms of customary law, a child 
did not automatically become a major on reaching the age of eighteen years.168 
Instead a child would only achieve majority status upon the completion of certain 
customary rituals or actions, such as initiation or setting up a separate home.169 
Therefore, it must not automatically be assumed that when reference is made to 
children in pre-colonial South Africa that it is referring to persons who are below the 
age of eighteen. 
 
During the pre-colonial era, the rights of a child were determined by the marriage/ 
marital status of his or her parents.170 This resulted in four categories of children 
being identified, and the subsequent rights that a child had were dependent on which 
category he or she fell under.  
 
The four categories of children identified were: 
 
1) Children of married woman; 
2) Children of unmarried woman; 
3) Children born to a widow; and, 
4) Adulterine children/children born of an extra-marital relationship. 
 
Not only were children’s rights determined by the marriage of his or her parents, but, 
marriage also resulted in the family groups of the child’s mother and father acquiring 
certain rights and obligations for which they were collectively responsible. 
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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
168
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Furthermore, it must be highlighted that the customary law rules relating to children 
centred on the lobolo agreement.171 The lobolo agreement was the transfer of cattle 
to the prospective wife’s family in consideration of a customary marriage.172 Lobolo 
was not only useful in determining what rules were applicable to children, but it also 
determined the rights that a child’s parent/parents had over the child.173 
 
Each of the categories of children identified above will now be briefly considered in 
order to ascertain what rights children derived by falling under a respective category. 
 
The rights of children of married woman174 
In terms of customary law, children of married women were considered as 
legitimate175 and because of the provision of lobolo, the husband/father had 
guardianship over these children and a legal right over the offspring. This was 
the position irrespective of whether the child/children were born before or after 
the marriage. Upon marriage, children became affiliated with their father’s 
clan. This affiliation was vital, particularly for male children and their rights. In 
terms of the rules of customary law, a male child (dependent on his 
seniority)176 would acquire a right to succeed as a result of the application of 
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the male primogeniture rule.177 Female children did not have the same rights 
as males, but they did have the right to expect their father to take 
responsibility for contractual and delictual obligations on their behalf. 
Therefore, the father acquired the right to lobolo for his daughters, and he was 
responsible for both contractual and delictual obligations. Had the customary 
marriage been dissolved for whatever reasons, a father would forfeit his rights 
to his children if he accepted the return of lobolo. The children would then 
belong to the mother’s family/clan. 
 
The rights of unmarried woman178 
Children of an unmarried woman belonged to the woman’s father or his 
heir.179 The child’s mother did not acquire guardianship over her own children 
as she herself was still subject to her own father’s guardianship. It can be 
assumed that a male child would still have the right to succession (from his 
mother’s family) based on his seniority. Should the unmarried woman have 
entered into a marriage relationship with a man who was not the child’s father, 
her husband acquired a right to the child, and the child was considered as 
legitimate.  
 
The rights of children born to a widow180 
In customary law, children of widows were regarded as legitimate as a 
marriage was not dissolved by the death of a husband/child’s father. It was 
not uncommon practice in customary law for widows to have children born as 
a result of an ukungena relationship. An ukungena relationship is “[a] union 
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with a widow undertaken on behalf of her deceased husband by his full or half 
brother or other paternal male relative…”181 
 
Children born as a result of this relationship belonged to the widow’s 
husband’s family group. The reason that the widow would enter into the 
ukungena relationship was to either provide an heir who would acquire rights 
to his mother’s husband’s property or to merely increase the number of 
offspring. 
 
Should the widow have had a child not born from an ukungena relationship, 
that child was regarded as legitimate, unless it was repudiated by the 
husband’s heir. This repudiation could be seen as taking a male child’s right 
to succeed from his father away from him. If the child was repudiated it 
belonged to the mother’s guardian. The reason for this was that a woman was 
subject to the guardianship of her father if she was not married. 
 
The rights of adulterine children/children born of an extra-marital 
relationship182 
Adulterine children were children who were born to a woman who had a 
relationship with a man other than her husband during her marriage. 
According to customary law, there was a rebuttable presumption that the 
children were the woman’s husband’s children unless it could be proven that 
they were in fact not. If a woman’s husband did not repudiate the adulterine 
children, they would be regarded as legitimate and be treated like children 
born to a married woman. This meant that male children would acquire a right 
of succession and female children would acquire a right to expect their 
mother’s husband to take responsibility for their contracts and delicts. 
 
In addition to accepting that children had rights, although not very many, customary 
law also acknowledged that children had interests. However, at this early stage there 
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is no evidence to support the existence of a ‘best interests of the child’ test. As a 
result of this, children’s interests were not considered as being very important and 
more often than not, the interests of the child/children were cast aside to make way 
for the broader interests of the group and tribe.183 Furthermore, a child’s welfare was 
only as important as the rest of the group, as it was interwoven with the communal 
welfare of the group, tribe or extended family.  
 
Not much information and history has been recorded about pre-colonial South Africa, 
presumably as a result of the fact that many of the laws and customs were passed 
down from generation to generation orally as opposed to having been written 
down.184 Furthermore, customary rules differed from one tribe to another, making it 
difficult to make generalisations as to how children were viewed. 
 
Despite the fact that South African legislation has progressed since its pre-colonial 
days, many of the customary rules that were applicable in this era are still applicable 
today, and, are relevant to children living in families who still follow traditional or 
customary law.185 
 
3 3  Colonial era 
The next historical period relevant to the observation of children’s rights is the 
colonial era. This period is referred to as the colonial era as this was when South 
Africa was colonised by the Dutch and British. 
                                                          
183
 Children were sometimes given to relatives to look after cattle or provide companionship. 
Individualism was not as highly valued as it was in the Western societies. In customary law, a person 
would be expected to compromise his or her interests for the good of the larger unit, this being the 
extended family, group or tribe. According to customary law, to stand on one’s rights was anti-social. 
Therefore, if rights were ever an issue, it was the concern of the whole group, family or tribe and not 
only the individual.  
184
 Johnson, Pete & du Plessis Jurisprudence: A South African Perspective (2001) 203. Mazisi 
Kunene, a literary critic confirms this statement, as he has been quoted as saying that “…African 
philosophy is lived rather than academized…”. 
185
 This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that lobolo is still a readily accepted and used custom in 
South Africa among many traditional families. See further Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha (Commission 
for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v 
President of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC). In this decision, the Constitutional Court held that the 
law preventing black women and girls from inheriting from male relatives (in customary law) was 
unconstitutional. As this was a 2005 decision, it shows that African customs are still being followed 
today by traditional families. 
34 
 
South Africa was first colonised by the Netherlands in 1652, when the Dutch East 
India Company186 (DEIC) founded a supply depot at the Cape.187 The DEIC was 
responsible for the Cape, as the Dutch parliament had delegated its authority over 
foreign territories to the Company.188 The legislative, executive and judicial 
authorities of the colony vested in the Dutch and as such the inhabitants of the Cape 
were subject to the laws and ways of the Netherlands.189 
 
In the earlier years of colonial rule, children’s rights and law relating to the care and 
protection of children was quite noticeably lacking. The only exception to this being 
law relating to the administration of deceased estates.190 As a way of resolving this 
lack of protection of children, the DEIC established an ‘Orphan Chamber’.191 This 
‘Chamber’ administered the wills of those who were dying intestate, in order to 
protect the interests of children.192 This initiative can be heralded as the first major 
step in protecting the interests of children in the colonial period. 
 
The Cape was colonised again in 1795, but this time by the British, in direct 
consequence of the invasion of the Netherlands by the French.193 Following the 
invasion, the French took control over the various Dutch territories. As the French 
were at war with Britain at the time, the British took occupation of the Cape, as they 
feared that their trade route would become unsafe in the hands of the French.194 As 
a result, the Cape was now part of the British colonies. Although no longer a colony 
of the Dutch, the law at the Cape remained Roman-Dutch.195 
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The Cape was not under British rule for very long, as it was returned to the 
Netherlands in 1803.196 However, the Cape was finally relinquished to the British in 
1806 (three years after it was given back to the Netherlands) and this was confirmed 
by the Treaty of London, 1814.197 
 
In 1815, in the very early days of British rule, the first children’s home was 
established and was known as Het Suid-Afrikaansche Weeshuis or the South African 
Orphanage.198 This development resulted in many other homes for children being 
established later in the century.199 It must be mentioned that the homes established 
later in the century were founded by churches, most notably the Anglican and Dutch 
Reformed Churches. This development can be seen as providing for the protection 
and welfare of children as well as providing for the right to basic shelter and 
appropriate alternative care.200 
 
Eekelaar has made the observation that child welfare in early English law could be 
found in the practice of apprenticeship.201 This concept was utilised in South Africa 
and provision was made for it in the Masters and Servants Act of 1856. Under 
apprenticeship, children would be placed under the guardianship of a suitable person 
and taught a trade.202 A child also had the right to bind himself as an apprentice on 
completion of compulsory education,203 or at the age of fifteen.204 This concept of 
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apprenticeship became such a popular idea that it remained a part of children 
protection law in South Africa for many years. 
 
In 1895 several key pieces of legislation were passed that were aimed at the 
protection of children, their interests and to a limited extent, their rights. These Acts 
included: the Deserted Wives and Children’s Protection Act205 and the Care of 
Neglected Children Act.206 
 
The Deserted Wives and Children’s Protection Act207 was implemented to deal with 
husbands who had allegedly deserted their wives and children. This particular Act 
made it possible for these men to be summoned to appear before a court and, 
unless they could provide good reason for having deserted their family, they could be 
ordered to pay some form of maintenance.208 
 
While children’s legislation was advancing, at the time, animal protection received 
greater legal attention in South Africa. This can be inferred from the fact that the 
Cruelty to Animals Act209 was implemented before any substantial piece of legislation 
dealing with the care and protection of children was passed. 
 
A similar position had existed in America, two decades before the passing of the 
Cruelty to Animals Act.210 In 1877, Mary Ellen Wilson was removed from her abusive 
foster family through the collaboration of the founder of the American Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, a Methodist mission/case worker, an attorney and 
a Judge in the New York Supreme Court.211 They made use of “an obscure provision 
in the writ of habeus corpus” to remove Mary Ellen Wilson from her abusive situation 
as there was a lack of comprehensive child law.212 
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The second of the Acts passed in 1895 which focused on the care and protection of 
children was the Care of Neglected Children Act.213 This Act was the first 
comprehensive piece of legislation focusing on the care and protection of children. 
The Act214 was considered as being comprehensive, as it made provision for the 
courts to deal with a number of child-related issues. These issues included dealing 
with children who were found to be begging and children who were found living in 
brothels.215 
 
Child mortality also played a pivotal role in the development of child care and 
protection law, not only in England but at the Cape as well. In order to curb the high 
rate of infant mortality in the Cape Colony, which had been identified by the Medical 
Officer, the ruling government passed the Protection of Child Life Act of 1907.216 This 
Act was met with great support and enthusiasm from the general public and as such 
the Society for the Protection of Child Life was founded in 1908.217 This society 
developed into what is known today as the Child Welfare Society.  
 
With the implementation of Acts such as the Care of Neglected Children Act,218 
(Natal) Child Protection Act219 and the Protection of Child Life Act,220 an assumption 
can be made that the foundation for a ‘best interests of the child’ test was being 
formulated. It appears that there were no definite provisions in these Acts to say that 
the best interests of children must be considered, but the fact that the Acts were 
concerned with protecting children against abuse, ‘baby farming’,221 destitution and 
so on, leads one to assume that the best interests of children were being considered.   
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3 4  Union years 
South Africa became a Union in 1910. Although Britain was no longer the ruling 
government, South Africa was still in many respects subject to the United Kingdom’s 
legislative and executive authority.222 It was only from 1919, when South Africa was 
a party to the Peace Treaty of Versailles223 and became a member of the League of 
Nations,224 that it, along with other former British colonies,225 tried to have the 
restrictions imposed by Britain rescinded.226 The former colonies were successful in 
their attempt in 1931,227 when the British parliament relinquished all legislative 
authority over its former colonies.228 South Africa confirmed its new found 
independence from Britain by adopting the Status of the Union Act.229 The last 
significant link to the United Kingdom was severed in 1951, when the right of appeal 
to the British Privy Council against South Africa’s Supreme Court decisions was 
abolished.230 
 
Despite the eventual rescission of restrictions and laws imposed by Britain, many of 
the laws from the Colony were combined with other legislation to provide new law.231 
 
Three years after this initial combination and consolidation, a new Children’s Act was 
passed and was known as the Children’s Care and Protection Act 25 of 1913. This 
Act concerned itself with the care and protection of children232 and for this reason 
became known as the “children’s charter”. For purposes of this Act, a child was 
deemed to be a person below the age of sixteen years.233 
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The Children’s Care Act of 1913 remained in place until it was repealed by the 
Children’s Act 31 of 1937. The 1937 Children’s Act raised the age of a child from 
sixteen years to nineteen years and introduced into its ambit provisions relating to 
adoptions.234 It also made provision for the introduction of children’s courts and 
declared that every magistrate was a ‘commissioner of child welfare’.235 
 
3 5  Apartheid regime236 
The years preceding the constitutional transformation in South Africa will forever be 
remembered for apartheid. Although apartheid is said to have its origins in South 
Africa’s colonial past,237 it really came to the forefront in 1948, when the National 
Party’s came to power.238 
 
Apartheid was known for being a system of legal racial segregation. Whites and non-
whites were clearly distinguished between and separated from each other. In light of 
this distinction, the rights afforded to whites were not the same as those afforded to 
non-whites.239 The most likely reason for this was because a white party was in 
office at the time. 
 
The apartheid era saw the implementation and enactment of two children’s Acts. The 
first was the Children’s Act 33 of 1960. This Act is said to have reflected the 
apartheid thinking of the time as it made provision for the creation of ‘Bantu’ 
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children’s courts.240 This court was established to deal with the welfare of African 
(non-white) children.241 
 
This Act also lowered the age of majority from nineteen years to eighteen years and 
was the first South African statute to use the term “foster care”. 
 
The Children’s Act242 was replaced with the Child Care Act 74 of 1983.243 One of the 
most notable changes implemented by this Act244 was that it introduced new 
measures in relation to adoption. These new measure deprived an adopted child of 
the right to inherit from his or her natural parents, subsequently altering the status 
adopted children once held. Initially, an adopted child had the right to inherit from 
both natural and adoptive parents, but the new Act changed this by severing all ties 
between natural parents and children upon the conclusion of their adoption.245 
Simply put, this change meant that adopted children now only had the right to inherit 
from their adoptive parents. 
 
It can be assumed from the wording of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983, that the 
drafters of the Act were concerned with the welfare of children. The Act introduced a 
criminal liability clause for dentists, nurses and medical practitioners who failed to 
report child abuse to the relevant authorities. The severity of this clause clearly 
demonstrates the lengths that the drafters were prepared to go to protect the welfare 
and interests of children.246 
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3 6  The ‘best interests of the child test’ 
Prior to the apartheid era in South Africa, legislation did not provide for the best 
interests of the child test. The foundation and basis for the test existed, but there was 
no provision for it in legislation.247 Then, at the beginning of apartheid, the test was 
given prominence in custody cases, commencing with the case of Fletcher v 
Fletcher.248 
 
In Fletcher v Fletcher,249 the then Appellate Division250 recognised that the best 
interests of children must be the main consideration when deciding which party in a 
divorce case should be awarded custody.251 In this way, the court acknowledged the 
paramount importance of the best interests of the child.252 Viewed differently, the 
Appellate Division in Fletcher v Fletcher253 placed at the pinnacle of its consideration, 
the ‘paramount/best interests’ rule.254 
 
Following the application of the test in Fletcher,255 the standard gained popularity 
and was applied in numerous cases. Many of the cases to which this test was 
applied, centred on custody and maintenance issues. There were however, several 
cases in which the test was applied to matters where the health and welfare of a 
child was one of the core issues. In these cases, the best interests of the child was 
central to the court decision to compel a minor and his or her parent to submit to a 
blood test, for purposes of determining paternity.  
 
In the cases of Seetal v Pravita256 and M v R,257 the courts accepted that, as the 
upper guardian of children, they had the power, where it would be in the best 
interests of a minor, to order a minor and his or her parent to submit to blood tests to 
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determine paternity. Furthermore, it was held that subjecting a child to a blood test 
was ultimately in the best interests of the child, as it would be in their interest to know 
the truth about his or her paternity.258 
 
In S v L,259Nell v Nell260 and D v K,261 cases of the same nature to those mentioned 
above, the courts were however, more reluctant to order a minor and his or her 
parent to undergo a blood test. The reason for this reluctance was that the courts 
held that, as the upper guardian of the child, its power was such that it was able to 
deal only with custody matters and not matters of a day-to-day nature.262 Moreover, 
the respective courts held that compelling a child to undergo a blood test and 
overriding a parent’s refusal in the process, was an infringement of both the right to 
bodily integrity and the right to privacy.263 
 
The fact that there are so few cases involving the application of the best interests of 
the child test to children and their health, prior to the enactment of the Interim 
Constitution (hereafter the IC), suggests, it is submitted, that there was a lack of 
medical advancement within South Africa at that time. In other words, it would 
appear that, as many of the medical procedures and techniques were only being 
developed at the same time as these cases, they had not had time to become an 
issue yet, at least in South Africa.264 Therefore, the courts had not yet been asked to 
protect children and their rights outside the issues of custody and maintenance. 
In addition to gaining popularity after the Fletcher265 case, legislation was enacted, 
that made provision for the best interests of children. The legislation enacted, dealt 
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specifically with divorce and custody cases and included the Divorce Act of 1979266 
and the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act of 1987.267 
 
The Divorce Act268 made provision for the protection of a child’s best interests in 
divorce matters, by stipulating that a marriage would only be dissolved once the 
court was satisfied that any provisions pertaining to a child were satisfactory or the 
best that could be affected in the circumstances.269 Furthermore, the court also had 
the power, by virtue of the Act, to award sole guardianship to one of the child’s 
parents, if it was deemed to be in that child’s best interests.270 
 
Working alongside the Divorce Act271 in determining what was in the best interests of 
a child in divorce cases, was the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act.272 This 
Act was aimed at removing a child from the arena of conflict at the earliest possible 
stage, thus ensuring that his or her best interests were served at all times.273 
 
It was only following the enactment of the IC that provision was made for the 
application of the best interests of the child test in cases other than divorce and 
custody matters.274 This was confirmed by the Constitution275 in section 28(2) and, 
most recently, by the Children’s Act,276 which assists the courts in determining what 
is in the best interests of a child/children by way of guidelines and factors.  
 
3 7  Conclusion 
From this chapter, it is evident that South Africa is a country that has a diverse legal 
and cultural history. Historically, the way children were viewed has improved, with 
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increased recognition being afforded to their rights and welfare. Starting in the pre-
colonial period, the interests of children were often set aside in favour of the welfare 
and interests of the group, due to the perception that the group was more important 
than the individual.277 However, children did acquire a limited number of rights based 
on marriage and lobolo.278 Following the colonisation of South Africa by both the 
Netherlands and the British, legislation was enacted that was aimed at the protection 
of the interests and welfare of children. Furthermore, the British were responsible for 
the introduction of the first comprehensive piece of children’s legislation at the 
Cape.279 
 
On becoming a Union, the recognition and protection of children’s rights continued to 
grow in South Africa, with additional law being enacted and the establishment of 
children’s courts.280 During the apartheid era, children’s rights continued to progress 
through the introduction of two new Children’s Acts.281 
 
In addition to the Acts, this period also welcomed the development of the best 
interests of the child test. This test, although not provided for in legislation at the 
time, was applied in several custody cases, to determine the best course of action to 
be taken for the sake of the child. Although the test gained prominence after the 
1948 case of Fletcher v Fletcher,282 its application was limited to predominantly 
custody cases, with very few applications in other areas such as health.283 
 
In Chapter 4, the focus of the discussion will turn to the Constitutional transformation 
that took place in South Africa following the end of the apartheid years. Specific 
attention will be paid to the development of children’s rights during this time and the 
development of the best interests of the child test, in preparation for the discussion 
that follows in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Constitutional Rights of Children to Bodily Integrity and Autonomy 
 
4 1  Introduction 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (hereafter the Constitution) is a 
consequence of and a reaction to South Africa’s rich and traumatic history.284 The 
Constitution symbolises: 
 
“a drastic break from that part of the past which is unacceptable. It constitutes a decisive 
break from a culture of Apartheid and racism to a constitutionally protected culture of 
openness and democracy and universal human rights for South Africans of all ages, classes 
and colours.”
285
 
 
With the dawning of the Constitution came about not only a recognition and respect 
for the newly democratic country’s diverse and radical society, but also the 
recognition of a particularly vulnerable, and once often ignored, group in society – 
namely children.286 
 
To undertake an analysis of children’s rights post 1994 without reference to, or even 
contemplation of, the Constitution and its background, is frivolous. For this reason, 
Chapter 4 will briefly consider the transformation that took place in South Africa after 
the implementation of the IC,287 but more specifically, the Final Constitution288 
(hereafter the Constitution). Furthermore, this chapter will provide a brief background 
on the preamble, values289 and rights290 that are encompassed in the Constitution. In 
this regard, specific attention will be paid to children’s rights, considering how they 
have been included in the Constitution and changed as a result of the constitutional 
transformation that took place in South Africa. The main focus of this chapter, 
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however, will be on a child’s rights to bodily integrity291 and autonomy and certain 
aspects of section 28 of the Constitution. 
 
4 2  South African Constitutions 
A study of constitutional law reveals that since the constitutional transformation 
(1993), South Africa has had two Constitutions, the IC and the Constitution.292Both of 
these constitutions will now be discussed, as they are fundamental to acquiring an 
understanding of how the Bill of Rights and Constitution works, and is applied. First, 
it must be established what precisely a constitution is. 
 
4 2 1  Definition of a Constitution 
According to the South African Legal Dictionary, a constitution can be defined as “a 
frame of political society, organised through and by law - that is to say, one in which 
law has established permanent institutions with recognised functions and definite 
rights.”293The Collins Shorter English Dictionary defines a constitution as “the 
fundamental principles on which a [S]tate is governed, especially when considered 
as embodying the rights of the subjects.”294 
 
Alternatively, a constitution sets out the rules according to which a country is 
governed, or, a contract between the people by which they create a state, transfer 
their power to it and then accept its authority.295 Furthermore, a constitution can also 
be described as a document that defines the rights and duties of citizens.296 
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South Africa is a constitutional state297 and is regulated by the principles and 
provisions contained in the Constitution.298 South Africa can be classified as a 
constitutional state, as the Constitution is sovereign as opposed to Parliament.299 
This classification is one of several classifications. In general, a constitution can be 
classified as one of the following: 1) Written or unwritten, 2) flexible or inflexible, 3) 
unitary or federal, or 4) sovereign or subordinate.300 South Africa’s constitution falls 
into the last category as a sovereign constitution. 
 
4 3  The Interim Constitution 
The IC came into effect on 27 April 1994, coinciding with the first democratic 
elections in South Africa.301 In addition to introducing a new system of government 
that aimed to bring the country from its apartheid past into a future based on 
democracy and equality,302 the IC also brought about a number of other fundamental 
changes which included:303 
 
1. The availability of the franchise and other associated political and civil rights 
to all citizens in South Africa, irrespective of race.304 
2. Parliamentary sovereignty was replaced by constitutional supremacy.305 
3. Government power (legislative and executive) was divided among national, 
provincial and local spheres of government.306 
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4. A proportional voting system was introduced.307 
5. The country was divided into nine provinces308 and, 
6. the Constitutional Court (CC) was established.309 
 
4 4 The Final Constitution 
As can be inferred from its name, the IC had a limited duration and was operational 
only for a temporary period while the 1996 Constitution was being drafted.310 The 
Constitution was drafted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 5 of the IC. In 
compliance with section 73(1) of the IC, the text of the Constitution was first adopted 
by the Constitutional Assembly on 8 May 1996, two years after the first sitting of the 
National Assembly under the IC.311 On 6 September 1996, the CC unanimously 
rejected certain clauses of the adopted text and, as a result, refused to certify the 
text.312 Therefore, the CC referred the text back to the Constitutional Assembly for 
reconsideration, as it was held that the text failed to comply with the Constitutional 
Principles in Schedule Four of the IC.313 Following amendments to the eight rejected 
clauses, the Constitutional Assembly sent the amended text back to the CC for 
certification.314 With unanimous approval, the CC certified the text on 4 December 
1996315 and it was signed into law on 10 December 1996 by Former President 
Nelson Mandela at Sharpeville. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
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108 of 1996 became operational on 4 February 1997, two months after it was 
certified.316 
 
4 5 The Preamble317 and values of the Constitution 
The Constitution (like so many other legal instruments) “begins with [the] preamble 
which seeks to give expression to the fundamental values318 and purposes of the 
Constitution as a whole.”319 
 
Apart from an introduction and conclusion,320 the preamble to the South African 
Constitution identifies four important themes or objectives namely:  
 
1. to heal the divisions of South Africa’s past and to establish a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; 
2. to lay the foundations for an open and democratic society, where government 
is based on the will of the people and in which every citizen is equally 
protected by the law; 
3. to improve the life of all citizens and to free the potential of each person; and  
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4. to build a united and democratic country which is able to take its rightful place 
as a sovereign state in the family of nations.321 
 
From the wording of these four objectives, most notably the first one, it is clear that 
protecting human rights is an important and central objective of the Constitution.322 
Immediately following the preamble are the values that are central to the 
Constitution, and upon which South Africa, as one, sovereign, democratic State, is 
founded upon.323 These values are listed in section 1(a)-(d) and are:  
 
 Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms. 
 Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
 Supremacy of the [C]onstitution and the rule of law. 
 Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and 
a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness. 
 
So important are these values,324 that they are echoed throughout the Bill of Rights 
in various sections.325 Under the next heading the Bill of Rights will be considered 
with particular attention being paid to the rights that children are entitled to under the 
Bill of Rights. 
 
4 6 The Bill of Rights  
The South African Bill of Rights326 is accepted as one of the most progressive Bills of 
Rights in the world.327 It is a cornerstone of South African democracy which 
enshrines the rights of all people in the country, and affirms the values of human 
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dignity, equality and freedom.328 Its application extends beyond natural persons to 
include juristic persons.329 Furthermore, the Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds 
the legislature, executive, judiciary and all organs of State.330 
 
Unlike international human rights instruments, the Bill of Rights makes provision for 
the inclusion of all classes of rights in one document.331 This means that the Bill of 
Rights consists of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Traditionally 
rights in the Bill of Rights have been classified as first-generation,332 second-
generation333 or third generation334 rights.335 First-generation rights or civil and 
political rights guarantee the individual freedom from unlawful interference by the 
State.336 These rights are absolute and also relatively easy to enforce, and protection 
must be provided swiftly and as soon as possible after a violation has taken place.337 
Second-generation rights are socio-economic rights which, in contrast to first-
generation rights, require the State to take a positive action.338 Unlike the first two 
generations, third-generation rights have only recently been identified and pertain to 
a group of people as opposed to an individual.339 Third-generation rights are said to 
be difficult to enforce, but this in no way implies that the application of these rights is 
to be ignored.340 The classification of rights into different generations does not signify 
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that there is a hierarchy amongst rights. In fact, the classification of rights in this way 
was done for the sake of convenience and to determine when certain rights started 
receiving prominent recognition.341 
 
4 6 1 The rights in the Bill of Rights as they relate to children 
“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the 
[S]tate-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution 
and possess constitutional rights.”
342
 
 
Although taken from American case law, the words of this foreign case echo the 
current position in South African law. According to section 7(1) of the Constitution, 
both adults and children alike have rights.343 Since children are viewed as the most 
vulnerable members of South Africa’s society,344 section 28 of the Constitution has 
been set aside to provide protection from, and rights to, children in situations where 
they are considered to be particularly vulnerable.345 A common misconception that 
often accompanies a discussion of section 28 is that these are the only rights 
afforded to children in the entire Constitution, simply because the section is headed 
“children”. While it is true that the rights in section 28 apply exclusively to children,346 
it does not bar children from the enjoyment, protection and application of other 
human rights347 found within the Bill of Rights.348 
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Although the children’s rights section is well written and comprehensive, this has not 
always been the position. When the drafting of the IC began in 1993, the initial 
children’s section was merely one line, which provided for “the right of children not to 
be subject to neglect, abuse or forced labour.”349However, over time, the children’s 
section in the IC developed into a more comprehensive section which provided 
further protection to children.350 
 
A subsequent expansion to the children’s rights section of the IC followed in 1996, 
after submissions from various political parties and civil society.351 Added to the 
already modified text were the following changes: “the right to family care or to 
appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment”352 was 
added to the pre-existing right to parental care;353 “the right to shelter”354 was added 
to security, basic nutrition and basic health care and social services;355 “the right to 
be protected from maltreatment or degradation”356 was added to expand the right to 
be protected from neglect or abuse.357 Further changes were made to the subsection 
on children in trouble with the law,358 which was expanded to include “the rights not 
to be detained except as a measure of last resort, only for the shortest period of time 
and to be kept separately from detained persons over the age of eighteen years.359 
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Completely new to the children’s section was “the right to have a legal practitioner 
assigned by the state at state expense in civil proceedings”360 and “the right not to be 
used directly in armed conflict.”361 
 
The rights which expanded the children’s section in the IC can be found in the “new” 
children’s rights section in the Constitution, section 28.362 In addition to these rights, 
the best interests clause and the definition of a child have been adopted from section 
30 of the IC and are found in section 28(2) and (3) respectively.  
 
Many of the rights which are found in section 28 are mere repetitions of the rights 
found in the other sections of the Bill of Rights, and can therefore be classed as 
background rights to the specific rights of children.363 An important observation, 
however, is that while not all rights are repeated in section 28, they nevertheless 
remain important for children. These rights include: the right to equality,364 dignity,365 
bodily and psychological integrity366 and the right to individual autonomy.367 In 
                                                          
360
 S 28(1)(h) of the Constitution.  
361
 S 28(1)(i) of the Constitution. 
362
 S 28(1) Every child has the right-  
a. to a name and a nationality from birth;  
b. to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the 
family environment;  
c. to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services;  
d. to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation;  
e. to be protected from exploitative labour practices;  
f. not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that-  
i. are inappropriate for a person of that child's age; or  
ii. place at risk the child's well-being, education, physical or mental health or spiritual, moral or 
social development;  
g. not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in addition to the 
rights a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained only for the shortest 
appropriate period of time, and has the right to be-  
i. kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and  
ii. treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of the child's age;  
h. to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in civil 
proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result; and  
i. not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed conflict.  
2. A child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the 
child.  
3. In this section 'child' means a person under the age of 18 years.  
363
 Kruger 2007 THRHR 241. 
364
 S 9 of the Constitution. 
365
 S 10 of the Constitution. 
366
 S 12(2) of the Constitution. 
367
 The right to autonomy is constructed from the rights to privacy, freedom of religion, freedom of 
expression and freedom of association read together. Kruger 2007 THRHR 241; Bekink & Brand 
“Constitutional Protection of Children” in Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (2000) 
169 178. 
55 
 
keeping with the theme of this work, it is the last two rights, namely the right to bodily 
integrity and the right to autonomy which are of importance and will therefore be 
discussed in detail. 
 
As bearers of rights, children have the right to bodily and psychological integrity 
which is found under the protection of the so-called “umbrella right” of freedom and 
security of the person in section 12 of the Constitution.368 The right to bodily integrity 
comprises of: 
 
“[The right] (a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; 
(b) to security in and control over their body; and  
(c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent.”
369
 
 
The first component of section 12(2) is the right to make decisions concerning 
reproduction.370 The right to make decisions concerning reproduction recognises the 
ability to make decisions relating to reproduction as a crucial aspect of control over 
the body and can be seen to include both abortion and sterilisation.371 With regards 
to abortion, Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v Minister of Health372 held 
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that a foetus does not enjoy the protection of the provisions of the Constitution373 
and, for this reason, section 12 would not be limited by any interests the foetus may 
have.374 In fact Mojapelo J was of the opinion that section 12(2)(a) and (b) both 
recognise and protect the right to abortion.375 The wording of section 12(2)(a) is such 
that it validates and provides constitutional support for both the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act376(hereafter CoToPA) and the Sterilisation Act.377 
 
The second component of section 12(2) is the right to security in and control over the 
body. The two terms used in section 12(2)(b) are not synonymous. “Security in” 
implies “the protection of bodily integrity against physical invasions by the State and 
others.”378Alternatively, “control over” signifies and “guarantees the freedom to 
exercise autonomy or the right to self-determination with respect to the use of one’s 
body.”379 
 
The wording of section 12(2)(b) assumes that individuals are capable of taking 
decisions that are in their own interests as well as acting as responsible and decent 
persons. This gives rise to the argument that interference and intervention in the 
lives of others must, in general, be minimised.380 If one experiences genuine concern 
for someone, that person can express their concern but must respect the choices of 
the other person at the same time.381 To reiterate the words of Sachs and O’Regan 
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JJ in S v Jordan382 “[the body is not] something to be commodified. Our Constitution 
requires that it be respected.”383 
 
The third component of section 12(2) is the right not to be subjected to medical or 
scientific experiments without informed consent. A precise definition as to what 
amounts to medical or scientific experiments is not easily ascertainable due to the 
fact that both day-to-day medical treatments, as well as experimental treatments for 
extreme illnesses, can amount to medical or scientific experiments.384 Despite the 
lack of clear parameters as to what amounts to medical and scientific experiments, it 
is commonly accepted that a medical practitioner has a duty to inform his or her 
patient as to the risks of the procedure to be performed in order for the patient to 
give his or her informed consent.385 To dismiss/satisfy the duty, the practitioner may 
be guided by the “reasonable patient” test as opposed to the “reasonable doctor” 
test.386 The “reasonable patient” test requires the doctor to warn the patient who is 
consenting to treatment of the material risk inherent in the proposed treatment.387 
 
The test employed in South Africa is the “subjective patient standard”, in other 
words, “what does the patient want to know”.388 Based on what the patient wants to 
know, the doctor is then able to decide what information must be given to the patient 
and how it is explained to said patient.389 
 
A patient is regarded as having given informed consent to medical and scientific 
experiments if he or she is not merely informed of the salient risks and options but 
that he or she “appreciates and understands what the…purpose of the [experiment] 
is.”390 
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In the same vein, Mojapelo J states that in South African law the informed consent 
requirement rests on the three independent legs of knowledge, appreciation and 
consent.391 
 
Working hand-in-hand with the right to bodily integrity is the contentious right of 
autonomy or self-government/self-determination. This refers to the right that a 
person has to decide what they want to be done with their body, without anybody 
else deciding such matters for them.392 Despite not being found within a particular 
section of the Constitution, the right to autonomy is comprised of the rights to 
privacy, freedom of religion, belief and opinion, freedom of expression, and freedom 
of association, all of which are rights that are guaranteed to children.393 
 
Support for a child’s right to autonomy can be found in the works of several authors 
and in case law, not just nationally but abroad as well.394 Freeman, for example, 
proposes four categories of rights for children, of which the third and fourth 
categories respectively validate a child’s right to autonomy.  
 
The third category of children’s rights put forward by Freeman in his framework for 
children’s rights is the right to be treated as an adult.395 Freeman proposes that the 
rights and liberties which are extended to adults should also be extended to 
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children.396 While sceptical of this position (as he believes society must provide a 
“childhood for every child” and not an “adulthood for every child”),397 Freeman does 
recommend solutions which will still allow children more freedom then they currently 
have. Based on the research of developmental psychologists, Freeman argues that 
the age–related restrictions placed on children should be kept under review. 
Alternatively, Freeman suggests that the legal capacity of children to make decisions 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis.398 Courts may be more willing to 
invoke a case-by-case assessment, as children mature at different stages. 
 
The fourth category of children’s rights that Freeman offers are the rights against 
parents. On closer inspection these rights would allow for claims of independence 
from parental control before the age of majority is reached.399In other words, the 
rights against parents would sanction a child’s decision making powers in matters 
such as length of hair, curfew, body piercing, contraceptives/abortion,400 determining 
gender orientation and consent to medical treatment and procedures.401 Another way 
of interpreting this right is to argue that children have a right to autonomy or self-
governance/self-determination. 
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Freeman notes two variants to this right, the first being complete independence from 
parents and the second being that a child should be able to act independently but 
with the assistance of an outside party.402 The second variant to this right, as will be 
seen in Chapter 6, is particularly useful in the scenario involving children who are 
below the age of consent for medical treatment, but whose parents fail to act in his or 
her best interests.403 
 
Wald is another author who has written on the framework for children’s rights. Wald 
writes that age has historically been the accepted basis for withholding certain 
luxuries from children.404 Based on this observation, Wald queries whether the 
existing assumptions on the capacities of children are correct, and whether it would 
not be necessary to determine if the current age restrictions in place make sense, in 
light of the different rate of maturity of children today than in previous years.405 
 
Like Freeman, Wald also suggests that children should have the right to be 
independent from their parents,406 and that children should be given the right to 
make decisions in areas having lasting consequences on the child.407 This was the 
approach adopted by the court in the 2003 case of Kotze v Kotze.408 In this case, the 
court refused to make a particular clause part of a divorce settlement. The clause 
was worded in such a way that it acknowledged that both parties to the divorce 
would undertake to educate their minor child in a certain church. The court refused to 
make this clause part of the settlement on the grounds that it denied the child the 
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 Wald 1979 University of California Davis Law Review 273 as referred to by Human “The Theory of 
Children’s Rights” in Introduction to Child Law in SA. 
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 2003 3 SA 628 (T).The opinion of Freeman and Wald, as well as the approach adopted by the 
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right to freedom of religion (and belief and opinion) as guaranteed by section 15 of 
the Constitution and that, furthermore, this clause was not in the best interests of 
the child. Therefore, because the best interests of the child are of paramount 
importance,409 and because the court’s only obligation, as the upper guardian of the 
child, is to act in the best interests of the child, the court held that it was obliged to 
amend the divorce settlement agreement.  
 
As Kruger notes: 
 
“[i]t is indeed one thing for parents to make such an agreement [to educate a minor child in a 
certain church] when the child is three years old; it is quite another for the court to make an 
order casting this agreement in stone until the child attains majority.”
410
 
 
In view of the highly emotive nature of decision making, it must be determined what 
the cost will be if a child is not given the right to decide? Wald argues, firstly, that it 
can be detrimental to the child and, secondly, if a parent decides for a child, it could 
result in rebellious actions from the child.411 
 
4 6 2  Respect for a child’s right to autonomy 
It has been proven that children are entitled to all the rights in the Bill of Rights, 
which includes the right to autonomy. A child should, therefore, be able to claim all 
rights which are legally enforceable. Nowhere in the Constitution are parents 
guaranteed the right to control and make decisions on behalf of their child.412 So why 
then does this still occur? To deny a child autonomy clearly shows that their status 
as independent individuals is ignored and that they are still viewed as the property of 
their parents.413 
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That we are to protect and recognise the autonomy and integrity of a child and his or 
her decision making capacities in no way means that we free not to heed Freeman’s 
warning of the possible dangers that come with complete liberation from parental 
authority.414Failure to heed this cautionary counsel would bring about complete 
emancipation of the child, at the cost of breaking down the moral fibre restrictions of 
society and could potentially foist on a child, an unrealistic expectation to act as a 
mature, responsible decision maker when he or she may not have the emotional or 
experiential capacity to make such a decision. This scenario will be dealt with in 
more detail in subsequent chapters.415 
 
Society must however be careful not to dichotomize a child’s right to autonomy.416 In 
other words, complete support for nurturance at the cost of self-determination and 
vice versa must be avoided.417 One possible way of rectifying this potential problem 
is to invoke the “test of irrationality”. The “test of irrationality” is a so called protection 
mechanism that can be applied when children are entertaining irrational actions.418 
The term irrational action must, however, be strictly defined to prevent an 
unnecessary interference with a child’s right to autonomy.419 Therefore, the “test of 
irrationality” must be confined so that it justifies interventions only to the extent that 
they are necessary to avert the immediate harm, as it must be borne in the minds of 
adults that all need to respect a person’s capacity to take risks and make mistakes, 
regardless of age.420 
 
4 7 The importance of the ‘best interests of the child’ 
Irrespective of the situation that children find themselves in, the Constitution ensures 
that their best interests are of paramount importance.421 Conversely, this right places 
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a duty on all other persons to respect this right and to allot to it the appropriate 
protection and application. The application of this right is particularly challenging due 
to the fact that section 28(2) of the Constitution fails to define what the best interests 
of the child are.422 Likewise, the Constitution fails to define the term paramount 
importance.423 This lack of clarity can and has resulted in a range of different 
interpretations, even by the courts as seen in the case of De Reuck v Director of 
Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division).424  In the High Court judgment, 
Epstein AJ held that: 
 
“a child’s best interests…is the single most important factor to be considered when balancing 
or weighing competing rights and interests concerning children. All competing rights must 
defer to the rights of children unless unjustifiable.”
425 
 
When heard in the Constitutional Court, the High Court judgment was overruled. In 
the words of Langa DCJ:426 
 
“…that section 28(2) trumps other provisions of the Bill of Rights…would be alien to the 
approach adopted by this Court that constitutional rights are mutually interrelated and 
interdependent and form a single constitutional value system.”
427
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De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions428 is by no means the first time that a 
South African court was approached to consider the best interests of the child. From 
as early as 1948 in the case of Fletcher v Fletcher,429 the South African courts had to 
determine what was in the best interests of the child.430 Fletcher v Fletcher431 is well-
known for being the case where the then Appellate Division (the Supreme Court of 
Appeal today) placed at the pinnacle of its consideration the “paramount/best 
interests” rule.  
 
Since Fletcher v Fletcher,432 the best interests principle has found a measure of 
consistent application, in cases of varying nature and content, where children are 
involved, either directly or indirectly.433 Some of these cases are considered below, 
due to the fact that they provide clear insight into how the courts interpret and fulfil 
the obligation placed on it by section 28(2) of the Constitution.  
 
V v V434 was an action for divorce and ancillary relief. The plaintiff and defendant 
were married but it was “common cause that the marriage had ended and that a 
divorce should be granted.”435 This however was not the contentious issue of this 
case. The major dispute related to the custody of the two biological children born out 
of the marriage. The plaintiff (husband/father) sought an order for sole custody of the 
children but was prepared to allow the defendant (wife/mother) supervised access to 
the children. Reasons submitted by the plaintiff in support of the court awarding him 
sole custody were firstly, that the defendant had become involved in a lesbian 
relationship436 (and he did not want his children exposed to this lifestyle)437and 
secondly, that the defendant suffered from a mental health disorder known as 
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Borderline Personality Disorder and at the time of the case she was allegedly still 
suffering from the disorder.438 
 
The court held that in a case such as this, the children’s’ rights are paramount and 
need to be protected and, as such, it may be required that action be taken for the 
benefit of the child which “cuts across” the parents’ rights.439 
 
From the reasons given by the plaintiff in his application for sole custody, it is clear 
that section 9 of the Constitution (the equality clause) had been infringed, as 
“everyone” has the right to be treated equally no matter what his or her sexual 
orientation is.440 In law, it is wrong to describe a homosexual orientation as 
abnormal, as decided in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen,441 a case which the plaintiff 
relied on. The court did, however, comment in its judgment that there was nothing 
wrong with the lifestyle that the defendant has chosen for herself, but that the 
children may end up having peer problems at a later stage. As a result, so the 
argument went, it may be in the best interests of the children to “discriminate” 
against the lesbian mother.442 The court would invoke section 36 of the Constitution 
to justify such a limitation and discrimination of the defendant as well as section 
28(2) of the Constitution. 
 
As the case progressed, the court found that the plaintiff and defendant had retained 
a measure of respect for each other, and that neither was using the children in a 
vindictive manner.443 It was therefore held that it would be better for the children to 
have access to both parents and, as such, it was in the best interests of the children 
for their parents to have joint custody.444 V v V445 clearly demonstrates how the court 
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used both the Constitution and other law to reach an amicable decision that 
benefited all parties. 
 
Had this case been heard before the IC had been promulgated and implemented, 
the defendant would most likely not have been given joint custody as a result of her 
lifestyle.446 In other words, due to her sexual orientation the court may have granted 
the plaintiff sole custody.  
 
The case of Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen447 firmly supports this point as this case was 
decided prior to the IC and the court held that homosexuality was “per se 
abnormal”.448 A further reason for refusing joint custody in V v V449 (had it been 
heard before the IC), is that seeing a woman sharing a bed with another woman and 
not a man would send wrong signals to children as they know what is considered as 
correct, and these wrong signals could be detrimental to the child and not in their 
best interests.450 
 
More recently, the best interests test was applied in the Constitutional Court (CC) 
case of S v M (Centre for Child Law: Amicus Curiae).451 M, the applicant in this 
matter, had been found guilty of repeated credit card fraud, for which she was 
sentenced to four years of direct imprisonment.452 Her attempts to apply for leave to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
when children were handicapped, very young or a girl. However, in Van der Linde v Van der Linde 
1996 3 SA 509 (O), the court declared that mothers were not necessarily better than fathers on a day-
to-day basis and that a parent’s role is not to be simply determined by gender. In other words, a father 
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also rejected in Madiehe v Madiehe 1997 2 All SA 153 (B) where the Court stated that custody is not 
a gender privilege or right. It did say however, that in the case of doubt, the Court may award custody 
to a mother. These cases were instrumental in ensuring that in all custody cases, the child’s interests 
must be paramount. 
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 1998 4 SA 169 (C). 
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referenced by de Vos “The Right of a Lesbian Mother to have Access to her Children: Some 
Constitutional Issues” 1994 (111) SALJ 687. See V v V 1998 4 SA 169 (C) 188D-F. 
451
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appeal were refused by both the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA).453 
Following this, M applied to the CC for leave to appeal against the refusal of the SCA 
and the sentence imposed by the High Court.454 The CC refused the first ground of 
M’s appeal but it did allow the second part, namely the appeal against the sentence 
imposed by the High Court.455 
 
Sachs J, who delivered the majority judgment for the CC, held that the Regional 
Magistrate had failed to take into account the best interests of M’s children and the 
impact that her verdict (sending M to prison) would have on them.456 In short, the CC 
held that the scope of the best interests principle had extended beyond custody and 
maintenance matters to include alternative matters in the new constitutional 
dispensation.457 Therefore, in view of this, it can be assumed that the court readily 
considered and applied section 28(2) to the case before it. 
 
Although not disputing the seriousness of M’s conduct and the offences for which 
she was convicted, Sachs J believed that sending M to prison would not be in the 
best interests of her children, given the fact that M was a single parent who was 
almost totally responsible for the upbringing and care of her children.458 Ms Cawood, 
a social worker, also reported that alternative care by non-family or even by M’s 
sister and M’s eldest child’s father would not be in the best interests of the 
children.459 Furthermore, it would not be beneficial to M’s victims if she was 
incarcerated, as she would then be unable to repay those she had defrauded.460 
 
With this in mind, the CC granted leave to appeal against the sentence imposed by 
the High Court and upheld the appeal.461 The CC additionally set aside the High 
Court sentence and replaced it with correctional supervision.462 
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454
 Para 4. 
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Not only does S v M463 demonstrate the correct approach to be taken by a court 
when children are involved in the matter, but it also provides support for the view that 
children should be seen as independent people who are not mere extensions of 
adults. This can be inferred from Sachs J statement:  
 
“If a child is to be constitutionally imagined as an individual with a distinctive personality, and 
not merely as a miniature adult waiting to reach full size, he or she cannot be treated as a 
mere extension of his or her parents, umbilically destined to sink or swim with them. The 
unusually comprehensive and emancipatory character of section 28 [in the Bill of Rights, 
dealing with the rights of children] presupposes that in our new dispensation the sins and 
traumas of fathers and mothers should not be visited on their children.”
464
 
 
Hay v B465 is a further South African case where the court observed the fundamental 
principle enumerated in section 28(2) of the Constitution.466 Very briefly, Hay v B467 
saw applicant Dr Nicoletta Hay (a paediatrician) apply to the High Court for an order 
authorising her to administer a blood transfusion to the baby of the first and second 
respondents. The respondents were members of the Jehovah’s Witness faith and 
accordingly were opposed to blood transfusions.468 In her testimony, the applicant 
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 The CC recently gave judgment in the case S v S 2011 2 SACR 88 (CC). The facts of this case 
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additional requirement that the child is duly supported by a parent or guardian. See s 129(2) and (3) 
of the Children’s Act. 
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 2003 3 SA 492 (W). See also Carstens & Pearmain Foundational Principles of SA Medical Law 
922 and Malherbe Legal Issues Arising from the Medical Use of Blood on Children of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses 11. 
468
 Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse blood transfusions as transfusions are prohibited in several Biblical 
passages, namely, Genesis 9 v 3-4, Leviticus 17 v 10-14, Acts 15 v 19-21 and Acts 15 v 28-29. In 
these verses, people were told to abstain from blood among other things. The adherence to and 
respect for this belief is so important for believers that “each baptized members, regardless of age, 
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emphasised the importance and the urgency of the relief she sought, stating that 
while there was no guarantee that the baby would survive if given the blood 
transfusion, the probability of the baby dying if it did not receive the blood transfusion 
was certain.469 
 
Having heard testimony, Jajbhay J granted the order sought by the applicant. In 
giving reasons for his judgment, Jajbhay J held that a child’s best interests were of 
paramount importance in every matter concerning the child,470 adding that it was “the 
single most important factor to be considered when balancing or weighing competing 
rights and interests concerning children.”471 Along with several other principles, 
Jajbhay J stated these principles “should apply in dealing with the first and second 
respondents’ objections to the administration of the blood transfusion.”472 It was 
further held that the right to life is a constitutionally protected value.473 Seeing that 
the baby’s life was in imminent danger, as testified to by the applicant, and that the 
right to life was and is inviolable, it was in the best interests of the baby that the right 
to life be protected by authorising the blood transfusion.474 It was also held that the 
respondent’s private religious beliefs had to be respected, and that their concerns 
were understandable. However, their concerns were neither reasonable nor 
justifiable, nor could their private beliefs override the baby’s right to life.475 Following 
careful consideration, it was stated that the interests of the baby in receiving the 
blood transfusion outweighed the reasons put forward by the respondents in 
opposing the transfusion.476 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
carries a signed - and legally binding - advance health-care directive or durable power of attorney 
which explicitly directs that no transfusions of whole blood, red cells, white cells, platelets, or plasma 
be given to them under any circumstances, even if health-care providers believe it is necessary to 
preserve life.” See Malherbe Legal Issues Arising from the Medical Use of Blood on Children of 
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It is evident from the cases mentioned above that the interpretation that seems to be 
favoured with regard to the reach of section 28(2) is that the section cannot be 
limited to the rights enumerated in section 28(1) and must therefore, be interpreted 
to extend beyond these rights.477 
 
4 8 Conclusion 
From the discussion thus far it has been established that following the constitutional 
transformation in South Africa, children’s rights grew from a mere one line into the 
section that is presently contained in section 28 of the Constitution. Furthermore, it 
has been argued that children are not only the bearers of the rights listed in section 
28 of the Constitution but that they are also the holders of all rights in the Bill of 
Rights, with the exception of section 19(3).478 
 
The discussion has also revealed that in accordance with section 28(2) of the 
Constitution, the judicial system regards the best interests of the child to be of 
paramount importance. What specifically constitutes the best interests of children is 
unclear as the Constitution fails to define this concept. Therefore, in the past, the 
courts had to rely on previous court interpretations. These interpretations, as argued 
above, were generally well suited to custody cases and not much else.479 However, 
section 28(2) extends the application of this standard to all matters affecting children. 
Nonetheless, as stipulated in De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions 
(Witwatersrand Local Division),480 the best interests of a child cannot be seen to 
trump the rights of others, as all rights are mutually interrelatedand interdependent 
and form a single constitutional value system.481 
 
In the discussion to follow, the focus will shift to ordinary legislation that has a 
bearing on a child’s capacity to make a decision relating to medical treatment. 
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Furthermore, this discussion will include an examination of national health legislation 
in preparation for the discussion to follow in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 
South African legislation 
 
5 1  Introduction 
While acknowledging that the Constitution remains the supreme law of the land,482 
and therefore, the ultimate reference point for South Africa’s society as a whole, 
there are further statutes that are specific to amongst others, children and health. 
These statutes provide additional protection of rights and support and supplement 
the Constitution.483 
 
Having already commented upon the constitutional position and status of children in 
South Africa,484 the focus of this chapter will be on the additional statutes that 
supplement the Bill of Rights. Of particular importance to this study are the 
Children’s Act,485CoToPA,486 the National Health Act (hereafter NHA)487 and the 
Human Tissue Act (hereafter the HTA).488 Each of these statutes impacts upon 
children, parents, the State and the medical profession in some or other way.   
 
The discussion that follows will concentrate on how the various relevant pieces of 
legislation make provision for a child’s participation in matters relating to his or her 
health and welfare. It will also be determined if these statutes demonstrate adequate 
respect for a child’s right to bodily integrity and autonomy. 
 
A study of the above-mentioned statutes is undertaken both to determine how each 
Act supplements the Bill of Rights and to observe South Africa’s fulfilment or non-
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fulfilment of obligations placed on it, by virtue of its status as a State Party to various 
international and regional human and children’s rights instruments.489 
 
5 2  Children’s Act490 
Following the adoption of the Constitution, many of the pre-existing statutes had to 
be re-written and re-worded.491 One statute, which underwent this procedure in 
1997, was the Child Care Act.492 The redrafting procedure commenced following the 
recommendations of then Minister of Welfare and Population Development, 
Geraldine Fraser Moleketi. These recommendations resulted in the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development493 requesting the South African Law 
Commission (hereafter the SALC) to include a review of child care legislation into the 
programme of the SALC.494 The Commission interpreted the mandate that it was 
given broadly, and consequently, sought to use the constitutional, regional and 
international law495 imperatives to draft a new and more comprehensive statute that 
would promote and protect children’s rights.496 The results of this interpretation lead 
to the writing of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005.497 
 
The aims of the Children’s Act, as set out in the long title are to, inter alia, 
supplement and give effect to certain rights which a child has in the Bill of Rights, 
and to set out principles relating to the care and protection of children.498 Added to 
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this, the Children’s Act also aims to provide children with special protective 
measures not necessarily provided for in the long title of the Act or the Bill of 
Rights.499 In short, the provisions of the Children’s Act aim to provide this country’s 
(South Africa) children with the necessary protection and safeguards that will ensure 
that their constitutional rights are being upheld, and that their overall well-being and 
protection, is being promoted as well.  
 
To this end, the discussion that appears below (on the Children’s Act) will be 
restricted to the provisions that have bearing on a child’s right to bodily integrity and 
autonomy, relate to medical treatment and / or have been implemented to fulfil South 
Africa’s international and regional law obligations.500 
 
5 2 1  General principles and special protective measures of the Children’s Act  
as they relate to the health of children501 
By now it has been determined that children have the right to bodily integrity and 
autonomy, which in the simplest of terms means that a child has the right to 
determine what happens to his or her body (self-determination).502 Therefore, before 
anything is done to the body of a child, his or her consent is theoretically required.503 
Without this consent, any contact with a child’s body could potentially amount to 
assault.504 For purposes of medical treatment and surgical operations, children are 
considered to have the capacity to consent, if they comply with two requirements, 
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Care Act Discussion Paper 103 88. 
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namely, age (twelve years and above) and maturity.505 Therefore, despite a child 
being vested with the rights to bodily integrity and autonomy, children are generally 
regarded as lacking the necessary capacity to make decisions regarding their 
medical care before the age of twelve.506 
 
Section 129(4) of the Children’s Act provides: 
 
“The parent, guardian or care-giver of a child may, subject to section 31, consent to the 
medical treatment of the child if the child is- 
(a) under the age of 12 years; or 
(b) over that age but is of insufficient maturity or is unable to understand the benefits, risks 
and social implications of the treatment.” 
 
Whereas section 129(4) of the Children’s Act makes provision for medical treatment, 
section 129(5) of the Children’s Act relates to consent for surgical operations on 
children. Section 129(5) provides: 
 
“The parent or guardian of a child may, subject to section 31, consent to a surgical operation on 
the child if the child is- 
(a) under the age of 12 years; or 
(b) over that age but is of insufficient maturity or is unable to understand the benefits, risks  
and social implications of the operation.” 
 
In both section 129(4) and (5), a child under the age of twelve is considered to lack 
the necessary capacity to consent to treatment or surgery. In these circumstances, a 
parent or guardian may consent to the treatment or surgery of the child in question 
when they believe this to be in the best interests of the child.507 Although not stated, 
                                                          
505
 Kassan & Mahery “Special Child Protective Measures in the Children’s Act” in Child Law in SA 
208-209.  
506
 A child is also regarded as lacking the necessary capacity to consent if that child is over the age of 
twelve, but is not mature enough or is subsequently unable to understand the benefits and risks of the 
medical treatment or surgery he or she is to undergo. Prior to the enactment of the Children’s Act, the 
Child Care Act 74 of 1983 was the authoritative statute on children and it held that the age of consent 
was fourteen years for medical treatment and eighteen years for surgical operations respectively. See 
s 39(4) of the Child Care Act. One exception to this statement is the right to consent to the termination 
of a pregnancy, as will be seen in the discussion below. 
507
 Refer to the Health Care Professions Council of South Africa Guidelines for Good Practice in the 
Healthcare Professions Seeking Patients’ Informed Consent: The Ethical Considerations Booklet 9 
(2008) 9 available at 
www.hpcsa.co.za/downloads/conduct_ethics/rules/generic_ethical_rules/booklet_9_informed_consent
76 
 
it can be inferred that if a parent can consent, they are equally entitled to refuse 
treatment or surgery, if they believe it not to be in the best interests of the child.508 
While parents and guardians have the right to refuse treatment, health care 
professionals are not bound by this refusal, and may approach the court asking for a 
ruling to be made on the matter.509 
 
The right to consent that a parent or guardian has in section 129(4) and (5) is subject 
to the condition stipulated in section 31 of the Children’s Act.510 The condition is that 
the views and wishes of the child in question must be given due consideration511 
before any decision, which is likely to significantly change, or have an adverse effect 
on a child’s health, is made.512 
 
The fact that the views of a child must be given due consideration can be said to 
stem from a child’s right to participate, as provided by section 10 of the Children’s 
Act.513 Section 10 states: 
 
“[e]very child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to be able to 
participate in any matter concerning that child has the right to participate in an appropriate 
way and views expressed by the child must be given due consideration.”  
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The use of the words ‘any matter’ makes allowance for a child to participate in 
matters affecting his or her health.514 
 
When a child reaches the age of twelve, and provided they are of sufficient maturity, 
they are deemed to be competent enough to consent to medical treatment and 
surgical procedures. Originally, the age of consent for medical treatment was 
fourteen years of age, but this was reduced by the provisions in section 129 of the 
Children’s Act.515 
 
Section 129(2) of the Children’s Act states: 
 
“A child may consent to his or her own medical treatment or to the medical treatment of his or 
her child if – 
(a) the child is over the age of 12 years; and 
(b) the child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits, 
risks, social and other implications of the treatment.” 
 
With the introduction of the Children’s Act, the age of consent for surgical operations 
was also lowered - this time from eighteen years of age to twelve years of age.516 
The lowering of the age of consent has been described as “a welcome recognition of 
children’s autonomy and evolving capacity.”517 Section 129(3) provides: 
 
“A child may consent to the performance of a surgical operation on him or her or his or her 
child if- 
(a) the child is over the age of 12 years; and 
(b) the child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits,  
risks, social and other implications of the surgical operation; and 
(c) the child is duly assisted by his or her parent or guardian.” 
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Although section 129(3) recognises that a child of twelve presumably has the 
capacity to consent to surgery, it requires that he or she still be duly assisted by a 
parent or guardian.518 In the event that the parent who needs to consent to surgery is 
still a minor themself, he or she requires the assistance of his or her own parent or 
guardian to consent to the surgery.519 Should a parent or guardian refuse to duly 
assist the child when he or she (the child) consents to the surgery, the Minister of 
Social Development may consent to the surgical operation.520 
 
The uniform age of consent in regard to medical treatment and operations, is now 
twelve years of age.521 The age limit for both medical treatment and surgery was 
lowered to twelve years of age, following the recommendations of the SALC. The 
SALC recommended that the age at which a child may consent to medical treatment 
be lowered to twelve years of age and that, until the age of eighteen is attained, a 
child cannot consent to an operation without parental assistance.522 The lowering of 
the age of consent followed comments received on certain recommendations made 
by the SALC, a consideration of South African law and policy and, a review of law on 
this topic in other countries.523 
 
As mentioned above, for purposes of a child consenting to medical treatment or 
surgical operations, two requirements must be complied with, age (twelve years and 
above) and maturity (sufficient maturity). In other words, the Children’s Act uses 
what has been termed as a ‘combined approach’ to determine a child’s capacity to 
consent.524 This approach, despite being an improvement on the Child Care 
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Act,525does present a problem. The combined approach fails to factor in that some 
children below the age of twelve may in fact be of sufficient maturity to consent to 
medical treatment and or surgery.526 While it is generally presumed that children lack 
the maturity to make decisions, (especially a decision as important as that relating to 
their health) saying that all children under the age of twelve are not sufficiently 
mature arguably restricts a child’s autonomy unnecessarily.527 On this issue, 
Reynolds warns that “restricting children’s autonomy unduly stunts their ability to 
judge and to make decisions for themselves and, therefore hampers their 
development as autonomous persons.”528 
 
In an attempt to address the problem of the combined approach, namely that a child 
who is of sufficient maturity but under the age of twelve cannot consent; a position 
similar to that adopted in the English case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech 
Area Health Authority529 may be implemented into the Children’s Act. In this case, 
the House of Lords confirmed that where a child has “sufficient understanding and 
intelligence to understand the nature and implication of the proposed treatment” he 
or she is permitted to consent to medical treatment, and is known as “Gillick 
Competent”, rendering parental consent unnecessary.530 The House of Lords did not 
restrict a child’s capacity to an age limit but rather to their maturity.531 Should this 
approach not be suited to South African law, the recommendation that the wording of 
section 129 be changed to read “who by age or maturity”, made by the Children’s 
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 Act 74 of 1983. The Child Care Act followed an age-based approach to determine capacity to 
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age. 
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Rights Project and Local Government Project could be adopted.532 Alternatively, 
recognising that it is a far more time consuming solution, where it appears that a 
child is of sufficient maturity, but has not reached the age of twelve, the matter may 
be brought before a panel or court for consideration. In other words, a case-by-case 
approach should be adopted, to consider whether or not a child not of age but who is 
of sufficient maturity, should be allowed to consent to treatment or surgery.533 
 
In addition to consent from parents or guardians, the superintendent of a hospital, or 
the person in charge when the superintendent is absent, may consent to the medical 
treatment of or surgical operation on a child.534 The superintendent may consent if: 
 
(a) “the treatment or operation is necessary to preserve the life of the child or to save the 
child from serious or everlasting physical injury or disability; and 
(b) the need for the treatment or operation is so urgent that it cannot be deferred for the 
purpose of obtaining consent that would otherwise have been required.” 
 
Likewise, where a child unreasonably refuses to give his or her consent to medical 
treatment or surgical operations, the Minister of Social Development may consent to 
either the medical treatment or surgical operation on the child in question.535 The 
High Court or children’s court may also consent to the medical treatment and 
surgical operation on a child “in all instances where another person that may give 
consent in terms of this section refuses or is unable to give such consent.”536 
 
Section 129 concludes by stating: 
 
“No parent, guardian or care-giver of a child may refuse to assist a child in terms of 
subsection (3) or withhold consent in terms of subsections (4) and (5) by reason only of 
religious or other beliefs, unless that parent or guardian can show that there is a medically 
accepted alternative choice to the medical treatment or surgical operation concerned.”
537
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Section 129(10) can be viewed as a welcome development “insofar as a parent’s 
religious beliefs may not trump the best interests of a child.”538 Although the best 
interests of the child are of paramount importance, to say “that all competingrights 
must defer to the rights of children unless unjustifiable”, is incorrect.539 This approach 
is incorrect as “constitutional rights are mutually interrelated and interdependent and 
form a single constitutional value system.”540 Therefore, should there be a conflict 
between the competing rights of a parent’s right to religion and a child’s right, such 
as the right to life, the matter requires a balancing of the competing rights. This 
approach was adopted by the court in the case of Hay v B.541 As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the case of Hay v B542 saw the applicant (Dr Hay) approach the court, 
asking for an order allowing her to administer blood to the baby of a Jehovah’s 
Witness couple, who refused the transfusion on religious grounds. The court granted 
the order, allowing the transfusion to take place. Jajhbay J held that, although the 
respondents’ right to religion must be respected and that their concerns were 
understandable, these concerns were neither reasonable nor justifiable and their 
belief could therefore not outweigh the child’s right to life.543 
 
In addition to religion, section 129(10) states that a parent cannot refuse to assist a 
child or withhold consent by reason of ‘other beliefs’. The inclusion of the words 
‘other beliefs’ extends the application of section 129(10) to traditional medicine,544 
thereby covering those South Africans who prefer to make use of traditional 
medicine as opposed to conventional medicine. For example, in 2006, the MEC for 
Social Development in Gauteng was petitioned by the Centre for Child Law to 
intervene and grant permission for a six year old girl to undergo brain surgery. At the 
time, the little girl had a cyst on her brain causing severe pressure which, if left 
unattended, would result in the child’s death. The girl’s father had been advised by a 
traditional healer to refuse the surgery. As the refusal of surgery was not in the best 
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interests of the girl, it was ordered that surgery be performed.545 While it can be 
acknowledged that a person’s beliefs are fundamental to the way they live and 
conduct themselves, it should not impede a child’s right to health and life.   
Furthermore, it must be highlighted that section 129(10) states that: 
 
“[n]o parent, guardian or care-giver of a child may refuse to assist a child…or withhold 
consent…unless that parent or guardian can show that there is a medically accepted 
alternative choice to the medical treatment or surgical operation concerned.”  
 
This provision means then that, if a parent can successfully prove there is another 
feasible and accepted alternative to surgery, their refusal on religious grounds may 
be upheld. There are currently several alternative techniques that have been 
proposed as a substitute to blood transfusions, which will most certainly be viewed 
as a welcome success amongst members of the Jehovah’s Witness faith.546 
 
5 2 2 The distinction between medical treatment and surgical operations 
Section 129 of the Children’s Act draws a distinction between medical treatment and 
surgical operations, for purposes of consent. The Act, like its predecessor,547 
however, fails to define these two terms, despite the SALC recommendation that 
these terms be defined.548 While these terms are not defined in the Children’s Act, 
‘medical treatment’ “is generally understood to include all procedures other than 
those requiring surgical intervention.” This definition of medical treatment can be 
viewed as including blood transfusions, which has potential ramifications for 
members of the Jehovah’s Witness faith. Members of this faith are known around the 
world for their consistent refusal of blood transfusions on religious grounds.549 
Parents refuse this treatment both for themselves and their children.550 However, if 
medical treatment is seen to include all treatment that is non-surgical, it means that a 
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child who is over the age twelve (section 129(2) of the Children’s Act) may consent 
to a blood transfusion, even if it is against the values of their belief and that of their 
parents.551 
 
This interpretation of medical treatment however, seems to be at odds with other 
interpretations of medical treatment, for the following reasons. Firstly, it would seem 
that the term medical treatment is used in a general sense and should therefore be 
seen as wide enough to include medical operations.552 Secondly, according to 
Bekink, to distinguish between treatment and operations amounts to a contradiction 
in terms and this is a matter which accordingly requires clarification.553 It must be 
noted that Bekink’s definition of medical treatment includes medical operations. 
Therefore, what constitutes non-medical surgery needs to be determined. It is 
submitted that non-medical surgery includes plastic surgery, which is done to 
enhance the body and for no other reason.554 If this rationale is to be followed, it can 
be argued that, in terms of the wording of section 129, assistance by parents or 
guardians for medical surgery will no longer be necessary, as it falls within the 
parameters of treatment, which only requires consent from a child.555 
 
5 2 3 ‘Best interests of the child standard’ 
From the discussion above, it is acknowledged that, in terms of the law, children 
below the age of twelve or who are of insufficient maturity, are deemed to lack the 
capacity to consent to their own medical treatment or surgical operations.556 Section 
129 of the Children’s Act stipulates that, in these instances, a parent or guardian 
may consent to the proposed treatment or surgery on behalf of the child. As a parent 
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or guardian, the decision that is made must reflect what will be in the best interests 
of the child.557 
 
The duty or obligation that a parent has to act in the best interests of the child, can 
be inferred from several sections of law. Section 28(2) of the Constitution clearly 
states that best interests of the child are of paramount importance in all matters.558 
Furthermore, section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution guarantees every child the right to 
parental care. This right, when read together with the definition of care in the 
Children’s Act, extends to include “generally ensuring that the best interests of the 
child are the paramount concern in all matters affecting the child.”559 Therefore, a 
parent has the duty to ensure that he or she is acting in the best interests of their 
child in matters pertaining to the health of the child. 
 
Furthermore, section 9 of the Children’s Act states that “[i]n all matters concerning 
the care, protection and well-being of a child the standard that the child’s best 
interest is of paramount importance, must be applied.” In that decisions relating to 
health concern the care and well-being of children, section 7 of the Children’s Act 
must be applied.560 Unlike section 28(2) of the Constitution, section 7 of the 
Children’s Act provides a list of factors that must be taken into consideration when 
determining what is in the best interests of a child.561 
 
Prior to the enactment of the Children’s Act, the best interests of a child were 
generally determined by utilising the list of factors provided for by King J in the case 
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of McCall v McCall.562 This case represents the first time that a comprehensive list of 
factors was provided according to which a court could refer in order to determine the 
best interests of a child.563 This list of factors represented what King J explained as 
being the sort of factors the court should take into account when deciding custody 
issues.564 Therefore, when the SALC was tasked with reviewing child care legislation 
in South Africa, it was convinced that the courts and other users of the new 
children’s statute were in desperate need of understanding what exactly was meant 
by the words, “a decision or action must be in the best interests of a child.”565 The 
recommendation put forward by the Commission was that guidelines needed to be 
set in place, which resulted in the inclusion of section 7(1)(a)-(n).566 
 
The provision of this list of factors for the determination of the best interests of the 
child can be seen as a welcome development in law due to its wide application.567 
However, this is a closed list of factors, allowing the court no possibility for 
consideration of alternative factors.568 The fact that section 7(1) is a closed list, 
allows for the argument to be made that it is a “pre-determined formula”. The 
Constitutional Court has previously held that applying a pre-determined formula is 
contrary to the best interests of the child.569 As a way of possibly overcoming this 
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problem, the courts could consider “all relevant factors” to determine the best 
interests of the child.570 Theoretically, this would mean that courts would be able to 
consider any factor they deem necessary, in addition to the factors listed in section 
7(1).  
 
5 3  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act  
While section 129 of the Children’s Act restricts a child’s right to consent with respect 
to surgical operations, it in no way limits a young girl’s right to consent to the 
termination of her pregnancy.571 Section 5(1) of CoToPA states that the termination 
of a pregnancy may only take place with the informed consent of the pregnant 
woman. Section 5(2) of the Act supports section 5(1) by stating that “…no consent 
other than that of the pregnant woman is required for the termination of a 
pregnancy.”572 For purposes of this Act, a woman is defined as “any female person 
of any age.”573 By virtue of this definition, section 5(1)-(2) of the Act and section 
129(1) of the Children’s Act, read together, a woman (any female of any age) 
including a girl has the right to consent to the termination of her pregnancy and 
requires no additional support or consent.574 
 
Having said that only the consent of the woman is required for the termination of 
pregnancy, there is one notable exception. According to section 5(4), someone other 
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than the woman, such as a spouse or legal guardian575 may consent to the 
termination of pregnancy in the case where a woman is: 
 
    “(a) severely mentally disabled to such an extent that she is completely 
         incapable of understanding and appreciating the nature or consequences 
         of a termination of her pregnancy; or 
     (b) in a state of continuous unconsciousness and there is no reasonable 
         prospect that she will regain consciousness in time to request and to 
         consent to the termination of her pregnancy in terms of section 2, her 
         pregnancy may be terminated during the first 12 weeks of the gestation 
         period, or from the 13th up to and including the 20th week of the 
         gestation period on the grounds set out in section 2(1)(b).” 
 
Although parental consent is needed for treatment or surgical operations on children 
below twelve years of age, it is clear from the wording of CoToPA that a girl child of 
any age may consent to the termination of her pregnancy. This ability to consent 
extends to any medical treatment associated with the termination of pregnancy, 
provided she has given her informed consent and is capable of doing so.576 
 
5 4  National Health Act and Human Tissue Act 
Thus far it has been seen that the Children’s Act regulates a child’s and parent’s 
right to consent to medical treatment and surgical operations which are to be carried 
out on a child.577 In the same vein, it has been shown that with regards to the 
termination of pregnancies, the discretion and decision lies solely with a woman, 
which is inclusive of girls of any age.578 In the discussion that follows, chapter 8579 of 
the NHA will be considered in preparation for the study that follows in Chapter 6.580 
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Of the provisions in chapter 8, sections 55 and 56 are particularly relevant, as are 
some of the regulations of the NHA.581 The significance of these sections and 
regulations is directly linked to the fact that in today’s society, there are alternative 
medical treatments that can be undertaken as opposed to using conventional 
medicine.582 As some of these alternative treatments involve using tissue, blood or 
blood products, and even cells from embryos and living persons, it must be 
determined how the law regulates these procedures and who can consent to their 
removal.583 
 
5 4 1  Existing national health framework 
On 28 April 2010, the President of South Africa held that sections 55, 56, 68 and 
93(1) of the NHA would become operational from 17 May 2010.584 The operation of 
these sections replaces the out-dated sections in the HTA.585 Sections 55 and 56 
regulate the removal and use of tissue,586 blood, blood products587 or gametes588 
from living persons.589 
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Section 55 of the NHA states: 
 
“A person may not remove tissue, blood, a blood product or gametes from the body of another 
living person for the purpose referred to in section 56 unless it is done- 
a)      with the written consent of the person from whom the tissue, blood, blood product or 
gametes are removed granted in the prescribed manner; and 
b)      in accordance with prescribed conditions.” 
 
Section 55 requires the written consent of the person from whom the tissue, blood 
and blood products are being removed. The removal of tissue, blood and blood 
products amounts to a medical procedure. Therefore, although the section requires 
the consent of the person from whom the products are being removed, where the 
removal is from a child, the rules of section 129 of the Children’s Act apply. In other 
words, where the child is below the age of twelve, it is accepted that his or her 
parent or guardian may consent to the removal of tissue, blood and blood 
products.590 Should the child be over the age of twelve and be of sufficient maturity, 
it is the child who consents to the removal of tissue or blood, but with the 
assistance of a parent or guardian.591 
 
Section 55 further requires that, in addition to obtaining written consent, the removal 
of blood, blood products and tissue may be done only in accordance with prescribed 
conditions. According to section 1 of the NHA, prescribed means prescribed by 
regulation under section 90. Section 90 states that “[t]he Minister, after consultation 
with the National Health Council, may make regulations regarding anything which 
may or must be prescribed in terms of this Act.” 
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s 1. 
589
 The regulation of the removal of blood, blood products and tissue is important for the discussion on 
‘benefactor children’ and ‘saviour siblings’ that follows in Chapter 6. This chapter will show that tissue, 
blood and blood products are commonly needed to cure diseases when medicinal treatment or 
conventional treatment fails.  
590
 That a parent can consent to the removal of tissue and other bodily components is worrisome, 
especially if the child happens to be a ‘benefactor child’ or ‘saviour sibling’. This is a matter to be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
591
 S 18(b) of the HTA required parents or guardians to give consent where a child was still a minor, 
thus strengthening the statement that the conditions employed in s 129(3) and (5) must be invoked in 
the application of s 55 of the NHA. Ss 55 and 56 are extremely important to the discussion on 
‘benefactor children’ and ‘saviour siblings’.  
90 
 
In May 2010, the Minister of Health after consultation with the National Health 
Council made the following regulations -Regulations Relating to the Withdrawal of 
Blood from a Living Person for Testing.592 From the wording of these regulations, 
there are certain conditions mentioned that must be met in order for tissue, blood 
and blood products to be removed or withdrawn. However, the regulations are not 
extensive and still leaves the reader unsure as to what conditions must be met 
before the withdrawal or removal takes place.593 
 
Section 55 provides the requirements that must be met before blood, blood 
products and tissue may be removed for the purposes in section 56. Therefore, the 
two sections must be read together to have full understanding of the provisions in 
each. Section 56 states: 
 
“1)      A person may use tissue or gametes removed or blood or a blood product withdrawn 
from a living person only for such medical or dental purposes as may be prescribed. 
 2)        a)        Subject to paragraph (b), the following tissue, blood, blood products or gametes 
may not be removed or withdrawn from a living person for any purpose contemplated in 
subsection (1): 
i)          Tissue, blood, a blood product or a gamete from a person who is mentally 
ill within the meaning of the Mental Health Care Act, 2002 (Act No. 17 of 
2002); 
ii)         tissue which is not replaceable by natural processes from a person 
younger than 18 years: 
iii)        a gamete from a person younger than 18 years; or 
iv)        placenta, embryonic or foetal tissue, stem cells and umbilical cord, 
excluding umbilical cord progenitor cells. 
b)        The Minister may authorise the removal or withdrawal of tissue, blood, a blood 
product or gametes contemplated in paragraph (a) and may impose any 
condition which may be necessary in respect of such removal or withdrawal.”
594
 
 
                                                          
592
 This regulation became operational on 17 May 2010. 
593
 See Regulations Relating to the Withdrawal of Blood from a Living Person for Testing GN R 401 in 
GG 33188 of 2010-05-14. 
594
 The wording of s 56 of the NHA has given rise to many concerns about academic freedom and the 
freedom of scientific research, which are both entrenched in s 16(1)(d) of the Constitution. See 
Swanepoel 2010 THRHR 9.Furthermore, the wording of s 56(2)(a)(iv) appears to create a loophole in 
the law. By virtue of using the words “living person”, it can be argued that while still a foetus in the 
womb, it is not considered as a living being, which could potentially allow for procedures such as the 
removal of stem cells to take place in-utero. 
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Section 56(1) states that a person may use blood, blood products, tissue and/or 
gametes “withdrawn from a living person only for such medical or dental purposes as 
may be prescribed.” As seen above, prescribed means prescribed by regulation 
under section 90. The regulations enacted by the Minister of Health in May 2010, 
namely Regulations Relating to the Withdrawal of Blood from a Living Person for 
Testing, apply not only to section 55 but to section 56 as well. However, the various 
regulations making up the Regulations Relating to the Withdrawal of Blood from a 
Living Person for Testing fail to list the medical and dental purposes for which blood, 
blood products and tissue may be withdrawn or removed as referred to in section 56. 
This has resulted in there being a lack of clarity as to which procedures constitute 
the purposes where blood, blood products and tissue may be removed or used.595 
As there exists ambiguity as to which medical and dental purposes will allow for 
tissue and blood to be removed, it is uncertain whether or not South African law 
regulates the removal of cells and tissues from ‘saviour siblings’.596 The issues 
highlighted thus far in relation to ‘saviour siblings’, as well as other matters, will be 
dealt with in more detail in the following chapter.597 
 
Section 56(2) states that subject to Ministerial consent, tissue, gametes, blood and 
blood products referred to in the subsection may not be removed. Put differently, this 
means that without Ministerial consent, stem cells and other cells and tissues cannot 
be removed. The difficulty in removing stem cells, foetal tissue, and umbilical cord 
cells leads one to conclude that the use of these bodily components is a highly 
emotional and controversial matter and has far reaching implications.598 
 
What appears above serves as a mere introduction to the relevant provisions (for 
purposes of this study) of the National Health Act. In Chapter 6, these provisions, 
along with the provisions from international, foreign, regional and other national laws 
                                                          
595
 The Act fails to define prescribed conditions in s 55. 
596
 The Regulations Relating to Human Stem Cells GN R 376 in GG 29840 of 2007-05-04 regulates 
the use of stem cells for very specific purposes which, from a lay person’s understanding, does not 
appear to include stem cells taken from ‘saviour siblings’. 
597
 Chapter 6 will also consider the matter of ‘benefactor children’. 
598
 Cases from England will reveal the controversial nature of designing ‘saviour siblings’ in order to 
use cells and tissue as a form of treatment for an ill sibling. See Chapter 6. 
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will be applied to determine what the effects of the scientific advancement in 
genetics (‘saviour siblings’) are on a child’s rights to bodily integrity and autonomy.599 
 
Although a comprehensive analysis of chapter 8 of the NHA was not carried out in 
this section of work, it can be argued that “chapter 8 of the National Health Act is 
confusing and incomplete.”600 This particular chapter of the Act can be described as 
confusing and incomplete, as it fails to define several key terms in sections that are 
already operational.601 Further compounding the problem with this chapter, is the 
noticeable lack of clear guidelines and regulations. Although viewed as problematic 
now, “chapter 8 is being revised, and regulations will provide clear guidelines on 
what is permissible and what is not.”602 
 
5 5  Conclusion  
Recent developments in children’s law have seen the age of consent for medical 
treatment and surgery being lowered.  Unlike the Child Care Act,603 where two 
distinct age limits were set in place,604 the newly operational Children’s Act has 
seen the age of consent lowered to a uniform age of twelve.605 The consequence of 
this is that children twelve years and older, are considered capable by law, to 
consent to or refuse any proposed medical treatment or surgery. Therefore, parents 
are now able to consent to treatment or surgery only on a child below the age of 
twelve. Although a child under twelve is not actively making the decision, he or she 
does have the right to participate in the making of the decision, and can therefore 
voice any concerns about the proposed treatment.606 
                                                          
599
 Chapter 6 will also consider how the provisions of the NHA affect ‘benefactor children’ and their 
right to bodily integrity. Chapter 6 will look at whether the right to reproductive freedom includes the 
decision to have a ‘saviour sibling’. Furthermore, as the best interests of the child are of paramount 
importance, Chapter 6 will consider whether it is in the best interests of a ‘benefactor child’ or ‘saviour 
sibling’ to be used as a donor. 
600
 Pepper “Cell-based Therapy – Navigating Troubled Waters” 2010 (5) SAMJ 286 288.  
601
 See the discussion above on ss 55 and 56. 
602
 Pepper 2010 (5) SAMJ 288.  
603
 Act 74 of 1983. 
604
 See s 39(4). The age limit was lowered from fourteen years of age for consenting to medical 
treatment and eighteen years of age for surgery. 
605
 Act 38 of 2005. It was decided, following the recommendations of the SALC, that the recognised 
age for consenting to medical treatment or surgery be lowered to a uniform age of 12. The SALC 
made this particular recommendation only after receiving comments on certain recommendations 
made by the SALC, as well as a consideration of South African law and policy and a review of law on 
this topic in other countries. See Review of the Child Care Act Discussion Paper 103 464-469. 
606
 See s 31 of the Children’s Act. 
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Age alone does not give a child the capacity to consent. The Children’s Act makes 
provision for a combined approach, which means that for a child to have the capacity 
to consent, they must meet two requirements. These requirements are age and 
maturity. Should a child fail to meet either of these requirements, they will be 
regarded as lacking capacity and will be treated in the same manner as a child under 
the age of twelve. 
 
There are some who believe that the new age limit is too low, as a child is regarded 
as lacking capacity at this age.607 There are others though,  who believe that the age 
limit should be removed altogether and that only a mature approach (where only the 
maturity of the child is used to determine capacity) should be adopted.608 This 
submission is made, based on the argument that the age limit is arbitrary and 
undermines and restricts autonomy.609 
 
It must be noted that the age restrictions in section 129 do not affect a woman’s 
right to have an abortion. The initial interpretation of the age provisions in section 
129 of the Children’s Act led many to believe that the age restrictions also applied 
to the termination of pregnancies.610 However, section 129(1) rectifies this 
misinterpretation, by specifically referring to section 5(2) of CoToPA, which clearly 
states that only the consent of the woman (or girl) is needed for the termination of 
pregnancy.611 
 
In terms of the national health legislation discussed in this chapter, the provisions of 
the NHA are bold, but leave much to be desired as a result of vagueness and 
incompleteness. In particular, the sections which are already operational in chapter 
8 fail to define certain terms and procedures and therefore cause uncertainty in the 
application of these sections. Despite these “teething” problems, chapter 8 is being 
                                                          
607
 Sloth-Nielsen “Protection of Children” in Commentary on the Children’s Act 7-35. 
608
 See the discussion under heading 5 2 1 as well as the case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech 
Area Health Authority 1986 AC 112 (HL). 
609
 See Kassan & Mahery “Special Child Protective Measures in the Children’s Act” in Child Law in SA 
214 and Reynolds 2007 International Journal of Children’s Rights 504. 
610
 Kassan & Mahery “Special Child Protective Measures in the Children’s Act” in Child Law in SA 
214. 
611
 A woman is defined as a female of any age for purposes of CoToPA. See s 1(xi) CoToPA. 
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revised, and regulations will provide clear guidelines on what is permissible and 
what is not.612 
 
Regardless of who consents to treatment or surgery on a child, it must be 
remembered that, in any matter, the best interests of the child are of paramount 
importance. Not only does the Constitution require this, but so too does the 
Children’s Act.613 
 
In the course of the next chapter, the law, as addressed in the preceding chapters, 
will be applied to the main topic of this study, namely the ‘saviour sibling/benefactor 
children’ dilemma. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
612
 Pepper 2010 (5) SAMJ 288.  
613
 See ss 7 and 9 of the Children’s Act. 
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CHAPTER 6

 
Tomorrow’s medicine – ‘Benefactor Children’ and ‘Saviour Siblings’: A means 
to an end? 
 
6 1  Introduction   
Thusfar, it has been seen that children are the bearers of rights, including 
international and regional rights. As the bearer of rights, children have the right to 
health and to participate in the making of decisions that have an influence on the 
right to health. In South African law, recent developments have led to changes in the 
age of consent for medical treatment and surgery. The newly operational Children’s 
Act has brought about a lowering in the age of consent from the ages of fourteen and 
eighteen respectively to the uniform age of twelve. Therefore, children of twelve 
years and older are recognised as being capable of consenting to their own medical 
treatment and surgical procedures. Children below the age of twelve, are however, 
still viewed as being incapable of making decisions of this magnitude and require 
parental consent when comes to medical treatment and surgical operations. As 
indicated from the outset, the fact that parents can consent on behalf of a child is 
potentially problematic for two special groups of children, namely ‘benefactor 
children’ and ‘saviour siblings’.  
 
Rapid advancements in the scientific, medical and technological fields over the last 
few decades have given rise to numerous ethical issues and debates. Historically, 
the main issues confronting society centred on the destruction of life,614 at both the 
beginning and end of such life.615 In the 21st century, the greatest ethical concern 
surrounds the creation and manipulation of life, undoubtedly due to the scientific 
                                                          

The intention of this chapter is not to stereotype or judge those who have or who will, in the future, 
resort to creating a ‘saviour sibling’ to save the life of an ailing sibling. Irrespective of individual 
perceptions and opinions towards the concept of ‘saviour siblings’, we must respect those who are 
faced with this arduous decision. 
614
 Wyatt “The New Biotechnology” in Stott Issues facing Christians Today 4th Ed (2006) 419 419. 
The fourth edition was fully revised and updated by Roy McCloughry. 
615
 Destruction of life at the beginning refers to abortion and destruction at the end of life refers to 
euthanasia. Abortion is legal in South Africa as confirmed by CoToPA and to a lesser degree by s 12 
of the Constitution. Active euthanasia is currently illegal in South Africa. However, a patient has the 
right to refuse medical treatment which can result in the premature termination of a person’s life.  
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discovery of DNA616 during the 20th century.617 The discovery of DNA and its double 
helix structure has allowed scientists the opportunity and increasing ability to study 
the entire human genome,618 which has the propensity to enable those within the 
scientific profession to manipulate and alter genetic sequences for their own benefit, 
as well as for the benefit of a select few.619  Although it is human nature to evolve, 
there is a responsibility not to venture so far into the scientific realm that it will result 
in untoward consequences for future generations.620 
 
Should society continue to allow unrestricted and unrestrained advances in the fields 
of medicine, science and, more specifically, genetics, it could result in a pandemic of 
“…threats to our liberty, erosion of our autonomy and a diminution in our moral 
values.”621 
 
Though there are multiple developments occurring in the fields of medicine and 
science, it is the legal and ethical issues stemming from “new biotechnology”622 that 
will be discussed in this chapter, with particular attention being paid to the effects of 
                                                          
616
 The scientific definition of DNA is “[a] macromolecule usually consisting of antiparallel 
polynucleotide chains held together by hydrogen bonds, in which the sugar residues are deoxyribose. 
The primary carrier of genetic information.” Klug & Cummings Essentials of Genetics G-5. DNA was 
discovered by James Watson and Francis Crick in 1953. In recognition of their contribution to science, 
both men, along with Maurice Wilkins, were the recipients of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or 
Medicine in 1962. Nobelprize.org “The Discovery of the Molecular Structure of DNA- The Double 
Helix” www.nobelprize.org/educational/medicine/dna_double_helix/readmore.html  (accessed on 19-
11-2011). 
617
 Dhai, McQuoid-Mason & van Bogaert “Issues in Genetics” in Dhai & McQuoid-Mason (eds) 
Bioethics, Human Rights and Health Law: Principles and Practice (2011) 111 111. 
618
 “The genome is the entire set of genetic instructions found in a cell. In humans, the genome 
consists of 23 pairs of chromosomes, found in the nucleus, as well as a small chromosome found in 
the cells' mitochondria. These chromosomes, taken together, contain approximately 3.1 billion bases 
of DNA sequence.” National Human Genome Research Institute “Genome” 
http://www.genome.gov/Glossary/index.cfm?id=90 (accessed on 13-07-2011). The Human Genome 
Project was established to determine the complete sequence of the DNA subunits, to identify all 
human genes, and to make them accessible for further biological studies. 
619
 Dhai et al “Issues in Genetics” in Bioethics, Human Rights and Health Law 111. 
620
 See Glover Ethics of New Reproductive Technologies: The Glover Report to the European 
Commission (1989) 159. 
621
 Dhai et al “Issues in Genetics” in Bioethics, Human Rights and Health Law 111. 
622
 New biotechnology includes the technologically assisted conception of a child for purposes of 
organ donation (‘saviour siblings’). Jacob “Frail Connections: Legal and Psychiatric Knowledge 
Practices in U.S. Adjudications over Organ Donations by Children and Incompetent Adults” in 
Children’s Health and Children’s Rights 219. 
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this advancement on specific categories of children (‘benefactor children’ and 
‘saviour siblings’) and their rights to bodily integrity and autonomy.623 
 
6 2  A new way of organ and tissue donation - the age of ‘benefactor 
children’ and ‘saviour siblings’ 
Every so often, the only medical chance that a child has of surviving a serious 
sickness is through a compatible tissue (or organ) donation from a sibling.624 Siblings 
are generally considered to be the best donors, although an exact match between 
siblings only occurs 25% of the time.625 Furthermore, where one child already suffers 
from a hereditary genetic disease, there is a 1 in 4 chance that another child from the 
same family (siblings) will be affected by the same disease.626 In the past, unless 
there was a compatible tissue match within the family, the only option was to be put 
onto a transplant list and hope that a compatible organ donor would be found in 
time.627 
 
Through current advancements in science, families (where there are presently no 
compatible matches) are able to resort to reproductive techniques which allow for the 
creation of a perfectly matched and healthy child (‘saviour siblings’), who will provide 
the lifesaving tissue or organ.628 Not every situation however, demands or 
necessitates the creation of a ‘saviour sibling’, as a current sibling may also prove to 
be a tissue match (‘benefactor children’), thus obviating the need for a ‘saviour 
sibling’.  
                                                          
623
 This chapter will also consider what impact this “new biotechnology” has on the best interests of 
the child/children. 
624
 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Annual Report (2003/04) 15. 
625
 Siblings are generally considered to be better donors, as they share a great deal of the same 
genetic material. As a result, there is less chance of organ rejection. Furthermore, siblings are 
generally close in age and size, which helps the body to better accept an organ. See Anderson 
“Encouraging Bone Marrow Transplants from Unrelated Donors: Some Proposed Solutions to a 
Pressing Social Problem” 1993 U. Pitt. L. Rev 477 482. Humans inherit half of their HLA type from 
their mother and the other half from their father. This results in each sibling having a one in four 
chance of being identically matched to a sibling. In other words, a 25% chance of being a match. 
However, considering the size of the average family, the chance of having a sibling that is tissue 
matched, drops to 15%. See Devolder “Preimplantation HLA Typing: Having Children to Save Our 
Loved Ones” 2005 J Med Ethics 582 582. 
626
 Braude et al 2002 (3) Nature Reviews Genetics 953. The Hashmi family tried to have another child 
after Zain, without the use of modern day science. Mrs Hashmi fell pregnant, but terminated the 
pregnancy on discovering that the unborn child was also ill with Beta Thalassemia.  
627
 Presently, there are 3500 people waiting for organ transplants in South Africa. See 
http://www.odf.org.za/ (accessed on 06-10-2011). 
628
Hocking & Ryrstedt “The Perils of Terminology and the ‘Saviour Sibling’ Dilemma” in The Nexus of 
Law and Biology 3. 
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In  this chapter, both ‘benefactor children’ and ‘saviour siblings’ will be considered in 
regard to the problems associated with these categories of children (specifically 
focusing on the age group below twelve) and how the law is to be applied to resolve 
these problems.629 
 
6 3 ‘Saviour siblings’ 
In 1978, the world witnessed the birth of the very first ‘test tube’ baby, Louise Brown, 
following the collaboration of physiologist Robert Edwards and gynaecologist Patrick 
Steptoe.630 From what was described “as a singular moment in human evolution”, 
the field of genetic research (science) has continued to progress, with most of 
society becoming more accepting of these advancements as they develop.631 One of 
the more recent developments, which has been highlighted due to several 
documentaries and publications,632 is the creation of one child to save the life of 
another.633 This is known as the creation of the ‘saviour sibling’. 
 
6 3 1  Definition and technique  
A ‘saviour sibling’, as has already been defined, is a child who was conceived and 
selected as an embryo by his or her parents, specifically to be an organ or tissue 
donor for an ill sibling.634 Traditionally, ‘saviour siblings’ are referred to by this name, 
                                                          
629
 The problems that have been identified with these two groups are firstly, that these children are 
tissue matches to sick siblings and therefore, are subjected to procedures to save sick siblings; 
secondly, South African law states that children under the age of twelve require parental consent 
before medical treatment or surgeries can be performed, which means that a parent can 
force/consent to a procedure on a child that can save a sick child. Thirdly, parents of ‘benefactor 
children’ and ‘saviour siblings’ do not always act in the best interests of these children. A further 
problem with ‘saviour siblings’ is that these children are born solely to save the life of a sick sibling 
and, as a result, certain techniques are used, to ensure that they will be a perfect match to the sick 
sibling. 
630
 Silver Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World (1997) 224-225. For his efforts, 
contribution and ultimate development of IVF technology, Robert Edwards was awarded the Nobel 
Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 2010. The summary as written by the Nobel Prize Organisation can 
be viewed at www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/2010/press.html (accessed on 19-
11-2011). 
631
Silver Remaking Eden 224-225 as quoted in Wyatt “The New Biotechnology” in Issues facing 
Christians Today 419. 
632
 Documentaries and publications on this topic include: ABaby to Save Our Son - Documentary 
(2003), Carte Blanche Medical: Designer Babies (2010), the movie My Sister’s Keeper (2009) and 
Picoult My Sister’s Keeper (2003). 
633
 Other developments of an equally sensitive nature include the so called ‘designer baby’. 
634
 Refer to Chapter 1. See further Jacob “Frail Connections: Legal and Psychiatric Knowledge 
Practices in U.S. Adjudications over Organ Donations by Children and Incompetent Adults” in 
Children’s Health and Children’s Rights 219.A ‘saviour sibling’ has also been defined as “a child 
selected as a result of genetic screening to have some innate characteristic that will help save the life 
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but there are alternative names that have been used to describe these children. 
These include ‘donor babies’ or ‘loved children’. Conversely, the controversial and 
stereotypical nature of ‘saviour siblings’ is reflected in the names ‘slave child’ and 
‘harvest child’.635 
 
‘Saviour siblings’ are “engineered” through the combined use of several medical 
procedures and techniques. These include in-vitro fertilisation (IVF), pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD) and human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tissue typing.636 A 
step-by-step description or explanation of the procedures used in the “engineering” 
of ‘saviour siblings’ is provided below.  
 
A ‘saviour sibling’ is “engineered” in the following manner: 
 
1. A woman undergoes normal IVF treatment in order for doctors to collect and 
fertilise her eggs. 
2. Once these eggs have been fertilised, an embryo (or embryos, depending on 
the number of eggs that were “harvested”) generally begins to grow. The 
embryo/s are grown in a laboratory for two to three days until the cells have 
divided and each embryo consists of about 8 cells. 
3. A trained embryologist then removes one or two cells known as blastomeres, 
from each of the embryos.637 
4. These removed cells are then tested to determine if the embryos from which 
these cells were removed contain the gene that causes the genetic condition 
in the family or sick child.638 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of an existing brother or sister.” See Hocking & Ryrstedt “The Perils of Terminology and the ‘Saviour 
Sibling’ Dilemma” in The Nexus of Law and Biology 2. A ‘saviour sibling’ differs from a ‘designer baby’ 
in that a ‘saviour sibling’ is created specifically to heal an ailing sibling, whereas a ‘designer baby’ has 
been designed to meet a variety of parental specifications. The term ‘saviour sibling’ is reported as 
having first appeared in the Journal of Medical Ethics October 2002. 
635
 ‘Slave child’ is the name that Richard Nicholson, author of “Bulletin of Medical Ethics”, has 
attached to ‘saviour siblings’. As will be seen below, there have been several cases of ‘saviour 
siblings’ who were “engineered” to save ill siblings. One such ‘saviour sibling’ is Jamie Whitaker, who 
has been labelled as a ‘harvest baby’. See Britten “’Saviour Sibling’ Cures Sick Older Brother” The 
Telegraph (2011-05-07) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/8499394/Saviour-sibling-cures-
sick-older-brother.html (accessed on 05-10-2011). 
636
 PGD can only be performed on an embryo, where the genes for the disease being screened or 
tested have been identified. Jamie Whitaker was not able to be screened for Diamond Blackfan 
Anaemia (DBA) as an embryo, as not all the genes for DBA could be screened at the time. 
637
 A blastomere means “an undifferentiated embryonic cell, derived from a blastocyte.” See GN R 7 
in GG 29526 of 2007-01-05. 
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5. In addition to screening for the genes which cause the genetic condition, a 
technician will put the same cells of the embryos through a series of tests, to 
determine the tissue type of the embryos. The results of these series of tests 
will determine if the embryo is an HLA tissue match to the sick sibling.639 
6. Embryos that are unaffected by the genetic condition and which have the 
same HLA tissue type as the sick child, will then be transferred to the womb. 
(The couple undergoing the procedure normally selects one or two embryos 
that are unaffected, to be placed in the womb.)640 
7. If any of the embryos are not used straight away, they are frozen. However, 
embryos that are carriers of a disease or affected embryos will be allowed to 
perish. 
8. Following a two week waiting period (after the unaffected embryo was first 
implanted into the womb), a pregnancy test is performed to determine 
whether the embryos have developed and whether the procedure has been 
successful or not.641 
 
The success rate of “engineering” a ‘saviour sibling’ by using the combination of IVF, 
PGD and tissue typing, is as low as 3 out of 16 embryos.642 Presently, scientists are 
able to screen for approximately 100 diseases.643 However, not all diseases are 
capable of being screened, as the specific genes have not been identified. 
Therefore, there is a potential risk of having another child who may be an exact 
match, but who also suffers from the same disease as the already ill sibling.644 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
638
 PGD is used in steps 3 and 4.  
639
 HLA tissue typing techniques are used in step 5. 
640
 One or two embryos are generally selected, as any more embryos may severely impact on the 
amount of blood and stem cells that will be collected at birth. See A Baby to Save Our Son -
Documentary (2003). The Whitakers, after undergoing the selection of embryos, had three viable 
embryos to choose from. They decided to implant only two, based on the advice of their doctor, which 
was that any more than two embryos could potentially limit the amount of blood available for collection 
at the birth. 
641
 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority “Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (pgd)” 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/preimplantation-genetic-diagnosis.html (accessed on 12-10-2011). 
642
 The total of 3 in 16 embryos is calculated in the following way: each embryo has a 1 in 4 chance of 
being a tissue match. Each embryo also has a 3 in 4 chance of not being affected by the same 
disease. When calculated together, this works out to be that each embryo has a 3 in 16 chance of 
being the exact embryo that is being looked for. See Braudeet al 2002 (3) Nature Reviews Genetics 
953. 
643
 According to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, genes for over 100 diseases can 
be screened.  
644
 This was the dilemma that the Whitaker family faced. As DBA could not be tested for when using 
PGD, there was no guarantee whether Jamie would be healthy or sick.  
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6 3 2  International and foreign law  
“Genetic research is presenting us with a rapidly developing and novel state of affairs. We 
may applaud this development, or condemn it. We may embrace it, seek to supress it or 
simply find ourselves concerned about where it is leading. We may decide to face it 
individually, or collectively. The one thing we cannot afford to do is ignore it…”
645
 
 
Although having international recognition and reach, the issue of ‘saviour siblings’ is 
not regulated by international law.646 To date, there is a noticeable lack of provisions 
regulating both the techniques used to create ‘saviour siblings’ and the purposes for 
which these children are designed and serve. Despite there being a lack of 
regulatory provisions in international law, the techniques and purposes of ‘saviour 
siblings’ are regulated by individual countries. In some of these countries, the matter 
of ‘saviour siblings’ is regulated by both domestic law and the regulatory provisions 
of regional instruments.647 
 
A consideration of foreign law is particularly relevant to this discussion, in view of the 
fact that South African law has not developed in the area of genetic research to the 
same extent as that of some countries around the world. Furthermore, section 
39(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution necessitates the consideration of both 
international and foreign law.648 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine649 does not expressly 
recognise ‘saviour siblings’. It is, however, submitted that the Convention does 
indirectly acknowledge the concept and sanction the techniques and purposes 
associated with this matter. This submission is based on the interpretation of several 
                                                          
645
 Extract from the foreword of Human Genetics Commission Making Babies: Reproductive 
Decisions and Genetic Technologies Report 4.The foreword was written by Baroness Helena 
Kennedy QC, chair of the Human Genetics Commission. 
646
 The UNCRC does not mention the procedures used in the creation of ‘saviour siblings’.  
647
 For example, the United Kingdom. A discussion on the United Kingdom’s national law with respect 
to ‘saviour siblings’, is undertaken in the paragraphs below. 
648
 S 39(1) of the Constitution states: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum - 
… 
b. must consider international law; and  
c. may consider foreign law.”  
649
 1997. In terms of art 2(2)(a) of Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes (2008), the protocol does not apply to 
genetic tests carried out on a human embryo or foetus. In terms of art 2(2) of Additional Protocol to 
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research, the Protocol 
does not apply to research on foetuses, embryos in vivo or in vitro.   
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sections within Convention’s text, as well as in the text of Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on Transplantation of Organs and 
Tissues of Human Origin.650 
 
The Convention is cognisant of the fact that science is continually progressing, and 
that it should do so for the benefit of future generations.651 However, it also 
acknowledges that the potential for misuse exists, jeopardising future generations. 
As a result, the Convention recognises that the welfare of the individual prevails over 
science and society.652 
 
Chapter IV (Human Genome) of the European Convention includes provisions that 
have been written in direct response to the advances within genetic research. It is 
under this chapter that provision for some of the techniques used to create a ‘saviour 
sibling’ can be found.   
 
Article 14 determines that techniques of medically assisted procreation may not be 
used to choose the sex of a future child. Medically assisted procreation techniques 
include IVF. Therefore, IVF may not be utilised to select the sex of a child, but there 
is no limitation in its use of “engineering” ‘saviour siblings’. 
 
Although the Convention prohibits sex selection, it does allow for predictive genetic 
tests. In terms of Article 12: 
“[t]ests which are predictive of genetic diseases or which serve either to identify the subject as 
a carrier of a gene responsible for a disease or to detect a genetic predisposition or 
susceptibility to a disease may be performed only for health purposes or for scientific 
research linked to health purposes, and subject to appropriate genetic counselling.” 
 
Article 12 must be interpreted to include the right to carry out diagnostic interventions 
on an embryo, to determine whether the embryo carries a hereditary gene that will 
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 2002. 
651
 Preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. 
652
 Preamble and art 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. This 
statement reflects the obligation not to venture so far into the scientific realm, that it will result in 
untoward consequences for future generations.  
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lead to serious illnesses in the future.653 In other words, Article 12 can be interpreted 
as making provision for PGD. 
 
Further recognition of ‘saviour siblings’ can be found within the articles of Additional 
Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on Transplantation of 
Organs and Tissues of Human Origin.654 Article 2 states “[t]he provisions of this 
Protocol applicable to tissues shall apply also to cells, including haematopoietic stem 
cells.”  Article 14 makes provision for the removal of stem cells or regenerative tissue 
from a sibling donor, even when the donor lacks capacity to consent.655 Article 14 
states:  
 
“1   No organ or tissue removal may be carried out on a person who does not have the 
capacity to consent under Article 13 of this Protocol.  
2   Exceptionally, and under the protective conditions prescribed by law, the removal of 
regenerative tissue from a person who does not have the capacity to consent may be 
authorised provided the following conditions are met: 
i   there is no compatible donor available who has the capacity to consent;  
ii   the recipient is a brother or sister of the donor;  
iii   the donation has the potential to be life-saving for the recipient;  
iv   the authorisation of his or her representative or an authority or a person or 
body provided for by law has been given specifically and in writing and with 
the approval of the competent body;  
v   the potential donor concerned does not object.”  
 
Should the removal of tissue not be in the best interests of the donor sibling, Article 2 
of the Convention requires the welfare of the individual (child) to be put above the 
interests of society and science.  
 
Despite the regional acceptance of genetic research, the selection of a person is 
strongly prohibited. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibits “eugenic 
practices in particular those aiming at the selection of persons.” From this provision, 
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 European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Explanatory Report Chapter IV art 12. 
654
  Refer to Chapter 2. For purpose of clarity, the Additional Protocol is written as Additional Protocol 
to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of 
Human Origin. Throughout the researching of this Additional Protocol, all references referred to this 
Protocol in the above manner. This is why a comma appears between the words “biomedicine” and 
“on”.  
655
 The provisions of the NHA are very similar to this. 
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it can be inferred that, presently, babies that are designed to meet certain parental 
specifications (‘designer babies’) will not be allowed.656 However, the potential for 
‘designer babies’ does exist, as Europe has a vested interest in advancing science 
for the benefit of future generations.  
 
National attitudes towards ‘saviour siblings’ vary considerably from one country to 
another. Countries such as Germany,657 Austria658 and Italy659 have enacted 
legislation that prohibits PGD, whereas countries such as Sweden660 and the United 
Kingdom have implemented legislation which accepts the techniques and purposes 
associated with ‘saviour siblings’.  
 
United Kingdom661 
Although the world’s first ‘saviour sibling’ was born in the United States of 
America,662 it is the United Kingdom’s system of regulation and decision-making in 
assisted reproduction and embryo research that is admired.663 As the frontrunner in 
assisted reproduction and genetic research regulations, researchers in England are 
well aware of the “scientific, medical, psychological, social and ethical dimensions of 
embryo research.”664 It can therefore be said that English law is mindful of the 
varying moral and religious implications and core beliefs of society, and thus best 
reflects the attitude to be adopted towards the developing nature of science. The 
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 A ‘designer baby’ is defined as an “artificial creation of human beings with certain pre-determined 
characteristics through modification of an early embryo’s genetic structure.” See Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority: A Framework for Legislation November 1987 White Paper para 37. 
657
 See the Embryo Protection Act 1990. 
658
 Reproductive Medicine Act 275 of 1992. 
659
 Assisted Reproductive Law 40 of 2004. 
660
 Chapter 4 s 2 of the Genetic Integrity Act 351 of 2006 states “PGD may not be used without the 
permission of the National Board of Health and Welfare to try and have a child with a set of genes that 
enables the child to become a donor of blood stem cells to a severely ill sibling. Permission may only 
be given if there are exceptional grounds for allowing such use.” 
661
 In addition to the foreign regional documents above, the discussion of foreign law will be restricted 
to the law of the UK. The reasons for this decision are firstly, the UK provides case law clearly 
demonstrating the controversial nature of this matter and, secondly, UK legislation is discussed, as 
considering the law of each State in both the United States and Australia, would be time consuming 
and detract from the theme of this dissertation. 
662
 Adam Nash is regarded as the world’s first ‘saviour sibling’. He was created to be a tissue match 
to his older sister Molly who suffered from Fanconi’s Anaemia. See Josefson “Couple Select Healthy 
Embryo to provide Stem Cells for Sister” 2007 321 BMJ 
http://www.bmj.com/content/321/7266/917.1.full (accessed on 10-10-2011). 
663
 Leather “Chair’s Introductory” in Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Annual Report 
(2003/04) 2.  
664
 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Annual Report (2003/04) 13. 
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clearest example of this is the amended Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 
2008 (HFE Act). 
 
The implementation of amendments through the HFE Act665 has seen a number of 
perceived controversial matters being regulated. These include the regulation of 
human admixed embryos,666 the granting of licences for embryo testing and the 
granting of licences in certain circumstances for sex selection. It is through the 
implementation of regulations pertaining to embryo testing that provision is made for 
‘saviour siblings’ in English law. Schedule 2 paragraph 1 section 1ZA(1)(d) of the 
HFE Act667 states:  
 
“[a] licence under paragraph 1 cannot authorise the testing of an embryo, except for one or 
more of the following purposes – (d) in a case where a person (“the sibling”) who is the child 
of the persons who gametes are used to bring about the creation of the embryo (or of either of 
those persons) suffers from a serious medical condition which could be treated by umbilical 
cord blood stem cells, bone marrow or other tissue of any resulting child, establishing whether 
the tissue of the resulting child would be compatible with that of the sibling.”
668
 
 
The section of law referred to above is the position currently held in the UK with 
regards to ‘saviour siblings’. Prior to the operation of the amendments in October 
2009, a more cautious approach was adopted in regard to licensing ‘saviour 
siblings’. This approach can be evidenced in the cases of Hashmi and Whitaker. 
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 2008. 
666
 See s 4A of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. “In terms of section 4A(6) a human 
admixed embryo is— 
(a) an embryo created by replacing the nucleus of an animal egg or of an animal cell, or two 
animal pronuclei, with— 
(i) two human pronuclei, 
(ii) one nucleus of a human gamete or of any other human cell, or 
(iii) one human gamete or other human cell, 
(b) any other embryo created by using— 
(i) human gametes and animal gametes, or 
(ii) one human pronucleus and one animal pronucleus, 
(c) a human embryo that has been altered by the introduction of any sequence of nuclear or 
mitochondrial DNA of an animal into one or more cells of the embryo, 
(d) a human embryo that has been altered by the introduction of one or more animal cells, or 
(e) any embryo not falling within paragraphs (a) to (d) which contains both nuclear or 
mitochondrial DNA of a human and nuclear or mitochondrial DNA of an animal (“animal 
DNA”) but in which the animal DNA is not predominant. 
(7) In subsection (6)— 
(a) references to animal cells are to cells of an animal or of an animal embryo, and 
(b) references to human cells are to cells of a human or of a human embryo.” 
667
 2008. 
668
 Schedule 2 paragraph 1ZA(1)(a) and (b) make provision for the use of PGD. 
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Zain Hashmi (6) suffered from a serious genetic disorder – Beta Thalassaemia 
Major.669 Beta Thalassaemia prevents bone marrow from producing enough red 
blood cells. As a direct consequence of this, Zain needed regular blood transfusions 
and drugs. There was, however, potential for Zain to lead a normal life with a 
transplant of stem cells from a compatible tissue donor.670 Unfortunately, the 
chances of finding a compatible donor were extremely small.671 As a result, the 
Hashmi’s approached the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), 
seeking permission to create a sibling that would be both Beta Thalassaemia free 
and a tissue match to Zain. 
 
The couple was granted permission to undergo both PGD and HLA tissue typing, to 
ensure a match for Zain.672 This decision was later challenged by Josephine 
Quintavalle on behalf of CORE (Comment on Reproductive Ethics) in the case of R v 
HFEA,673 on the grounds that the HFEA did not have the authority to licence these 
procedures.674 
 
In R v HFEA,675 Maurice Kay J held that, under the licences the HFEA could award, 
tissue typing could not be authorised. The basis for this argument was that treatment 
licences could be granted only for an activity that the HFEA considered to be 
“necessary and desirable” for the purpose of assisting a woman to carry a child.676 
Maurice Kay J held that tissue typing was done to ensure tissue compatibility with an 
older sibling and that he did not consider this to be “necessary or desirable” to assist 
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 Quintavalle v HFEA [2005] UKHL 28 Lord Hoffman para 2. 
670
 Quintavalle v HFEA [2005] UKHL 28 Lord Hoffman para 3. 
671
 All three of Zain’s older siblings were non-compatible matches. Mrs Hashmi fell pregnant a further 
two times after Zain, in the hopes of having a sibling that would be a match. Unfortunately, the one 
pregnancy resulted in an abortion and the other resulted in a healthy baby who was unfortunately a 
non-compatible match to Zain. 
672
 Pattinson “Designing Donors” in Gunning & Holm (eds) Ethics, Law and Society Volume 1 (2005) 
251 251. 
673
 [2002] EWHC 2785. 
674
Quintavalle v HFEA [2005] UKHL 28 Lord Hoffman para 8. Pattinson “Designing Donors” in Ethics, 
Law and Society 252. 
675
 [2002] EWHC 2785. 
676
 See Schedule 2 para 1(3) of Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 as well as s 2(1) of the 
Act. 
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a woman in carrying her child.677 Therefore, Maurice Kay J held that the HFEA acted 
outside the bounds of its authority. 
 
When taken on appeal, the judges of the Court of Appeal held that the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act678 could be read to include helping a woman 
produce a child with stem cells that would be a match to another child.679 
Furthermore, the court deemed tissue typing to be a service that fell under the list of 
treatment services which the HFEA had the authority to licence.680 Based on this 
interpretation, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of Maurice Kay J.681 
 
Following the success of the Hashmi’s, the Whitakers, who had an equally ill child, 
approached the HFEA for permission to create a ‘saviour sibling’.682 Charlie Whitaker 
suffered from Diamond Blackfan Anaemia (DBA), a disease affecting his blood. 
Similarly to Zain, Charlie had to undergo blood transfusions as a way to clean his 
blood. To a lead a normal life, Charlie also required the transfer of stem cells from a 
compatible donor. The Whitakers approached the HFEA for permission to create a 
sibling who would be a compatible match to Charlie, but were refused. The reason 
given was that DBA could not be diagnosed by PGD and that embryo selection, 
based on tissue typing alone, was not allowed “because of the risk that a child born 
following the procedure might be damaged by a test undertaken solely for the benefit 
of a sibling.”683 
 
The HFEA believed that there could be risks associated with the removal of one or 
two cells from an embryo for testing. As the risks were unknown, the HFEA adopted 
a cautious approach and held that screening an embryo for compatible tissue 
matches would be allowed only when an embryo biopsy was already taking place to 
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 See R v HFEA [2002] EWHC 2785para 17. See further Pattinson “Designing Donors” in Ethics, 
Law and Society 252. 
678
 1990. 
679
 R v HFEA [2002] EWHC 2785 paras 48, 89 and 133 as cited in Pattinson “Designing Donors” in 
Ethics, Law and Society 252. 
680
 See Schedule 2 para 1(1)(d) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
681
 Read further the case of Quintavalle v HFEA [2005] UKHL 28 which dealt with the appeal of R v 
HFEA [2003] ECWA Civ 667. The House of Lords held the same opinion as the judges of the Court of 
Appeal.  
682
 See ABaby to Save our Son -Documentary (2003). 
683
 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Annual Report (2003/04) 13. 
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screen for a disease. Having reviewed the implications of the techniques and the 
available evidence indicating no great harm to the embryo, the HFEA amended its 
stance on the matter. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal granted the HFEA the power 
to license embryo biopsies, which includes the procedures of PGD and HLA tissue 
typing.684The granting of this permission should not be seen as the first resort to 
helping sick siblings. Rather, it should be considered after all other possibilities have 
been explored and proven to be non-viable options. Only then, and taking each case 
on its own merits, should the HFEA grant permission to create a ‘saviour sibling’.685 
 
6 3 3 National legislation 
Within the South African national legislative framework, the NHA686 is central to 
health legislation.687 With this in mind, the respective techniques and purposes 
associated with ‘saviour siblings’ must be weighed against the provisions of the NHA 
and the accompanying regulations to determine the legal position of ‘saviour siblings’ 
in South Africa. While sections of the NHA can equally be applied to ‘benefactor 
children’, there are differences between the two categories of children (‘benefactor 
children’ and ‘saviour siblings’). Therefore, ‘benefactor children’ and the law 
applicable to these children, will be considered later in the chapter.      
 
Despite the wide ranging regulatory powers of the NHA, the Act (unlike the HFE Act 
of the UK) has no specific provision/s regulating ‘saviour siblings’.688 Although a 
single express provision regulating ‘saviour siblings’ is lacking, it could be interpreted 
that the regulation of ‘saviour siblings’ is to be found through the reading together of 
several sections and regulations of the NHA. Following this pragmatic approach, 
sections 55 and 56 and Regulation 4(a)(vii) of the Regulations Regarding the Use of 
Human DNA, RNA, Cultured Cells, Stem Cells, Blastomeres, Polar Bodies, 
Embryos, Embryonic Tissue and Small Tissue Biopsies for Diagnostic Testing, 
Health Research and Therapeutics must be read together.  
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 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Annual Report (2003/04) 15. 
685
 Supra 684. 
686
 The NHA came into effect in May 2005, with the exception of Chapters 6 and 8. 
687
 Carstens & Pearmain Foundational Principles of SA Medical Law 246. 
688
 When compared to the HFE Act 2008 above, the lack of provisions is clearly noticeable. 
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Section 55 states that tissue, blood, blood products or gametes may not be removed 
from a living person, for the purposes in section 56, without their written consent, and 
that the removal is done in accordance with prescribed conditions. 
 
This section requires the written consent of the person from whom the tissue, blood 
or blood products is being removed. In compliance with section 129 of the Children’s 
Act, should the person be a child under the age of twelve, a parent or guardian can 
consent on behalf of that child. Where the child is over twelve years of age, the 
written consent must be given by the child.689 
 
Section 56 regulates the removal of tissue, blood, blood products or gametes. Of 
importance is section 56(2)(a)(ii) and (iv) which states that:  
 
“… the following tissue, blood, blood products or gametes may not be removed or withdrawn 
from a living person for any purpose contemplated in subsection 1…tissue which is not 
replaceable by natural processes from a person younger than 18 years…or placenta, 
embryonic or foetal tissue, stem cells and umbilical cord, excluding umbilical cord progenitor 
cells.”
690
 
 
Section 56(1) does not list or define the medical or dental purposes for which blood 
and tissue may be withdrawn or removed from a living person. Instead, this 
subsection states that tissue or blood may only be withdrawn for the medical or 
dental purposes prescribed.  As discussed in Chapter 5, the word “prescribed” is 
defined by the NHA as prescribed by regulation under section 90.691 The Minister of 
Health has enacted regulations (Regulations Relating to the Withdrawal of Blood 
from a Living Person for Testing) that apply to section 56, however, these regulations 
do not define or list medical and dental purposes for which blood, blood products and 
tissue may be withdrawn or removed.692  Therefore, it is unclear for which medical or 
dental purposes tissue or stem cells may be removed. As a result, it cannot be said 
with absolute certainty whether the NHA regulates the purposes for which ‘saviour 
siblings’ are created.  
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 See the discussion on the Children’s Act in Chapter 5 as well as the discussion on s 55 of the NHA 
in the same chapter. 
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 S 56(2)(a)(ii) and (iv). 
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 See s 1 of the NHA. 
692
 See Regulations Relating to the Withdrawal of Blood from a Living Person for Testing. 
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Despite the lack of clarity, tissue that is not replaceable and stem cells may be 
removed if the Minister of Health has authorised their removal. The Minister may 
impose any conditions deemed to be necessary before this removal takes place.693 
 
Regulation 4(a)(vii) of the Regulations Regarding the Use of Human DNA, RNA, 
Cultured Cells, Stem Cells, Blastomeres, Polar Bodies, Embryos, Embryonic Tissue 
and Small Tissue Biopsies for Diagnostic Testing, Health Research and 
Therapeutics states: 
 
“preimplantation DNA tests following the removal of a polar body or one or two blastomeres of 
a developing embryo can be carried out for the purpose of ensuring implantation of an 
embryo, without a mutation that causes a serious genetic condition.”  
 
In other words, this particular regulation makes provision for the use of PGD to 
screen embryos for the genes of various diseases.694This Regulation is however, a 
draft regulation and has therefore not been made final. As such, the provision is not 
yet operational and it is unclear from other legislation whether PGD and HLA tissue 
typing is allowed in South Africa.695 
 
Based on the wording of the various sections and regulations, it is submitted that 
South African legislation does not currently (expressly) recognise ‘saviour siblings’. 
However, there is potential within the law for the recognition of ‘saviour siblings’. This 
can be achieved with very little effort and few changes to current legislation. For 
example, if the Regulations Regarding the Use of Human DNA, RNA, Cultured Cells, 
Stem Cells, Blastomeres, Polar Bodies, Embryos, Embryonic Tissue and Small 
Tissue Biopsies for Diagnostic Testing, Health Research and Therapeutics were to 
be finalised, and provisions for HLA tissue typing were included, the law would 
recognise and regulate ‘saviour siblings’, as these are the procedures used to create 
these children.  
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 S 56(2)(b) of the NHA.  
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 Refer back to the explanation on how ‘saviour siblings’ are created above.  
695
 The provisions in the NHA do not mention PGD and tissue typing. However, the provisions of 
chapter 8 of the NHA are incomplete and unclear, so it cannot be said with certainty that the NHA 
does not regulate PGD and tissue typing.  
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Furthermore, if the legislature, with the assistance of the Minister of Health, were to 
list the medical and dental purposes for which blood and tissue can be removed and, 
included in this list, the removal of tissue, blood or blood products to treat a sick 
sibling, both the NHA and Regulations Relating to the Withdrawal of Blood from a 
Living Person for Testing would recognise and regulate ‘saviour siblings’.696 
 
From the fact that the law does not expressly refer to ‘saviour siblings’ and from the 
noticeable lack of South African case law and media attention on the matter, one can 
conclude that South Africa has not yet joined the ranks of countries which have had 
to answer the pleas of parents to allow them to create ‘saviour siblings’.697Should 
‘saviour siblings’ become a part of South African society in the near future, current 
law would need to be amended as suggested above. Without these amendments to 
the law, ‘saviour siblings’ will not be properly regulated and their rights as one of the 
more vulnerable members of society will potentially be undermined and infringed 
upon. 
 
The Constitution recognises that everyone has the right to bodily integrity and 
autonomy, which includes the right to make decisions concerning reproduction.698 It 
can be argued that the decision to ‘select’ an embryo which is disease free and a 
tissue match to an already ill sibling, is protected by the right to reproductive 
autonomy. To prohibit PGD and tissue typing can be viewed as an interference with 
reproductive freedom.699 The only justified reason for interfering with the 
reproductive autonomy of a person is when there is a risk of serious harm to others, 
including resulting children. Since research has shown that there are no immediate 
effects associated with PGD, and has yet to report any long term effects, there is no 
legitimate reason to interfere with or limit the right to reproductive autonomy.700 
However, the right to reproductive autonomy (as guaranteed by section 12(2)(a)) 
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 Refer to Chapter 5 and the discussion above. The recommendations made are based on the 
problems and sections of law mentioned above.    
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 For example, countries such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Australia 
have all enacted law that regulates ‘saviour siblings’ in some way.  
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 Ss 12(2), 12(2)(a) and 27 of the Constitution. 
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 Art 16(1) of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights guarantees every man and woman of 
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700
 It is also difficult to justify preventing parents from attempting to create a ‘saviour sibling’ where 
they have a child with a life threatening illness, who may be cured by a stem cell transplant. Human 
Genetics Commission Making Babies: Reproductive Decisions and Genetic Technologies Report14.  
112 
 
must be weighed against the rights of the resulting child, as “constitutional rights are 
mutually interrelated and interdependent and form a single constitutional value 
system.”701 
 
Children, like adults, have the right to bodily integrity and autonomy.702 Therefore, it 
can be assumed that children are capable of making decisions and that any 
intervention or outside interference should, in general, be minimised.703 However, for 
an embryo destined to be a ‘saviour sibling’, interference with the “body” begins long 
before the embryo or the “child to be” is recognised as a bearer of rights. Where 
PGD is carried out without tissue typing, it can be argued that this is done in the best 
interests of the embryo and therefore, does not amount to an interference with bodily 
integrity. However, where PGD is combined with HLA tissue typing, it is submitted 
that this is not in the best interests of the embryo, but rather of the sick sibling, and 
amounts to an interference.704 Statements of this nature are controversial in a 
country such as South Africa, where the law does not recognise an embryo as a 
legal subject which can be afforded rights.705 There are those in society who believe 
that an embryo is more than a bundle of cells and is in fact, a potential baby.706 As a 
result, the status of an embryo/foetus has been challenged.  
 
One of the most well-known examples where this was challenged was in the case of 
Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v Minister of Health.707 Although this 
case dealt with the constitutionality of abortion, the principles can be applied to the 
status of the embryo. 
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 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) 2004 1 SA 406 (CC) 
para 55. 
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 Refer to Chapter 4 heading 4 6 1. See further Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha (Commission for 
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Very briefly, in the case of Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa, the court 
was asked to determine whether CoToPA was unconstitutional and should be struck 
down. The reasons submitted in support of the claim of unconstitutionality were that 
abortion infringed on the right to life of an unborn child and that this right attached to 
the unborn child at the moment of conception. 
 
After consideration, the court held that section 28, the Children’s rights section did 
not expressly refer to a foetus or embryo in any of its provisions and, furthermore, 
that certain rights within this section could not be applied to an unborn child, such as 
the right to work or detention. Based on this observation, it was concluded that none 
of the other rights in the Bill of Rights could be applied to a foetus either. 
 
In addition, the court observed that the use of the words “everybody” or “every 
person” did not extend to include a stillborn child, an unborn child, a viable unborn 
child, an unborn human being or a living foetus. As a result of all these observations 
and arguments, it was said that a foetus cannot be afforded the right to life, as it is 
not considered to be a living person or legal subject.  As such, a foetus or embryo 
cannot be the bearer of rights. 
 
Therefore, South Africa does not ascribe the status of legal subject to an individual, 
until that person is born. For this reason, it is submitted that it cannot be said that 
PGD with or without tissue typing, is or is not in the best interests of the embryo, as 
this would infer that an embryo/foetus does in fact have rights, which is incorrect. 
 
Nevertheless, upon birth, a child is afforded both the status of a legal subject and the 
rights in the Bill of Rights.708 That a child acquires rights only upon birth raises the 
question as to what right of redress a child (‘saviour sibling’) has if any procedure 
performed on them as an embryo resulted in harm to their body, leading to 
subsequent deformity or other issues.709 Although there are no reported cases of any 
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harm caused or injury sustained as a result of PGD and HLA tissue typing, it has 
been said that when an embryo is “biopsied”, there are potential risks for the 
embryo.710 Could principles similar to those of the nasciturus fiction be applied to the 
above mentioned scenario? In other words, for the sake of remedy and redress, can 
the child in question be said to have been alive at the time that the injury occurred? 
This would be acknowledging that at the time of injury, an embryo is a legal subject. 
Should such an incident arise, it is a question that would need to be answered by a 
court in that, at this time, there are no reported cases, precedent or law on this 
matter. 
 
Children, like their adult counterparts, are entitled to the rights in the Constitution.711 
As seen from the discussion on the Bill of Rights, some of these rights are 
guaranteed in both section 28 and other sections of the Bill of Rights.712 Those rights 
that appear to be repeated (in section 28) are described as background rights to the 
specific children’s rights in section 28. Those which are not repeated, however, are 
also applicable to children, such as the right to bodily integrity.713 Young children are 
generally thought to lack the ability to give “autonomous donor consent”.714 In terms 
of South African law, children have rights to bodily integrity and autonomy, but are 
deemed to be insufficiently mature by virtue of age to make decisions concerning 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
this is a matter for the Courts and the legislature to decide. The approach followed by the British 
authorities may be an option to be considered in South Africa. In other words, strict legal controls 
need to be set in place to protect the embryo. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority  Annual 
Report (2003/04) 13. Current legislation in South Africa is incomplete and confusing, as are the draft 
regulations that attempt to regulate matters of a similar nature. See the NHA and Regulations 
Regarding the Use of Human DNA, RNA, Cultured Cells, Stem Cells, Blastomeres, Polar Bodies, 
Embryos, Embryonic Tissue and Small Tissue Biopsies for Diagnostic Testing, Health Research and 
Therapeutics. 
710
 See A Baby to Save our Son - Documentary (2003). Through the course of this documentary, a 
number of interviews took place. Suzi Leather, the former chair of the HFEA, stated during her 
interview that when an embryo is biopsied there are potential risks for the embryo, with all the benefits 
going to another person or sick sibling. Another interview conducted with a technician at the medical 
institute where the Whitakers underwent the process of tissue typing embryos, said that there is 
potential for structural damage to an embryo if, during the process of screening and testing embryos, 
any extra manipulation is done to the embryo. 
711
 It is generally said that children are the bearer of all rights in the Bill of Rights, with the exception of 
s 19(3) of the Constitution. This is not correct however, as there are other rights in the Bill of Rights 
which do not generally apply to children, for example, children do not have rights that prisoners have 
(s 35(2)) unless they are prisoners themselves. Furthermore, worker and employer rights (s 23(2)-(5)) 
do not apply to children unless they are workers or employers.  
712
 Refer back to the discussion on the Bill of Rights and children’s rights under heading 4 6 – The Bill 
of Rights. 
713
 S 12(2) of the Constitution. A child becomes a bearer of rights upon birth. Refer back to Chapter 4. 
714
 All children under the age of 12 are considered by South African law to be incapable of consenting 
to medical treatment or surgery. 
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their health care and treatment.715 As such, provisions in the newly operational 
Children’s Act716 prescribe that parents may consent to the medical treatment or 
surgical procedures on behalf of a child who is below twelve years of age (or who is 
over the age but not mature enough). This is potentially problematic, especially with 
young ‘saviour siblings’, as provisions such as these give parents a right to consent 
to any treatment or surgery with very few restrictions.717 What is more worrisome is 
that the Constitution does not guarantee parents a right to control or make decisions 
on behalf of their children. Therefore, it can be argued that section 129, if applied 
without guidelines, will place children in the same category as property, and they will 
not be viewed as individuals with autonomous decisions and views.718 
 
Section 31 of the Children’s Act, however, provides some assistance by directing 
parents to give due consideration to the views and opinions of children under the age 
of twelve, for whom they are consenting.719 In terms of Article 12 of the UNCRC, due 
consideration requires more than merely listening to the views of children. Therefore, 
in order to comply with the condition imposed, a serious consideration of the 
opinions expressed by the child must be undertaken. Article 12 of the UNCRC does 
not prescribe an age limit when parents are required to consider the views of a child.  
However, for purposes of this discussion and, in compliance with South African law, 
parents must consider the views expressed by a child under the age of twelve, as 
those above this age are considered competent to make their own decisions. Due 
consideration must be given to both verbal and non-verbal expressions of the views 
of children. Non-verbal expressions of a child must be recognised, as a child below 
twelve may have the inability to use the appropriate words to express their opinion, 
                                                          
715
 See Chapter 5. 
716
 Act 38 of 2005. 
717
 The only restriction or limitation on a parent’s right to consent to medical treatment or surgery on a 
child under twelve, is that due consideration must be given to the views and wishes of that child. See 
s 129(4) and (5). In this way, parents are not theoretically able to consent to treatment or surgery as 
and how they please.  
718
 S v M2008 3 SA 232 (CC) para 18, “Every child has his or her own dignity. If a child is to be 
constitutionally imagined as an individual with a distinctive personality, and not merely as a miniature 
adult waiting to reach full size, he or she cannot be treated as a mere extension of his or her parents, 
umbilically destined to sink or swim with them.” 
719
 S 129(4) and (5) direct those who are consenting to the treatment or surgery of a child under 12 to 
observe the condition stated in s 31 of the Children’s Act. S 10 of the Children’s Act also recognises 
that a child may participate in an appropriate manner in any matter concerning him or her. Both ss 10 
and 31 comply with art 12 of the UNCRC.  
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but nonetheless understands the implications of treatment or surgery.720 Some 
writers are of the opinion that children should not only be allowed to participate, but 
should be able to make the decision in matters that may have long term 
consequences for them.721 This is a general statement which, if applied to South 
African law, could be interpreted as meaning that children under twelve should not 
have only a participatory right, but also a right to consent to any treatment or surgery 
that has potential long term consequences for them.  
 
Irrespective of who should be allowed to make the decision regarding surgery on a 
‘saviour sibling’, it is absolutely clear that the best interests of that child must always 
be of paramount importance, as required by section 28(2) of the Constitution.722 This 
imposes a duty on all (more so on parents) to respect the best interests of the 
child.723 But what must be done where parents fail to heed the best interests of a 
‘saviour sibling’ under the age of twelve? It has been reported that there are 
concerns about the wellbeing of a child who is a ‘saviour sibling’.724 There are 
apprehensions that, once perceived as a “saviour”, it will become very difficult to set 
limitations as to when tissue or organs from a ‘saviour sibling’ under twelve may be 
used for the benefit of the sick sibling.725 Emotionally burdened parents of ‘saviour 
siblings’ may potentially continue to resort to using a ‘saviour sibling’ below the age 
of twelve, thereby putting the welfare of the sick child above the best interests of the 
‘saviour sibling’.726 In addition, parents may overlook the opinion of the child, and fail 
to consider the views and opinions of the ‘saviour sibling’ before proceeding with the 
donation. This may well amount to a failure to consider the best interests of the 
                                                          
720
 Refer back to the discussion on art 12 of the UNCRC in Chapter 2. 
721
 Refer to Wald in Chapter 4. Presently, the long term effects of PGD and tissue typing are 
unknown. 
722
 In terms of s 129 of the Children’s Act, those who can consent to surgery on a child include 
parents, guardians, the Minister of Social Development, the superintendent of a hospital or a High 
Court or Children’s Court. Furthermore, the application of s 28(2) extends beyond the rights listed in s 
28(1). This means that the application of the best interests of the child test will extend to other rights 
in the Bill of Rights, such as s 12. See Kruger 2007 THRHR 248 in general and Minister of Welfare 
and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC) para 17 specifically.     
723
 The best interests of the child test was discussed in detail in Chapter 5.  
724
 Human Genetics Commission Making Babies: Reproductive Decisions and Genetic Technologies 
Report 14.  
725
 Human Genetics Commission Making Babies: Reproductive Decisions and Genetic Technologies 
Report14.  
726
 The Whitaker family said that they would continue to undergo the process of creating a ‘saviour 
sibling’ until they had a child who would “save” Charlie.  
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‘saviour sibling’, as well as an unintentional but gross violation of the right to security 
in and control over the body of such child. 
 
This prompts the question, where two children are involved, whose best interests are 
considered to be of more importance? The law states that the best interests of the 
child are of paramount importance in all matters.727 Therefore, both the best interests 
of the ‘saviour sibling’ and the sick child must be considered to be of paramount 
importance. However, whose best interests are deemed to be of more importance? 
How are the competing interests of a ‘saviour sibling’ and sick child to be balanced? 
Although the court has never had to decide on such a matter, it is suggested that, in 
order to resolve this problem fairly, the decision as to whose best interests are more 
important (either the ‘saviour sibling’ or sick child) must be taken out of the hands of 
the parents and be given to a neutral third party. In other words, the ultimate decision 
as to which child’s best interests are more important should be made by an impartial 
and neutral judge, with the assistance of a person such as the Family Advocate or 
an ombudsman.728 
 
Furthermore, a National Board should be established, to review each proposed case 
of ‘saviour siblings’. This would include assessing the reasons why parents wish to 
create a ‘saviour sibling’, thereby preventing parents using the guise of a ‘saviour 
sibling’ to screen embryos for a particular gender or sex selection. This Board should 
consist of professionals in the fields of medicine and law. The HFEA, a National 
Board established in the United Kingdom, as part of its authority, reviews requests 
by various couples to create ‘saviour siblings’. As UK law provides the most detailed 
provisions on ‘saviour siblings’, South Africa would do well to follow a similar 
approach. 
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 S 28(2) of the Constitution. 
728
 The office of the Family Advocate was established primarily to help families resolve custody or 
maintenance arrangements that are in dispute, in order to finalise a settlement of divorce in the Court. 
As a recognised neutral person, the Family Advocate is able to determine what is in the best interests 
of the child and would be helpful in assisting a judge to determine which child’s best interests are 
more important. Likewise, the ombudsman, as a children’s rights advocate, would be able to 
represent the children independently from their parents in the Court, in addition to promoting their best 
interests. 
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Although the concept of ‘saviour siblings’ has yet to be introduced into South Africa, 
it is no longer a matter exclusively for the future. With funding secured, the Southern 
African Human Genome Project (SAGHP) will soon be established in South Africa. 
While still very much in its infancy, the potential long term benefits of this project 
include finding new ways to diagnose, treat and prevent numerous diseases.729 With 
this development, and the draft regulation law allowing PGD, it is only a matter of 
time before South Africa will begin to break “scientific” ground on this “new 
biotechnology”. In the words of Dr Yvonne Holt, as medical science advances, “this 
regenerative medicine will definitely be part of the future.”730 Therefore, South 
African law must continue to develop, otherwise it will be “in catch-up mode instead 
of shaping the expansion of the field.”731 If the law does not put in place regulatory 
provisions now, “law [will be] formed in response to the legal and ethical 
conundrums”, as opposed to putting in place provisions to address the potential legal 
and ethical conundrums.732 
 
6 4 ‘Benefactor children’733 
It is estimated that more than seven million babies are born each year with a genetic 
disease or congenital abnormality.734 In South Africa, reports have indicated that at 
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 The way in which the SAHGP will attempt to treat diseases in the long term could include using 
stem cells and tissue from siblings or children that are specifically screened to be an exact genetic or 
tissue match.  
730
 Dr Holt is the Medical Director of Netcells, a company in South Africa that provides storage for 
stem cells. Before South Africa welcomes this new biotechnology as a feasible treatment option, there 
are several problem areas which need to be addressed, the most pressing being irregular electricity 
supplies. If South African law should legalise ‘saviour siblings’, various clinics and laboratories will 
require a constant and uninterrupted supply of electricity. A steady supply of electricity is essential to 
keeping both embryos and cells alive and viable for transplant. In recent times, Eskom, South Africa’s 
electrical energy supplier, has experienced a number of equipment problems which have impacted on 
the consistency of the electricity it can supply. These problems will need to be fixed if we are to utilise 
this biotechnology effectively. 
731
 Lyerly “Test Tube Families: Why the Fertility Market needs Legal Regulation by N R Cahn” 2009 
(361) N Engl J Med 429 430.  
732
 Lyerly 2009 (361)N Engl J Med 430. Should South Africa fail to regulate this matter, it has the 
potential for the development of international medical tourism. International medical tourism is the 
term used to describe those persons who leave their country and go abroad to escape the regulatory 
provisions of their own country. Once the Whitakers’ request for permission to have a ‘saviour sibling’ 
in England was denied, the family went to the USA, to undergo the procedure. By going to the USA, 
they escaped the prohibitions of the law in the UK.  
733
 Benefactor is defined as “a person who supports or helps a person, institution, etc.” Collins Shorter 
English Dictionary 99. 
734
 Weatherall “The Inherited Diseases of Hemoglobin are an Emerging Global Health Burden” 2010 
Blood 4331 4331.   
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least 1 in 40 babies are born with a defect.735 Furthermore, there are over 150 000 
children born annually who are affected by a genetic defect requiring a medical 
intervention by the age of five.736 Not all of the defects and diseases that children 
present with can be cured through normal conventional treatment and there are 
some that are incurable. Other diseases however, are treatable only through the 
donation of tissue or organs.737 In situations requiring tissue or organ donations, the 
most likely suitable donor would be a family member. Where the donation is for a 
child, the most suitable donor would be a sibling. In the discussion above, emphasis 
was placed on the creation and use of ‘saviour siblings’. In this section of work, the 
discussion turns to the rights of a child who is a tissue match to an ill sibling, but who 
has not undergone PGD and HLA tissue typing to be a match.738 Put differently, this 
discussion will focus on the rights of children who fall within the 25% possibility of 
being a tissue match; that is, ‘benefactor children’. 
 
The possibility of finding a tissue match in a family is generally very slim. The 
chances of finding a match in a parent is as low as 1 in 8, with a slightly improved 
chance amongst siblings, who share a 1 in 4 chance of being exact tissue matches. 
That a child is both a tissue match and disease free (without having undergone the 
procedures discussed above) is quite remarkable, and the decision by a parent to 
use the tissue or organ from one sibling to save the life of another sibling can easily 
be understood. 
 
Within South African law, parents are able to consent to the medical treatment of or 
surgical operation on a child. This capacity to consent is, however, restricted to 
children under the age of twelve, due to the recent changes in law.739 As seen in 
Chapter 5, the newly operational section 129 of the Children’s Act states that parents 
of children under the age of twelve, have the right to consent to both the medical 
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 These numbers reflect the results available in 2001. More recent statistics could not be found. 
Refer to the Department of Health http://www.doh.gov.za/show.php?id=148 (accessed on 05-10-
2011). 
736
 Department of Health http://www.doh.gov.za/show.php?id=148. 
737
 These include Beta Thalassemia, Diamond Blackfan Anaemia and Fanconi’s Anaemia. 
738
 See Chapter 1 and the explanation of the procedure used to create a ‘saviour sibling’ above. 
739
 Refer to Chapter 5. In terms of the Children’s Act a uniform age of twelve has been set down as 
the age of consent, whereas the Child Care Act had imposed age limits of fourteen years for 
consenting to medical treatment and eighteen years for consenting to surgery. 
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treatment of and operations on their child/children.740 Section 129 can therefore be 
interpreted as providing parents with the authority to consent to the transplant of 
tissue or an organ from their healthy ‘benefactor child’ (under the age if twelve) to 
their child in need.  
 
Further supporting this right to consent is Regulation 3 of the Regulations Regarding 
the Use of Human DNA, RNA, Cultured Cells, Stem Cells, Blastomeres, Polar 
Bodies, Embryos, Embryonic Tissue and Small Tissue Biopsies for Diagnostic 
Testing, Health Research and Therapeutics, which allows a parent of a child under 
the age of twelve to consent to the removal of biological material for genetic testing. 
 
However, the newly operational sections 55 and 56 limit what can be removed from 
a child (both a ‘benefactor child’ and ‘saviour sibling’) and, therefore, limits a parent’s 
capacity to consent. As discussed above, section 55 requires the written consent of 
the person from whom the tissue or other products is being removed. As section 129 
of the Children’s Act specifically states that children under the age of twelve require 
parental consent, it is accepted that parental consent will be needed before blood, 
blood products or tissue may be removed from a ‘benefactor child’ under twelve.741 
 
Section 56 limits what procedures a parent may consent to as it states:  
 
“… the following tissue, blood, blood products or gametes may not be removed or 
withdrawn from a living person…tissue which is not replaceable by natural processes 
from a person younger than 18 years…”
742
 
 
This section is unfortunately confusing, as it is not clear what amounts to tissue 
which is not replaceable by natural process or, for what medical purpose this tissue 
may or may not be removed.743 Therefore, before a medical procedure can be 
                                                          
740
 Guardians are also capable of consenting to a child’s surgery. Children over twelve are able to 
make the decision themselves, but they must be duly assisted by a parent or guardian. There is a 
noticeable lack of provisions in international and regional law stating at what age a child is entitled to 
consent to medical treatment or surgery. All that is provided is that each child has the right to health 
and the right to participate in matters that affect them.  
741
 Refer back to Chapter 5 under heading 5 4 1 Existing national health framework. 
742
 S 56(2)(a)(ii) of the NHA. 
743
 Refer back to Chapter 5 under heading 5 4 1 Existing national health framework. See further the 
review of s 56 under the discussion on ‘saviour siblings’. 
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performed on a ‘benefactor child’, it will need to be determined if tissue that is being 
removed from a child under twelve is considered to be replaceable or non-
replaceable. Should tissue not be replaceable but be required to save a sick sibling, 
the Minister of Health may consent to its removal from a ‘benefactor child’, subject to 
any conditions that he or she wishes to impose.744 
 
Though a parent has the capacity to make decisions and consent to medical 
procedures on their child, he or she should not consent to a transplant from one child 
to another where there is an adult who is a match and is willing to be a donor.745 
Furthermore, while it can be assumed that any child would want to help a brother or 
sister, a parent should not consent to treatment or surgery on a ‘benefactor child’ 
under twelve where the likelihood of success is extremely low.746 The effects of the 
failure of the treatment or operation can be more detrimental to this child than the 
operation itself. It is only once all available options have been explored and, 
following a consideration of the views of the ‘benefactor child’, that parents can 
feasibly consider consenting to the proposed operation.747 
 
Should a ‘benefactor child’ express an objection to the proposed treatment or 
surgery to remove tissue or an organ, his or her parents need to respect this 
objection.748 Where a parent overrides a child’s (below twelve) refusal, it can be said 
that they fail to acknowledge that child as a source of wishes and fears and treat him 
or her as a mere means to an end.749 This amounts to a potential infringement of a 
child’s right to security in and control over their body. Furthermore, parents do not 
derive a right from their power to consent to deal with a child as they see fit.750 
Where a parent consents to an operation which will cause the ‘benefactor child’ to 
suffer from unnecessary harm or, where there is a risk of harm, all for the sake of the 
sick sibling, it can be viewed as placing the welfare of the one child over the other. 
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 S 56(2)(b) of the NHA. 
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 Ross, Thistlethwaite & the Committee on Bioethics “Minors as Living Solid-Organ Donors” 2008 
Pediatrics 454 456. 
746
 Ross et al 2008 Pediatrics 456. 
747
 Ross et al 2008 Pediatrics 456-457. See further ss 10 and 31 of the Children’s Act and art 12 of 
the UNCRC. 
748
 The NHA gives every person, including children, the right to refuse treatment or surgery. 
749
 Archard “Children’s Consent to Medical Treatment” in Ashcroft, Dawson, Draper & McMillan (eds) 
Principles of Health Care Ethics 2
nd
 ed (2007) 311 312. 
750
 Archard “Children’s Consent to Medical Treatment” in Principles of Health Care Ethics 315. 
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This can be seen as placing the welfare of the sick child over the welfare of the 
‘benefactor child’ and could be viewed as an infringement of the ‘benefactor child’s’ 
right to bodily integrity and section 28(2) of the Constitution. Again, this raises the 
question, where two children are involved, whose best interests are deemed to be 
more important?751 As no answer exists in law, the same suggestion as made under 
the discussion on ‘saviour siblings’ can be made here; that is, that the decision as to 
whether the proposed procedure takes place needs to be taken out of the hands of 
the parents and given to a neutral third party, such as a judge, with the assistance of 
a person such as the Family Advocate or ombudsman. 
 
The approach adopted by the court in the following Australian case of Re GWW v 
CMW752 may serve as a useful point of reference for South African courts with 
respect to children under the legal age for consenting to medical treatment or 
surgery.  
 
In this case, the Family Court sitting in Hobart had to decide whether the proposed 
medical procedure on a 10 year old child (B) in an attempt to save his maternal adult 
aunt (Mrs R), could be performed.753 Mrs R suffered from leukaemia and required a 
bone marrow transplant without which, her condition was terminal. Despite having 
her own young children as well as siblings and their spouses, it was only B who was 
a fully matched relative donor to Mrs R. As the procedure to be performed was not 
for the benefit of B but for a third party, Hannon J considered it necessary that B be a 
party to the proceedings and that he be represented separately as well, thereby 
ensuring B’s best interests were paramount at all times. 
 
As this particular case concerned the bodily integrity of a minor, the court considered 
other cases of a similar nature as a reference point. One such case referred to was 
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 The best interests of a child are of paramount importance in any matter. This is recognised by s 
28(2) of the Constitution and s 7 of the Children’s Act. 
752
 [1997] 21 Fam LR 612. 
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 B’s parents tried on numerous occasions to dissuade B from wanting to help his aunt but were 
unsuccessful. It is submitted that, as B’s parents felt differently to B, it was taken to the Court to 
decide what would be in the best interests of B. The facts of this case can be found in general in 
Hocking & Ryrstedt “The Perils of Terminology and the ‘Saviour Sibling’ Dilemma” in The Nexus of 
Law and Biology 9-11. 
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the British case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Health Authority,754 where it 
was held that a minor is capable of making a decision and consenting where there is 
sufficient understanding to fully understand what treatment is proposed.755 With this 
approach in mind, Mrs S a psychologist and expert witness testified that, although B 
understood what the procedure to remove bone marrow involved, his depth of 
understanding was not sufficient enough to consent to the procedure himself. As 
such, B was not what is termed “Gillick Competent”. To be “Gillick Competent” 
means that a child has “sufficient understanding and intelligence to understand the 
nature and implication[s] of the proposed treatment” and can therefore consent to 
medical treatment.756 
 
Again, because this case dealt with the bodily integrity of a minor, the court had to 
determine whether this amounted to a case which fell outside the scope of parental 
consent. It had to be determined whether this was a special case and a matter that 
the court had to decide, as a wrong decision could have potentially grave 
consequences on a child’s bodily integrity. It was decided that this was a special 
case and, therefore required an intervention by the court to protect the child. 
 
In coming to a decision, Hannon J considered the opinion of the expert witness, the 
views of B’s parents and the wishes of B.757 Hannon J also considered what was 
ultimately in the best interests of B, as the best interests of a child are of paramount 
importance.758 
 
The final decision of this case was that the procedure to remove bone marrow from 
B be authorised. Although this was a special case and the ultimate decision was 
taken away from B’s parents, they were authorised by Hannon J to consent to the 
procedure as well.759 
 
                                                          
754
 1986 AC 112 (HL). 
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 Refer back to Chapter 5 under heading 5 2 1 General principles and special protective measures 
of the Children’s Act as they relate to the health of children for more on the case of Gillick.  
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 Refer back to Chapter 5.  
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 Despite their efforts to dissuade B, B indicated to his parents on numerous occasions, that he 
wanted to help his aunt.  
758
 See s 28(2) of the Constitution.  
759
 See Hocking & Ryrstedt “The Perils of Terminology and the ‘Saviour Sibling’ Dilemma” in The 
Nexus of Law and Biology 11. 
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Whether this is necessarily the best approach to be followed by the South African 
courts is unclear. This approach is questionable, as it does not address and factor in 
the weight of influence that a parent may have on a child’s decision or opinion when 
it comes to donating tissue or organs. This approach does, however, provide some 
insight as to how the views and opinions of a child under the age of twelve must be 
considered, as well as how the courts can act as a neutral third party, acting in the 
best interests of the child.760 
 
6 5 Conclusion 
Recent scientific advances demand a careful consideration of legal and ethical 
issues. In this chapter, the focus of the discussion was on the legal implications 
associated with ‘benefactor children’ and ‘saviour siblings’ and what effect their 
purpose has on a child’s right to bodily integrity and autonomy. Although not born for 
the same reasons, both ‘benefactor children’ and ‘saviour siblings’ serve the same 
purpose, which is, to save the life of an ill sibling through the donation of tissue or 
organs.   
 
Following the recent implementation of new law into the South African legal 
framework, children over the age of twelve are recognised as having the capacity to 
consent in their own right to medical treatment or surgery.761 For those children 
under the age of twelve, their fate rests in the hands of their parents.762 This is 
potentially problematic in those instances where parents are so emotionally 
burdened by the illness of their one child, that they place the welfare of the sick child 
above that of the ‘benefactor child’ or ‘saviour sibling’. Whether this approach is 
correct is not clear, as the law does not stipulate which child’s best interests are 
more important, the sick child or the ‘benefactor child’/’saviour sibling’. Therefore, 
this is a matter that the courts will need to decide.  
 
Furthermore, allowing parents to make the ultimate decision with regard to medical 
treatment and surgery potentially limits a child’s rights to bodily integrity and 
autonomy. This is because the Constitution guarantees all persons the right to bodily 
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 In the course of Chapter 7 a list of recommendations based on the identified problems will be 
made. 
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 S 129(2) and (3) of the Children’s Act. 
762
 S 129(4) and (5) of the Children’s Act. 
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integrity and, as children are guaranteed all Constitutional rights, they are 
theoretically entitled to decide and control what happens to their body.763 However, 
children, especially young children (twelve years and younger), are considered to 
lack the maturity to make decisions of this nature.764 
 
To overcome these infringements, it is submitted that children under the age of 
twelve, (especially ‘benefactor children’ and ‘saviour siblings’) should be able either 
to participate in making the decision in regard to treatment or surgery, or, make the 
decision with the assistance of an outside neutral third party (for example the court 
with the assistance of a person such as the Family Advocate or ombudsman).765 
Furthermore, the combined approach of age and maturity used to determine capacity 
to consent, should be replaced by the mature approach. The mature approach 
recognises that children do not develop at the same pace and does not unduly 
restrict the autonomy of children below twelve. Finally, a National Board similar to 
the HFEA in the United Kingdom should be established, to review each proposed 
case of ‘saviour siblings’, thus ensuring that the embryo is treated with respect and 
that the welfare of “child to be” is a paramount consideration.   
 
Presently, South African society has not been overwhelmed by the concept of 
‘saviour siblings’, but there is evidence to suggest that ‘saviour siblings’ could soon 
be making the move from Europe, North America and Australia, to South Africa. With 
this in mind, South African law makers need to adopt a proactive approach and 
begin to draft and build on the legislation that is already in place. Whereas legislation 
pertaining to ‘saviour siblings’ needs to be enacted or amended, current legislation 
already recognises ‘benefactor children’.   
 
No matter what the future of South African law may hold with regard to ‘benefactor 
children’ and ‘saviour siblings’, it must be observed that: 
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 See Chapter 4 and s 28(2) of the Constitution.  
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 See Chapter 5. 
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 See Freeman as discussed in Chapter 4. See further Chapter 7 under the heading 
recommendations.  
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“[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are 
free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached 
the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.”
766
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CHAPTER 7 
The Constitutional Rights of ‘Benefactor Children’ and ‘Saviour Siblings’: 
Concluding Remarks 
 
At a time when an estimated 7 million children are born annually with defects or 
illnesses, it is reasonable to assume that, at some stage during their childhood, 
medical intervention will be sought.767 Medical intervention is generally sought by a 
parent or guardian on behalf of a child. For many children, the treatment sought is 
effective, with little to no side effects to the child. There are cases, however, where 
more intensive treatment is required. 
 
In this dissertation, it has been shown that, although still children, they are the bearer 
of rights. In fact, children are not only entitled to the rights in section 28 of the 
Constitution, but to all rights which may be applicable to them and which are 
contained in the Bill of Rights.768 This position is a far cry from that of the past. In 
previous years, children possessed very few rights and were often seen as less 
important than the broader, adult community.769 As South Africa became 
independent from its colonisers, the number and variety of rights that children 
acquired increased.770 It was only following the adoption of the IC that a more 
comprehensive standard of rights for children developed.771 Subsequent expansions 
to the section of rights for children took place following the adoption of the 
Constitution, resulting in the section of rights that children have today.772 
 
This dissertation focused on the Constitutional rights of ‘benefactor children’ and 
‘saviour siblings’ to bodily integrity and autonomy.773 The right to bodily integrity, as 
provided for by section 12(2) of the Constitution, includes the right to security in and 
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control over the body.774 Thus, theoretically, as holders of all rights, children in 
general have the right to control what happens to or what is done to their body. In 
other words, children have the right to consent to medical treatment and surgery.  
 
However, it was observed that although children have this right to decide in theory, it 
is actually a parent or guardian who makes a decision as to what is done to a 
child.775 A parent is responsible for consenting to medical treatment and/or surgical 
operations, as children are believed to lack the necessary capacity to consent. 
Furthermore, as parents have a duty to care, it is believed that they will generally act 
in the best interests of the child.776 Therefore, until recently, the position in South 
African law was that children below the age of fourteen were considered incapable of 
consenting to medical treatment or surgery.777 Moreover, the age required for 
consenting to surgery was eighteen years of age.778 
 
Recent developments in law have seen the age of consent for both medical 
treatment and surgical operations lowered to the uniform age of twelve.779 As such, 
children above the age of twelve, provided they are of sufficient maturity, are 
regarded as capable of consenting both to their own medical treatment without 
parental consent and to surgery, provided they are duly assisted by a parent or 
guardian.780 Children below the age of twelve, however, are not old enough to 
consent and therefore require parental consent before any medical treatment or 
surgical operation can be carried out.781 The lowering of the age limit to twelve years 
has been described as “a welcome recognition of children’s autonomy and evolving 
capacity.”782 
                                                          
774
 See s 12(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
775
 Chapter 5 and s 129 of the NHA.  
776
 Age restrictions are in place for the drinking of alcohol, smoking cigarettes and driving a car, to 
name a few. 
777
 S 28(1)(b) of the Constitution and s 1 of the Children’s Act. 
778
 S 39(4)(b) of the Child Care Act. 
779
 S 39(4)(a) of the Child Care Act. 
780
 Chapter 5. See the discussion under heading 5 2 1 General principles and special protective 
measures of the Children’s Act as they relate to the health of children. See further Review of the Child 
Care Act Discussion Paper 103 470 and Review of the Child Care Act Report 139. 
781
 See s 129 of the Children’s Act. Where a child is still young enough to be considered a child, yet 
has become a parent already, that child may consent to the treatment of their own child, but must still 
be duly assisted by a parent when consenting to surgery. See s 129(3) of the Children’s Act. See also 
Chapter 5. 
782
 See Sloth-Nielsen “Protection of Children” in Commentary on the Children’s Act 7-35. 
129 
 
That parents have the capacity to consent to medical treatment and surgery on 
behalf of a child who is under the age of twelve is potentially problematic in view of 
recent scientific advancements. This dissertation revealed that genetic research has 
developed to such an extent that scientists are now able to determine not only the 
gender of a child before birth but, if the child to be will be disease free and have the 
same tissue type as a member of family.783 This is a positive development in 
science, especially for those who desperately require a tissue or organ donation, but 
for which there is no available supply. This scientific advancement is termed ‘saviour 
sibling’. A ‘saviour sibling’ is a child who was conceived and selected as an embryo 
by his or her parents, specifically to be an organ or tissue donor for an ill sibling.784 
This recent development has, however, been met with great concern over the 
welfare of the ‘saviour sibling’ and regarding where this advancement is leading. 
Opposition to the concept of ‘saviour siblings’ includes the argument that this 
development is empowering doctors to “play God”, which could result in society 
heading down a “slippery slope” towards ‘designer babies’.785 
 
This dissertation also concentrated on children who, although not having undergone 
the procedures used to create a ‘saviour sibling’, are a match to a sick sibling.786  
These children were termed ‘benefactor children’ in that a sick sibling would be in a 
position to benefit from the donation of tissue or organs from a healthy, matching 
sibling. The crucial difference between ‘benefactor children’ and ‘saviour siblings’ is 
that ‘benefactor children’ were not conceived specifically to provide a medical 
solution to a sick sibling. These children became ‘benefactor children’ purely 
because they are a tissue match to the needy sibling.787 
 
While it is reasonable to expect parents to act in the best interests of their child, as 
they have a duty to care, this is not always guaranteed. This could be especially true 
in regard to ‘benefactor children’ and ‘saviour siblings’ when emotions run high and 
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the needs of a sick child tend to cloud perspective and cause parents not to act in 
the best interests of the potential donor child (‘benefactor child’ or ‘saviour sibling’). It 
is precisely these incidents where major concern is raised and the problems facing 
parents who have to consent to medical intervention on the part of their children, is 
highlighted.788 In such highly emotive and stressful situations the application of the 
best interests standard is uncertain. Therefore, this is a matter that the courts will 
need to decide.   
 
Failure to act in the best interests of a child constitutes an infringement of the 
provisions of international, regional and national law.789 South African case law that 
was referred to illustrate how the test has developed over time.790 Initially, the 
application of the test was restricted to mostly custody and maintenance cases but, 
since the introduction of the new Constitution, has extended to all areas, including 
health.791 
 
Although a child below twelve lacks the capacity to consent to treatment and 
surgery, there is a right to participate in the ultimate decision.792 The right to 
participate extends to matters of health.793 Failure to recognise this right amounts not 
only to an infringement of international, regional and national law, but has the 
potential to further compound the problem, and  causes children to be viewed as a 
commodity as opposed to a person.794 
 
While the main focus of this dissertation is on children’s rights, it must be understood 
and recognised that parents have rights too, such as the right to reproductive 
autonomy.795 Sometimes, as was seen in this dissertation, constitutional rights may 
compete with each other.796 In such cases, it is necessary that a court balance these 
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rights. A balancing of these rights requires that the best interests of the child be of 
paramount importance but, at the same time, recognises that the rights in the 
Constitution are mutually interdependent and interrelated and, therefore, one right 
cannot be seen to trump another.797 
 
While it may be inferred from the discussion on ‘saviour siblings’ that this is presently 
not an issue in South Africa, there is evidence to suggest that it could become one. 
The SAHGP is currently being established in South Africa, which has the propensity 
to make the way for ‘saviour siblings’.798Legislation does not expressly recognise 
‘saviour siblings’ and must therefore be enacted or amended, whereas current 
legislation already recognises ‘benefactor children’.799 
 
Therefore, South African law already needs to set in place provisions that will both 
guide and regulate the matter of ‘saviour siblings’, so as to prevent loopholes in the 
law or safeguard the law from becoming out-dated. This will require a consideration 
of foreign law, as international law is silent on the matter. Law and science need to 
develop together to avoid law being left behind and becoming stagnant.800 
 
Although having specifically focused on ‘benefactor children’ and ‘saviour siblings’, 
the problems that were identified in the course of this dissertation in regard to age 
and consent, face all children below the age of twelve. Therefore, the 
recommendations that are to follow affect all children and not merely ‘benefactor 
children’ and ‘saviour siblings’.   
 
Recommendations 
Through the course of this dissertation, several potential problems were identified. 
While in no way implying that the recommendations listed below represent all the 
possible answers or that they are necessarily the correct answers, they do offer 
possible solutions that could be implemented to address the identified problems.  
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The first recommendation is that a National Board needs to be established, to review 
each proposed case of ‘saviour siblings’. The Board should consist of professionals 
in the fields of medicine and law. By establishing a Board, its members will be able to 
review and asses the reasons why parents want to create a ‘saviour sibling’. At the 
same time, a National Board will prevent parents from using the guise of wanting to 
have a ‘saviour sibling’ to screen for embryos which are of the desired gender. Sex 
selection is strictly prohibited in international law and in the draft Regulations 
Regarding the Use of Human DNA, RNA, Cultured Cells, Stem Cells, Blastomeres, 
Polar Bodies, Embryos, Embryonic Tissue and Small Tissue Biopsies for Diagnostic 
Testing, Health Research and Therapeutics.   
 
A National Board has been established in England, in terms of legislation. The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority is responsible for licensing amongst 
other things, the creation of ‘saviour siblings’. Since English legislation provides the 
most detailed provisions on ‘saviour siblings’ and is the clearest, it is advisable that a 
similar approach be adopted in South Africa.   
 
The second recommendation is that a neutral third party/ies needs to be assigned to 
matters where parents wish to remove tissue or organs from a ‘benefactor child’ or 
‘saviour sibling’ in an effort to save a sick sibling. The law requires that the best 
interests of the child be of paramount importance in any matter, but it does not state 
how the test is to be applied when more than one child is involved and which child’s 
welfare is deemed to be more important. It was suggested that in highly emotive 
matters like this, the onus of decision making needs to be taken away from 
emotionally burdened parents and given to a neutral third party such as the court. As 
an impartial and unaffected party, a judge would be most suited to decide which 
child’s best interests are more important.  
 
Additional third parties, such as a family advocate or ombudsman, must also be 
assigned to matters of this nature, as they will provide unbiased representation of the 
children. An ombudsman is an advocate for children’s rights and ensures that the 
rights and welfare of children are given full consideration as well as promoting the 
best interests of the child. In view of the fact that the office of the family advocate is 
133 
 
very busy, it may be better for an office of the ombudsman to be established in South 
Africa at national level, as a designated ombudsman’s focus could be child specific.   
 
The third recommendation is that a register with the names of ‘saviour siblings’ 
needs to be drawn up. A register of ‘saviour siblings’ will allow the National Board to 
monitor the welfare of ‘saviour siblings’ and collect information that may be useful to 
future cases of ‘saviour siblings’, such as whether the initial techniques have any 
effects later in life.   
 
The fourth recommendation can be viewed as a contentious issue, in that it would 
see the current combined approach for capacity to consent (age and maturity) being 
replaced by the mature approach. As it is not clear whether the age of twelve is 
necessarily the correct age for consenting to medical intervention, adopting a mature 
approach may be more readily welcomed. The mature approach would make 
provision for children who are deemed mature enough to consent to their own 
treatment or surgery. The mature approach is cognisant of the fact that children 
develop mentally, physically and emotionally at different stages. Adopting a mature 
approach would remove the threat of unduly stunting a child’s ability to judge and to 
make decisions for themself.801 
 
The fifth recommendation relates to terminology. Through the course of this 
dissertation, it was observed that certain sections of South African law fail to define 
key terms. As a result, the lack of definitions led to vagueness and ambiguity and a 
lack of clear understanding of the provisions which ultimately affected the application 
of the law. Terms that need to be defined by legislation include medical treatment 
and surgical operations in section 129 of the Children’s Act.802 It was submitted that 
medical treatment is broad enough to include surgical operations. If this 
interpretation is to be accepted, it has potentially huge ramifications on parental 
consent. In other words, as medical treatment includes surgical operations, it will 
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render the need for parental assistance by a child over twelve, null and void. The 
interpretation of medical treatment however, has no bearing on whether a female 
child can consent to an abortion with or without parental consent. As was seen, 
section 129(1) of the Children’s Act states that the provisions of section 129 do not 
limit a child’s right to terminate a pregnancy.803 
 
Additional terms requiring clear definitions include medical and dental purposes in 
section 56 of the NHA. Although a regulation has been enacted, both the regulation 
and the NHA fail to define these terms, which has resulted in uncertainty as to the 
application of section 56.804 
 
The sixth recommendation is that children need to be made more aware of their 
rights. As the provisions of the Children’s Act are new, they are not widely known 
and this means that children are presumably unaware of their rights. To overcome 
this problem, it is recommended that initiatives be undertaken to educate all children 
and adults on the rights of children. Article 42 of the UNCRC requires that children 
and adults be made aware of their rights and, therefore, the same approach must be 
adopted into national law.     
 
The final recommendation is that legislation regulating ‘saviour siblings’ and other 
genetic research of this nature, should be enacted as soon as possible. The reason 
for such a recommendation is that law and science should develop at the same 
pace, to prevent law from becoming out-dated. There is evidence to suggest that 
‘saviour siblings’ could be a part of South Africa’s short-term future, necessitating the 
implementation of appropriate law now, thereby preventing future uncertainty and 
loopholes in the law pertaining to ‘saviour siblings’.805 
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